Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Germany and Austria, Volume II

740.00119 Control (Germany)/11–2648: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

top secret
us urgent
niact

Washington, November 28, 1948—8 p. m.

Gadel 602.¹ For Jessup and Bohlen, Eyes Only.

Para. 1. It was not our intent December 5 elections be cancelled or western powers take initiative in proposing postponement. We are fully aware of disastrous consequences this would produce in German reaction and Sov evaluation our determination to stay Berlin (Berlin’s 2816² and Deptel 1865³). What has been disturbing us is that basis upon which SC neutrals have been proceeding re currency might be different from that which would meet our requirements in event definitively split city administration resulted from December 5 elections. In other words we might be called upon to accept a currency arrangement premised on a uniform city administration which could damage our interests under different set of circumstances. Sov responsibility for splitting city and chain events justifying holding of elections western sectors clear. If you agree we feel that SC neutrals’ attention be flagged re implications present and pending events which are outrunning purely technical considerations.

Para. 2. It could be put this way. In accordance with Berlin constitution agreed four powers 1946 Germans are proceeding with elections called for after two year term. Sovs have repudiated agreement by refusing permit elections Sov Sector and so frustrating elections for whole city but Germans Western Sectors are going ahead in fulfillment their obligations. SC neutrals should take note that split city may result from Sov actions, and that if city split into two city administrations, the currency and trade plans which have been under consideration for implementation by a single city administration would become very difficult and without substantial modifications perhaps impossible. (See Clay’s CC 6896 repeated to you through MA today.⁴) Neutrals must be made aware of these new factors.

Para. 3. Element of possible definitive split city should impel urgent pressing forward of mediation efforts so that results become known earliest. With reference French approach urtel 6049,⁵ efforts should be made Paris by US and UK keep French in accord with election program emphasizing points raised above, particularly Western Govts must honor obligation assumed under Four Power agreement whereas Sovs are in default.⁶

Marshall

1. Repeated to Berlin as 1874.
2. November 26, p. 1268.
3. Not printed; for a summary of this telegram, see footnote 1 to telegram 2816, November 26, from Berlin, p. 1268.
4. Not printed; in it Clay stressed that it might be possible to use a single currency in a split city, but he was “… most doubtful if this could be accomplished under the terms of the Moscow agreement. In any event, it would require entirely different arrangements for customs inspections, trade licensing, etc., which under our proposals in Berlin meetings would be done by German officials, and many details which were agreed in our discussions with Sokolovsky would no longer be applicable. Thus, if in fact we are confronted with a split city then we must re-examine the kind of agreement which would make a single currency effective and, as necessary, modify the Moscow directive to permit such an agreement being reached.” (Department of Defense Files)
5. Not printed; it reported a communication from Schuman in which the French Government asked whether the Berlin City elections should be postponed pending a decision by the Security Council of the Berlin question (740.00119 Control (Germany)/11–2648).

6. In its next telegram (Gadel 603, November 28, to Paris, not printed) the Department of State transmitted the following instructions to Jessup and Bohlen:

   “If neutrals should suggest postponement elections until outcome present mediation effort becomes clear, we should indicate that we are in no position follow Soviet action repudiating past quadripartite agreement providing for this election, and should point out possibly disastrous effects on German population in Berlin of permitting Soviet unilateral action in their sector delay elections throughout city.… If neutrals should still insist in requesting delay, we consider their appeal should be to German City Administration rather than to Western Powers for specific delay of, say one week, with statement that unless Soviet has accepted neutrals’ proposed currency solution and also accepted a request by neutrals that elections be permitted throughout the city, neutrals consider that elections should proceed in Western Sectors on specific date, say December 12. Reason addressing City Administration aside from our reluctance to have any part in delaying election is tacit recognition this would give City Administration and Security Council approval of elections when held. However preceding two sentences purely for your background information and not for communication even to British and French. No commitment concerning delay even to this extent should be given without further consultation here.” (740.00119 Control (Germany)/11–2848)