740.00119 Control (Germany)/11–548
Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department of State (Bohlen) to the United States Deputy Representative on the Security Council (Jessup)
While I still feel that there is considerable danger in any attempt by the Secretary General, the six neutrals or other neutral commission to attempt to work out the Berlin currency question, I fully recognize that it would be difficult and probably unwise on your part to attempt to discourage any such further efforts on their part to find a settlement. However, if it becomes necessary for us to acquiesce in any neutral attempt to work out the currency question of Berlin, I feel it very important that we make clear to the Secretary General or members of a neutral body what in our view should be their terms of reference.
In this connection, I believe that every attempt should be made to exclude any specific reference to the August 30th directive1 as a guide. Not only do we all recognize that this document lost its validity as an agreement because of the failure of the Military Governors to work out the implementation but acceptance as a basis would operate as an obstacle or at best a harmful restriction on the ultimate settlement of [Page 1249] the currency question. If the August 30th directive is used as a guide there will be inevitably a repetition of the difference of interpretation placed upon that document so that far from dealing with realities of the currency situation in Berlin the dispute will center around the wording of the August 30th directive itself.
Since the problem in regard to the currency has remained unchanged since the introduction of two currencies in Berlin, it would appear preferable and much more fruitful to set forth the elements of the problem as a guide to the efforts of the neutrals to work out a practical solution. The main points are very simply as follows:
The Western Powers were prepared to accept the German mark of the Soviet Zone as the sole currency of Berlin provided its introduction and continued use in the city is under adequate four-power supervision.
There could be no legitimate grounds for Soviet objection to such a formulation of the problem to be considered by a neutral expert commission unless it is still the Soviet intention to deny adequate four-power control over the currency of Berlin.
This procedure would leave the Commission free to examine any type of practical implementation which would give effect to those two provisions.
The neutral experts would of course not be debarred in any way from utilizing any material in connection with this matter including the August 30th directive and the discussions of the Military Governors concerning it, but the directive should not specifically form part of their instructions as a controlling document.