Office of the Historian

740.00119 Council/5–3148

Memorandum of Trans-Atlantic Telephone Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Saltzman)1

top secret
[Washington,] May 31, 1948.
Participants: Ambassador Douglas [in London] and Mr. Saltzman

Re our message 20032 having to do with the British and the U.S. telling the French at the end of the current conference that if because of the debate in the French Chamber or for some other reason the French withhold agreement on any papers, the U.S. and U.K. will together be compelled to proceed immediately with the bizonal area. Mr. Douglas said the British were willing to do this and it was his and their plan to tell this to the French as a matter of information rather than in a coercive manner. I agreed that this should be done.

Re London message 2360,3 and our message 20083 having to do with action by the Military Governors to submit the constitution for ratification, it was agreed with Mr. Douglas that we should have a clear but informal understanding with the British at this time that if the U.S. and U.K. Military Governors find that the constitution is acceptable, with the French dissenting, the U.S. and U.K. Military Governors will authorize the submission of the constitution for ratification, notwithstanding the French dissent.

Re London 23634 having to do with the question raised by the French as to steps which may be taken in the event of overt acts committed by the Soviets as a result of implementation of the general program. I told Mr. Douglas that we thought it undesirable to include in the report to the three governments the language suggested in 2363 because of its specific reference to overt acts committed by the Soviets and I agreed with him that it would be satisfactory to put in the report a statement to the effect that after acceptance of the program, the governments might jointly consult on all aspects of the situation that may result from announcement and implementation of [Page 302] the program. I suggested to him that he check this point with General Clay. It was his opinion that General Clay would agree with it as the latter recognizes there are certain aspects of this subject which are matters of governmental concern and information rather than his own.

Re London 23565 regarding reparations. I agreed with Mr. Douglas that it would not be objectionable to authorize the French to make a statement, in connection with the presentation of German recommendations to the Assembly, that allocations and deliveries of reparations to French will continue.

Re London 23616 relative to obtaining prompt approval of the program by this Government. Mr. Douglas pointed out in the telephone conversation the desirability of obtaining such approval before the French Assembly debate and said that if possible such approval ought to be obtained by this coming Friday, June 4th. I agreed to keep Ambassador Douglas informed of our progress in this respect.

Re our 20075 and the Communiqué in general. Mr. Douglas agreed with our suggestions in 2007 and stated that he would try to avoid all reference to ownership in the Communiqué if possible.

Re London 23627 relative to currency conversion. Mr. Douglas said that General Clay has told the French that we must proceed on schedule, without delay, but has not yet heard from the French. Mr. Douglas said that the British agree with us on this point, i.e., that we should proceed on schedule. He does not think this matter will affect the the satisfactory closing out of the conference, although he is not sure. He will cable us regarding any further developments in this respect.

Charles E. Saltzman
  1. This conversation began at 10 a. m., Washington time, May 31, 1948.↩
  2. Not printed, but see footnote 2 to telegram 2346, May 28, from London, p. 298.↩
  3. Neither printed.↩
  4. Neither printed.↩
  5. Dated May 30, not printed. It reported that in a private meeting with Douglas and Strang on the afternoon of May 30, Massigli had reiterated the French fear that the Soviet Union, as a result of the implementation of Conference decisions regarding Germany, might commit overtly hostile acts. Massigli wanted the Conference Report to include some American and British assurance of the steps to be taken should the Soviet Union act overtly. (740.00119 Council/5–3048)↩
  6. Not printed.↩
  7. Supra.↩
  8. Not printed.↩
  9. Not printed, but see footnote 1 to telegram 2002, May 29, to London, p. 905.↩