Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Germany and Austria, Volume II

501.BC/10–2848

Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department of State (Bohlen) to the Deputy United States Representative on the Security Council (Jessup)

secret

Paris, October 16, 1948.

The following points concerning the US position on the Berlin matter might be made at this afternoon’s meeting, particularly to Mr. Parodi.¹

I. The United States has not and is not seeking a condemnation of Soviet actions in Berlin for its sake alone. In so far as US public opinion is concerned this is completely unnecessary since our people have been very solid in their own condemnation of the Russian actions as have been the public opinions of the democratic countries in general apart from the Communist minority.

Our objective has been and is the removal of the blockade.

The possibility of Security Council condemnation, however, might be a factor in inducing the Soviet Government to alter its position sufficiently to permit a settlement of the Berlin issue.

II. Our objection to the so-called conciliatory approach which carries the implication of concessions on both sides is that it will tend to stiffen rather than to render more reasonable the Soviet attitude.

III. We are not prepared, however, to accept a settlement which in effect involves surrender to the Soviet thesis that we have no rights in Berlin.

IV. In so far as question no. 2² in the Security Council is concerned, we consider it is of vital importance that the real cause of the breakdown of the negotiations be clearly stated, and that it is the conviction on the part of the three Western Powers that the Soviet Government was indeed using the blockade as an instrument of political pressure in order to force the three Western Powers to abandon their rights, duties and obligations as joint occupying powers in the city of Berlin.

It would be inaccurate and dangerous as well to attribute the cause of the breakdown to some difference of technical interpretation concerning currency, trade, inspection, etc.

We went to Moscow in large part to ascertain what purposes the Soviets had in mind in applying these restrictions. The first statement to Stalin of August 2 asked this question and informed the Soviet Government that if it was technical difficulties, they could be remedied; if it was the currency problem, it could be adjusted; and that if it was to bring about negotiations, the restrictions were unnecessary and in themselves created an obstacle to such negotiations. The statement added however that “if the purpose of these measures is an attempt to compel the three Governments to abandon their rights as occupying powers in Berlin, the Soviet Government will understand from what has been stated previously that such an attempt could not be allowed to succeed.”

As long as there was a possibility that these restrictions related to the problems created by the currencies in Berlin, the Western Powers were willing to negotiate. But when it became apparent as the negotiations progressed that the real Soviet intention was the one that Stalin had been informed was totally unacceptable to the Western Powers, the negotiations were obviously doomed to failure.

Let me briefly summarize the reasons why the Western Powers came to this conclusion:

1. Russian assertions during the discussions that we had no juridical rights in Berlin.

2. The refusal of the Russians, despite the appearance of agreement, to accept genuine four-power supervision over the currency of Berlin.

3. The attempts of the Russians to establish Soviet control over trade (which despite concessions in the October 3 note³ has by no means been settled) and over the commercial cargo and passenger traffic in the air corridors (in connection with the latter point, we know what the Soviet purpose is, as was stated by Marshal Sokolovsky, namely, to reduce air traffic in the corridor to the needs of the occupying forces only).

4. The Soviet inspired attempts, following the classic Communist pattern, to disrupt the existing municipal government of Berlin and to have its functions usurped by a Communist minority. This point, although not directly connected with the negotiations, is so important an indication of real Soviet intentions that it should not be neglected in any reply.

Any agreement concerning currency will have to be carried out by the municipal machinery of Berlin even under four-power supervision. If that municipal machinery has already been transformed into a Soviet-controlled entity four-power supervision is meaningless. The same situation would prevail if the municipal machinery of Berlin continued to be split in two as is the case at present.

Finally, the three Governments in their notes of September 22 and and 26/27⁴ to the Soviet Government expressly made the point that technical difficulties were not the cause of the failure of negotiations as the following quotes indicate:

1. Identic notes of September 22

“It is clear that the difficulties that have arisen in the attempts to arrive at practical arrangements which would restore normal conditions in Berlin derive not from technical matters but from a fundamental difference of views between the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France and the Soviet Government as to the rights and obligations of the occupying powers in Berlin, their right to have access by air, rail, water and road to Berlin and to participate in the administration of the affairs of the City of Berlin. The blockade imposed by the Soviet authorities together with other of their acts in Berlin are in violation of the rights of the three Western Occupying Powers.”

2. Identic notes of September 26/27

“The issue between the Soviet Government and the Western Occupying Powers is therefore not that of technical difficulties in communications nor that of reaching agreement upon the conditions for the regulation of the currency for Berlin. The issue is that the Soviet Government has clearly shown by its actions that it is attempting by illegal and coercive measures in disregard of its obligations to secure political objectives to which it is not entitled and which it could not achieve by peaceful means.”

3. Foregoing language also incorporated in identical notification from United States, United Kingdom and French Governments to Secretary-General of United Nations, September 29, 1948.

Charles E. Bohlen

1. The reference here is to one of a series of meetings of representatives of the three western powers to coordinate their actions with respect to the discussion of the Berlin question at the Security Council.
2. The reference here is to the second Bramuglia question to the occupying powers in Germany. See Delga 280, October 11, from Paris, p. 1216.
3. Ante, p. 1201.
4. Ante, p. 1180 and p. 1187.