Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Germany and Austria, Volume II

740.00119 Control (Germany)/5–2148: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

secret
us urgent

Washington, May 26, 1948—7 p. m.

1821. Urtel 2724, May 21.¹ Please deliver to FonOff note along following lines, if you have no objections in light your latest conversations with Bidault:

US Govt received with surprise note delivered by FonOff to Am Ambassador, May 20, re London tripartite talks on Germany. US Govt notes that many issues raised in French communication are being dealt with in continuing discussions at London, but has following observations to make on several points:

1. It is not believed correct that the Germans have been reticent about the immediate constitution of a Govt in Western Germany. Eight Ministers President of Western German states have unanimously requested a constitution.

2. Vote in Hesse was local, with no national significance. It may be expected, however, that further stagnation of conditions in Germany and delay in governmental development will promote the revival of German nationalist elements.

3. London proposals do not involve five appeals to ballot box in less than year. Five questions involved could be resolved by two elections.

4. Reference to failure of London talks to make progress with respect to question of security against Germany must have been composed prior to receipt of report on security prepared by delegations May 20 which indicates marked progress.

US regards delay with respect to organization of federal government in Western Germany as fundamentally contrary to successful fulfillment of whole program formulated in London talks. Moreover, maximum German contribution to European recovery cannot be obtained without establishment of political organization of Western Germany. Delay would also be detrimental to desired process of integration Western Germany into Western Europe. So much publicity has been given exact details of proposed time-table that failure to proceed therewith would appear to Soviets as sign of weakness, and to other peoples, including Germans, as appeasement. US Govt not moved at all by desire to anticipate Soviet initiative. While appreciating French concern, US Govt does not believe that western nations can permit themselves to be deterred from actions they regard as right by consideration of possible Soviet objections.

US Govt hopes that French Govt will not permit substantial progress toward agreement achieved during talks to be endangered. US Govt believes that common interest lies in loyal pursuit of common objectives for Western Europe with respect to which prospective agreements of London talks on Germany are essential part.²

Sent Paris as 1821; repeated to London as 1931, and USPolAd Berlin as 928.

Marshall

1. Not printed; it transmitted the text of the French Foreign Ministry note of May 20. For substance of note, see footnote 2, p. 266.
2. In his telegram 2822, May 27, from Paris, not printed, Ambassador Caffery observed that since he had already delivered communications to Foreign Minister Bidault on May 25 and 26 in pursuance to earlier Department instructions, a further note would be a tactical error. Caffery instead proposed that he keep after Bidault and other Cabinet ministers and continue to drive home to them verbally the overall American views (740.00119 Council/5–2748). In telegram 1850, May 28, to Paris, not printed, the Department concurred in Ambassador Caffery’s suggestion (740.00119 Council/5–2848).