Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

840.20/10–2648

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Satterthwaite) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

top secret

[Washington,] October 26, 1948.

Subject: Future United States Policy Toward Security of Nations Threatened by the USSR but not included in the Proposed North Atlantic Defense Arrangement

problem

While not aware of the details, this Office understands that negotiations are presently under way with Canada and the Brussels Pact countries for the conclusion of a close arrangement for mutual defense in accord with the provisions of the “Vandenberg Resolution”.¹ It is understood that the arrangement will probably be concluded, so far as the Executive Branch is concerned, within the next two or three months, and will become public knowledge. The relatively close association of the United States with certain states of western Europe under this arrangement will emphasize the lack of any special arrangement for the security of other states which are similarly threatened by the Soviet Union but which, by their geographic position, could not logically be included in the North Atlantic group. It seems essential that a decision be made regarding our policy toward the security of these states in the light of the North Atlantic arrangement.

background

[Here follow the first two paragraphs summarizing conversations with the Turkish Ambassador “last spring” and on July 21.]

Turkish officials have continued to raise this question throughout the summer and fall. They have also sounded out the British and French and possibly the Italian governments. It seems obvious that this insistent activity arises primarily from Turkey’s desire to assure itself of at least as close a relationship with the United States as that of any other nation similarly exposed, and from the Turkish understanding that the best, if not the only, way of achieving such relationship lies through participation in a regional group of the type envisaged by the “Vandenberg Resolution”.

No other nation in the NEA area has posed the same question to us in so direct and insistent a fashion, but the Greek Government has let us know it is thinking of a Greek-Turkish-Iranian pact (which would undoubtedly have as a major objective the achievement of some form of association with the United States), and the Iranian Ambassador has told us of exploratory conversations on the subject of a regional arrangement which he has had with the Turkish, Greek and Egyptian Ambassadors in Washington. It is probable that most of the free nations on the Soviet periphery will be anxious about their positions in the light of the growing involvement of the United States with Western Europe.

discussion

NEA believes that the fundamental question raised by the various approaches of the Turkish Government is extremely serious. So long as the United States has not committed itself to come to the defense of any one nation or group of nations, there is no fundamental difference between the expressed intentions of this country to assure the security of any one, as contrasted with any other, of the various friendly nations whose independence and integrity are threatened by the Soviet Union. The individual nations concerned may, and generally do, believe that we would come to their assistance if they were attacked, because of our friendship and because of the danger to us if any of them were over-run. Similarly, the Soviet Union cannot assume that it could attack any of the members of the United Nations located on its periphery without violent reaction on the part of the United States. However, if we made a close defensive arrangement with the Western European group, saying publicly that we will come to the assistance of those nations in the event of an attack upon them, and we fail to make a similar arrangement, or at least a similar declaration, with respect to other countries which are equally threatened and even less able to defend themselves, there will be a very strong implication that we have refrained from making such an arrangement or such a declaration because we would not be willing to go to the assistance of those states in the event of attack.

In our view, the immediate result would be to discourage, and perhaps force out of office, the political leaders in those countries who had favored the Western powers. In the weaker and more remote states, such as Iran, there could be a rapid reversal of policy and a scramble to appease the USSR, followed shortly by the appearance of a government which would be virtually a Soviet puppet. In states where this did not happen, the foundations of resistance to the Soviet Union would nevertheless be weakened, and the USSR would certainly be tempted to increase its pressure and perhaps even to use military force in the belief that it would have nothing to fear other than futile protests by the United States. Apart from the serious danger of war involved in developments of this kind, it is obvious that any further extension of Soviet power, whether by arms or by political means, would have the most disheartening effect on all the free nations of the world, including those of Western Europe.

NEA believes it is imperative that some formula be found under which all nations directly threatened by the Soviet Union and friendly to the Western powers may be given public assurances that their defense, is of as much concern to the United States as the defense of Western Europe. We do not consider that this would necessarily require a close mutual assistance pact of the type apparently contemplated for the North Atlantic region, nor that it would necessarily involve the provision of substantial amounts of military equipment to all the countries concerned. We fully realize the unwisdom and impossibility of attempting to create strong military forces in all nations which consider themselves threatened by the USSR. (Conversely, the Soviet Union cannot exert equally strong pressure along its entire periphery at the same time.) The essential thing, in our opinion, is to let it be known to the countries concerned and to the Soviet Union that an attack upon any one of them will be regarded by the United States as an attack on its own security and may be expected to produce a corresponding reaction.

The distinction to be drawn, in our thinking, between countries with which we may conclude formal mutual defense arrangements and others with which we do not wish to make such arrangements would seem to be that in the first case we are entering into arrangements which will produce defensive power, which will increase the overall military strength of the participants, whereas in the second case the weakness, remoteness, or lack of productive power of the foreign countries concerned would mean that no overall increase in military strength could be expected from a mutual defense arrangement. This distinction should not mean that we disinterest ourselves in those weaker, more remote nations. What is even more important, we should make it plain to the world that we have not disinterested ourselves in their fate and that an attack upon them would have as serious consequences for the aggressor as would an attack upon the nations with which we have made closer working arrangements.

In the absence of more precise information as to the exact nature of the arrangement contemplated for the North Atlantic group, NEA does not feel qualified to make specific recommendations as to the formula which might be used to reassure our friends and to warn our opponents. However, the three following alternatives are suggested for study:

(1) It is recalled that some months ago the National Security Council had under consideration draft policy papers on the position of the United States with regard to Iran and Turkey. These drafts included a proposal for a joint US–UK declaration to the effect that the two governments would consider that an armed attack on Greece, Turkey or Iran would affect their own national security and consequently would bring immediately into effect, so far as the two governments were concerned, the obligations imposed by the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and the right of collective self-defense provided by Article 51 of the UN Charter. It is suggested that the issuance of a declaration along these lines, preferably in even more direct language and applying to all nations whose security might be threatened by external aggression, might serve the purpose. Such a declaration should be issued simultaneously with any final announcement regarding the North Atlantic arrangement.

(2) Alternatively, in the case of certain countries, at least, it might be considered desirable to enter into association with additional regional groups, as suggested by the Turkish Government. Presumably, this would be desirable in all cases where it was considered that the existence of the regional group would in fact add to the political and military strength of the region concerned and hence to the security of the United States. We believe that this question should be given early and careful study. However, it may be that from a military point of view not all of the nations concerned could profitably be brought within the framework of such regional groups and directly associated with the United States in defense arrangements.

(3) Perhaps most effective of all, a declaration such as that suggested in Paragraph 1 above might be incorporated in the initial statement of principles of the North Atlantic association; this would not, of course, preclude separate declarations to the same effect by the United States or any of the other individual members of the association.

recommendations

It is recommended that the Policy Planning staff and other appropriate offices of the Department be asked promptly to consider the two questions raised above, namely: (a) the necessity of finding some means of making clear to both friendly and hostile governments that our association with the North Atlantic group does not mean that we have a lesser interest in the security of other threatened countries, and (b) whether this government should encourage the formation of additional regional defense groups with which the United States would associate itself under the terms of the “Vandenberg Resolution”.

Following such preliminary study in the Department as seems necessary, it is suggested that the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be obtained and that the question be referred to the National Security Council for final decision.

This should be done with sufficient speed to produce a definite decision by the time any announcement is made regarding the arrangements among the members of the North Atlantic group.

1. Passed by the Senate on June 11, 1948; for text, see volume iii, under Western European Union.