Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Germany and Austria, Volume II

Policy Planning Staff Files: Lot 64 D 563: Box 29

Report by the Policy Planning Staff

top secret

Washington, October 1, 1948.

PPS 40

Berlin Airlift

The Problem:

1. To outline the course of action of the U.S. in the event of partial or complete interruption by the U.S.S.R. of the airlift to Berlin.

Comment:

2. It is assumed that the problem envisages interruption of the airlift as a result of varying forms of physical interference by the Russians with the movement of U.S. planes into or out of Berlin.

3. We are operating our planes into Berlin by right, and consequently any physical interference with that operation would be in violation of the Four-Power Agreement contained in the decision of the Allied Control Council of November 30, 1945 which established agreed air safety regulations. Such interferences also would be either a provocative or a hostile act on the part of the U.S.S.R.

4. The recommendations outline a general procedure only. Each specific case should be handled according to the nature of the possible interference and the circumstances under which it takes place.

Recommendations:

5. Whenever the Government of the U.S.S.R. or its representatives give notification to the U.S. and the other occupying powers of any intention to establish regulations or to take any other action inconsistent with the Four-Power Agreement, which would interfere with the operation of the airlift to Berlin, there should be an immediate and vigorous protest to the Soviet Commander-in-Chief in Berlin, as well as through the Air Safety Center in Berlin.

6. In the event of any physical provocative action, such as the buzzing of U.S. planes by Soviet planes, there should be immediate and vigorous protest to the Soviet Commander-in-Chief in Berlin, as well as through the Air Safety Center in Berlin. These protests should include a statement to the effect that the U.S. intends to continue the airlift operation in spite of such provocative action.

7. In the event of indirect mechanical interference to navigation through such means as jamming of radio control systems, smoke smudges, et cetera, there should be immediate and vigorous protest as outlined in paragraph 6; and these protests should include statements that the U.S. intends to continue the airlift operation, and will hold the U.S.S.R. responsible for the loss of any U.S. plane through such acts.

8. In the event that a U.S. plane is brought down by any act such as collision or firing in the air or by anti-aircraft fire from the ground the U.S. should immediately demand an explanation from the Government of the U.S.S.R. through the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and should include in its communication a warning that the U.S. may be forced to adopt defensive measures to protect U.S. planes against such acts.

9. If the U.S.S.R. denies that any act such as those referred to in paragraph 8 was a deliberate act, the U.S. should demand punishment of those guilty of the act, full compensation for the U.S. loss, and the adoption of measures by the U.S.S.R. to prevent a recurrence of such acts.

10. If the U.S.S.R. accepts responsibility for acts which may result in the further loss of U.S. planes, an immediate and full report should be made to Washington and necessary preparatory steps should be taken to put defensive measures into effect in the event that instructions to do so are sent from Washington. The U.S. Commander in Berlin should assume that there exists a grave risk of imminent war.

11. If there are repeated acts which result in the loss of U.S. planes and which the U.S.S.R. may claim to be accidental, the course of action outlined in paragraphs 8 and 9 should be followed and, in addition, an immediate report should be made to Washington outlining practicable defense action that might be taken against the U.S.S.R. forces within or over the air corridor and requesting instructions with respect to putting these defense measures into effect.

12. The airlift operation should be continued in spite of the interference envisaged in this paper, pending a further review of the situation by the National Security Council.

13. The U.S. should continue to work in closest cooperation with the U.K. and France and should seek their fullest support in all action to overcome interference with the airlift.

14. The U.S. should keep the U.N. fully informed regarding all incidents and developments in connection with the operation of the airlift.¹

1. The National Security Council considered this paper October 7, 14, and 21. At the meeting on the 14th it recommended that the President add 66 more C–54’s to the airlift and that steps be taken to secure aviation petroleum products and personnel for the increase. On October 22 the President approved and authorized these recommendations (Executive Secretariat Files).