740.00119 Control (Germany)/12–1648: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France 1
us urgent
4820. For Jessup and Caffery. Present State–Army views re work of SC Experts Com follow. We are repeating this message Douglas with request he discuss these views with Bevin. If British agree with us, we would expect joint approach be made French either through Caffery or yourself, followed by informal discussions by you and ur Brit and Fr colleagues with such neutral members of SC as you feel most useful.
We believe work done by Experts Com on hypothesis of split city is most unlikely be fruitful. A single currency for two Berlins seems quite impracticable. Altho from strictly technical point view currency and trade arrangements might be designed which were adaptable to this situation, continued hostility and tension inherent in split city would almost certainly frustrate effective working of such arrangements. Furthermore, it seems most unlikely Soviets would lift blockade in exchange for currency and trade arrangements which left city split unless these arrangements were so completely one-sided as to expose Western half of split city to early strangulation.
Moreover, we feel work done on hypothesis of a united Berlin becoming more and more unrealistic since every indication past few weeks points to intent of Soviets to effect complete schism of Berlin. Any currency plan on thesis of united Berlin is therefore based on major assumption political action will reunite Berlin plus large number of minor but essential assumptions as to political and economic structure of union.
If Experts Committee in face of realities of split Berlin insists on proceeding to technical report they should concentrate upon preparation of recommendations as to most equitable arrangements for currency and trade in city in which unified municipal administration has been restored. Even in this approach Experts Corn’s report should recognize plan could receive proper consideration only after essential pre-condition of political unification had been achieved.
We suggest foregoing be called immediate attention of individual neutrals and be further impressed on Robertson as opportunity offers. They should also be warned again that Western powers may soon be forced go forward with currency changeover to protect their interests in Berlin.
Question remains of extent to which Western experts should participate between now and Dec 30 in formulation Experts Committee’s [Page 1280] recommendations. We understand Committee now envisages period active negotiations commencing early next week during which it would bargain with Western experts and with Soviet expert, and perhaps with both together, to work out an agreed compromise plan for submission by Dec 30. This procedure is based upon second (question and answer) portion of Bramuglia statement Nov 30.2 As you know, this portion of statement was never approved or even seen in advance by Western representatives, whose endorsement was confined to first portion of statement. Western experts, upon instructions, made statement at opening of Neutral Committee meetings emphasizing they were appearing on basis four numbered points in first part Bramuglia statement.
We see serious risks and disadvantages in accepting Committee’s contemplated procedure. Western experts can scarcely negotiate terms of plan with committee without committing their Govts, and we do not believe it feasible undertake definitive negotiations in this forum and in time available. Complexity of issues and need for coordination of views between Washington and Berlin and among Western Powers make such a course seem unrealistic. In view these considerations and necessity for a political settlement in Berlin as prerequisite to agreement upon technical arrangements, we believe only reasonable course action for Experts Com is to proceed through own deliberations to preparation of report for President of SC.
Committee has had from Western experts full presentation of problem and of Western views and interests, and is presumably receiving corresponding presentation from the Soviet expert. It is understandably anxious achieve compromise plan acceptable to both parties in dispute rather than some ideal technical solution. If our experts now embark upon definite negotiations with Committee they will find themselves under constant pressure make piecemeal concessions to Soviet viewpoint without knowledge of or regard for possible Soviet counter concessions. If they remain aloof, our bargaining position will be preserved and we may await with some confidence a report from the Committee (if one can be agreed upon there) which would steer some middle course between opposed views of parties to dispute. Only after report is submitted and after adequate analysis and coordination of views among Western powers, could we determine in light of then political circumstances whether report constitutes useful starting point for negotiations to be conducted through intermediation of the neutral group.