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Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
Just before my departure I had a private conversation with Ambassador Grady and got his expressions regarding several of the points that were at issue not only between the Greek Cabinet or the Royal [Page 162] House and the American Mission, but between the military authorities and the civil representatives of the Mission.
In the first place, Ambassador Grady said he was in accord with the recommendations of the military authorities that there be no reduction of the Greek Army this December and that on the contrary an increase of 15,000 was desirable.
I gave him my impressions of the conversations with the officials of the Greek Cabinet and with the King and the Queen, and with our own people, notably General Van Fleet, and with the British Ambassador, and particularly the British Military Commander. I expressed to him the feeling that a very determined effort should be made to get everybody “looking in the same direction”. I was referring immediately to the political leaders and the Royal House, and the American and British attitude toward some phases of this as related to military arrangements and military commanders. I thought some compromises were necessary; otherwise there would be a continuance of distracting pressures and resulting propaganda. It was quite impossible to secure perfection—far from it, but it was very necessary to secure a general feeling of confidence in the arrangements and the individuals largely concerned.
Ambassador Grady appeared to be in general agreement with me but felt that the pressures from the Royal House were ill-advised. At the same time he seemed to feel that the activities of the Cabinet were inadequate to the occasion. Certain members of his staff were pessimistic regarding the situation, but he depreciated this and I myself was not overly concerned by it. It seemed natural in the circumstances. All were in agreement that what Greece lacked, particularly as to the economic situation and in a political way regarding the military situation, was a spark of leadership. The only trouble was that no one had any practical suggestion about the spark. I even went so far as to suggest that if our American-Greek Skouras was sufficiently vigorous, clever and able to achieve the largest taxable income in the United States he might be an economic spark in Greece. This was not received with any favor but no alternatives were offered.1
- For the official statement on the visit of Secretary Marshall to Greece, see Department of State Bulletin, October 31, 1948, p. 561.↩