Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Germany and Austria, Volume II

740.00119 Council/6–1848

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armour)

[Washington,] June 18, 1948.

Participants:	The Polish Ambassador1
	G—Mr. Armour
	EE—Mr. Elbrick

The Ambassador said that he had been instructed by his Government to deliver a note,² which he handed to me, setting forth the Polish Government’s views with respect to the recent six-power conference in London and protesting the decisions taken at that conference with respect to Germany.

The Ambassador said it was his Government’s view that decisions with respect to the treatment to be accorded Germany should only be taken in accordance with the procedure set up by the Potsdam Agreement. He did not mention the Soviet Union in this connection, but the implication was clear. He went on to say that the Polish protest was motivated, not only in the interest of achieving harmony under the terms of the Potsdam Agreement, but also because Poland is vitally interested in all matters affecting the future of Germany. He said that this interest springs from the long history of German aggression against Poland and is heightened by the fact that 6,000,000 Poles lost their lives as a result of the most recent aggression.

I told the Ambassador that it had been our hope to reach a solution of the German problem which would be mutually satisfactory to all the powers concerned, and I reminded him that this Government had made many efforts to achieve a harmony of views and a common ground for proceeding to the implementation of the Potsdam Agreement. I said that I thought this Government had been most patient in its effort to reach some understanding on this subject and I thought he should understand that it was only after the failure of repeated attempts to arrive at an understanding that we considered it necessary finally to take the action he was protesting.

The Ambassador said that the Polish Government feels that the security of Poland would not be properly safeguarded by the six-power decisions. He said that prior to World War II, Poland had been economically dependent upon Germany and that Poland had no desire to resume any such relationship in the future. He said that the Polish Government feels that unless efforts are made to minimize Germany’s economic potential, Germany will once again attempt a war of revenge. Also, he felt that despite our statement to the contrary, a certain priority was being given to Germany in the matter of economic reconstruction, and that this could only result in placing Poland once more in the position of an economic vassal to a resurgent Germany. He laid great stress on the fact that this represented the views of the Polish Government and the Polish people as a whole and should not be considered, as some were apt to do, as merely a reflection of the Soviet attitude.

I said that I thought that the Ambassador was inclined to overemphasize the effect of German industrial rehabilitation as envisaged by the six-power conference, and to underemphasize the industrial potential and progress of Poland. The plans of the Polish Government for expansion of Polish industry, augmented by the addition of a large German industrial area now being administered by Poland, have made it evident that Poland does not intend or expect to be dependent upon any power in the future. The Ambassador admitted this but said that if German industry is restored to 60 per cent of its prewar capacity, it will still make it impossible for Poland to compete and would once again reduce Poland to the status of an agricultural nation.

The Ambassador was reminded that it was not the policy of this Government, as stated in our note³ to the Polish Embassy regarding the level of industry in Germany, to give priority to the reconstruction of Germany over any European country. It is important, however, that German industry be permitted to play its proper role in the overall reconstruction of Europe. The Ambassador said that this was very well as far as Western Europe was concerned, but that he felt that Eastern European countries, particularly Poland, would suffer as a result. I said that I regretted that Poland had not seen fit to join the other European nations in their present recovery program, and that it had always been the hope of this Government that such rehabilitation of industry as may take place in Germany would serve the common interests of all European countries. The Ambassador said that it was obvious that Poland could not participate in a recovery program such as that proposed in as much as it was expressly directed against the Soviet Union. He said it was as unthinkable for Poland to do this as it would be for Cuba, for example, to take some similar action with respect to the United States.

Earlier in the conversation, when I asked him if Soviet actions in the Soviet Zone were not a cause for concern in Poland, the Ambassador replied quietly but emphatically in the negative. He said that the Soviet had continued to reduce German industrial potential but that, unfortunately for Poland, the greater part of German industry was located in the West.

I said that we would study the Polish note in the Department and that it would be brought to the attention of Secretary Marshall with a view to making a reply.

Norman Armour

1. Jozef Winiewicz.

2. For toe text of the note, dated June 18, see Poland, Germany and European Peace, p. 38. The Polish Government also sent similar notes to the French Government on June 17 (ibid., p. 43), to the United Kingdom Government on June 18 (ibid., p. 32), and to the Belgian, Netherlands, and Luxembourg Governments on June 18 (ibid., p. 47).

   On June 16, Major General Jakub Prawin, Chief of the Polish Military Mission in Germany, presented a similar communication (ibid., p. 48) to General Koenig, in the latter’s capacity as Chairman of the Allied Control Council for Germany for the month of June. General Koenig circulated the communication to Generals Clay and Robertson who refused to agree to have the matter made an item of the Council’s agenda unless instructed to do so by their governments. Telegram 1068, June 18, to Berlin, not printed, stated that the Department did not consider the Polish communication an appropriate subject for the Council’s agenda. (740.00119 Control (Germany)/6–1748)

3. In a note to Ambassador Winiewiez dated September 30, 1947, the Secretary of State rejected the interpretation placed by the Polish Government on the Revised Level of Industry Plan for the United States–United Kingdom zones of occupation in Germany and restated the position of the United States with respect to the plan. For the text of the note, see Germany, 1947–1949, p. 364, Department of State Bulletin, October 12, 1947, p. 742, or Carlyle, Documents on International Affairs, p. 636.