Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

Executive Secretariat Files, Lot 63–D351

Draft Report by the Department of State to the National Security Council ¹

top secret

[Washington, November 30, 1948.]

The Position of the United States With Respect to the Use of U.S. Military Power in Greece

the problem

1. To reconsider the position of the United States with respect to the use of U.S. military power in Greece, pursuant to paragraph 10 of NSC 5/4.²

analysis

2. Conclusions were reached in NSC 5/4, dated June 3, 1948, that “the United States should not now send armed forces to Greece as token forces or for military operations,” and that “if the situation in Greece should deteriorate and, in any event not later than November 1, the National Security Council should reconsider the problem.”

3. United States military and economic aid to Greece has been successful to the extent that it has prevented communist domination and control of Greece. On the other hand, the results achieved in 1948 will fall short of those envisaged in the appendix to the memorandum of the Secretary of National Defense annexed to NSC 5/4, which were stated as follows:

The United States program of assistance to Greece, now to be continued and strengthened, should result in overcoming the guerrilla efforts within the current calendar year provided the Soviet satellites and the USSR do not take active part with their armed forces.

The effect of a series of successful military offensives culminating in the Grammos operation of June–August on the Albanian frontier has been counterbalanced by the fact that several thousand guerrillas were able to escape from the Grammos into Albania and return to Greece and by the ability of the guerrillas further to recoup their manpower losses from reserves abroad and by recruiting within Greece. Thus the overall strategic situation remains substantially unchanged and there has been a marked deterioration of public order in the Peloponnesus.

4. The basic pattern of communist-instigated military action has remained unchanged, i.e. Greek guerrillas are used exclusively and there is no direct participation in military operations against Greece by the armed forces of the USSR or Greece’s three northern neighbors, apart from occasional minor frontier incursions, recurrent harassing fire from across the frontier against the Greek Army, supply by sea of guerrilla forces in regions removed from the frontier, satellite hospitality and assistance to guerrillas, and presumed operational direction exercised on non-Greek territory.

5. The United States assistance program to Greece has been continued and strengthened by equipping the Greek armed forces with American military supplies and equipment which is superior to that possessed by the guerrillas, feeding the Greek Army, provision of U.S. military operational advice, and an economic program for the benefit of the civil population of Greece.

6. The inadequate results have been due to:

a. the guerrilla ability to retreat to satellite territory for tactical moves, rest, hospitalization, rearming and regrouping;

b. the guerrilla ability to recoup manpower losses by drawing on reserves of Greek nationals outside Greece and by recruiting, forced or otherwise, within Greece which is facilitated by the economic distress and declining morale of the population;

c. the lack of sustained offensive spirit on the part of the regular Greek forces whose morale has been adversely affected by the seemingly endless nature of the struggle;

d. the inadequate training and mediocre military qualities of a good percentage of the GNA officers and men;

e. political interference with and lack of efficient centralized control in the leadership of the Greek national forces.

f. the continued courage and tenacity of the guerrillas, especially of the hard communist core;

g. the economic and political situation in Greece which, though improved, continues unsatisfactory due principally to insecurity on the frontiers and within Greece but in part also to shortcomings of the Greek authorities.

7. The satellite situation has been modified in theory and to some extent in practice as a result of the Tito–Cominform rift. Yugoslav subservience to the USSR has presumably been terminated, and Albania’s land communications with the Soviet bloc have presumably been rendered more difficult. Yugoslav material aid to the Greek guerrillas has apparently been somewhat reduced, owing to Yugoslavia’s need to conserve its own resources. On the other hand, Albanian logistic and tactical support of the guerrillas has actually increased. Yugoslav policy of supporting the guerrillas remains unchanged, the movement of guerrilla reserves from Yugoslavia into Greece has been facilitated, and the guerrillas continue to enjoy great tactical advantage from the virtually unhindered use of Yugoslav territory.

8. Although the USSR may have come to the realization that the guerrillas cannot dominate Greece by military action alone so long as U.S. aid continues, it derives great advantage, from its own narrow viewpoint, in maintaining Greece in turmoil and draining Greek and U.S. resources. The USSR undoubtedly counts on eventually exhausting Greek U.S. morale, bringing about the cessation of U.S. aid, and thereby winning Greece by default. There is thus no indication and no reason to believe that the USSR would permit any political settlement with Greece which would not result in or pave the way for communist domination of the country.

9. Employment in Greece of U.S. armed forces in adequate strength would, of course, help greatly in sealing the frontiers, in increasing the sense of internal security and the tempo of economic rehabilitation. It would be enthusiastically welcomed by Greece, would greatly hearten the opposition elements (the majority of the population) in Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, and might result in more circumspect behavior by their Governments. The reaction of the Yugoslav regime would be problematic, depending on whether Tito moves closer to the western orbit, returns to the Cominform fold, or disappears. The presence of U.S. troops in Greece in force could accelerate this diplomatic evolution, but it is impossible to say in what sense, since other factors will probably determine its direction. On the other hand, the probable or possible effects of employing U.S. armed forces in Greece must be carefully weighed in the light of our military capabilities, commitments and plans, and the overall world situation. Moreover, effective propaganda use would be made of the presence of U.S. combat troops in Greece by the USSR, which would doubtless adopt an attitude justifying it in the use of satellite or USSR forces against Greece should such action fit in with overall Soviet plans. Conceivably, the use of U.S. combat troops in Greece might be used as a pretext for the introduction of Soviet troops into Yugoslavia, or other satellites not now occupied by Russian forces, or for intensified USSR and satellite pressure and action in areas such as Trieste, Italy and Austria.

10. The Greek Government has repeatedly suggested to the United States Government the possibility of collective defense of Greece under the permissive authority of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The pertinent part of this article reads: “Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, …” In raising this question, the Greek Government undoubtedly has in mind the dispatch of armed forces of the United States and other friendly nations to assist in closing the northern frontiers of Greece against the assistance now being furnished by Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to the guerrillas. The Department of State is studying the question whether the activities of the three northern countries in support of the guerrillas would constitute legal justification for invoking Article 51.

conclusions

11. Developments in the Greek situation have not been of sufficient consequence to require alteration of the conclusion set forth in NSC 5/4, paragraph 9, or reconsideration of the general considerations set forth in paragraph 11.

12. The National Security Council should keep developments in Greece under continuing review.³

1. Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff as PPS/46.
2. Dated June 3, not printed; but see editorial note, p. 101.
3. The National Security Council, on January 10, 1949, approved the conclusions in this report (NSC Action 173, Executive Secretariat Files, Lot 66–D95).