893.20 Missions/10–1547
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) to the Secretary of State
There is attached a “Memorandum for Mr. Ringwalt”, prepared by General Wedemeyer,71 in response to a tag from Mr. McWilliams of S/S indicating that you desired that Mr. Ringwalt obtain General Wedemeyer’s comments on an assessment made by General Lucas last June of the Army Advisory Group. It was General Lucas’ opinion that the Army Advisory Group should expand the scope of its activities so as to permit more active participation in the development of an effective Chinese Army, especially in the training of combat troops (Tab 1).
In his “Memorandum for Mr. Ringwalt”, General Wedemeyer expresses the view that if the Army Advisory Group is to be continued in China a clarifying directive should be dispatched at once to that Group removing current restrictions on the scope of its operations to permit activities such as those recommended by General Lucas, so designed, however, as to preclude direct involvement in civil war (Tab 2).
In the attached message (2253, 11 October 194772) (Tab 3), General Lucas outlined a training program which could be implemented realistically only if additional United States equipment were provided. He estimated that to train ten divisions successively in a center with a capacity for one division would require the following equipment:
- a.
- Equipment for one United States infantry division modified to suit Chinese needs.
- b.
- Sufficient ammunition for normal training of ten divisions.
- c.
- Major training aids.
General Lucas indicated ideal results would be achieved if divisions arriving at the center could be given United States equipment which they would later take with them into combat. This would require ten sets of divisional equipment plus ammunition for the United States weapons taken into combat.
General Lucas stated that present plans call for the establishment of a training center in Formosa, initially to be advised by twenty-five United States Army personnel. He estimated that twenty-two months would be required to deliver five trained divisions from such a center, that ten divisions could stabilize the military situation, but that additional divisions would be required to retake Manchuria. This program in his opinion would provide a morale boost to the Government but might produce a wave of anti-Americanism outside of Government circles.
In a letter to General Lucas dated October 9, 1947 the Embassy expressed the view that the proposed training program should not be considered on its own merits but rather in the light of our over-all policy toward China. The Embassy pointed out that the choice of Formosa as a training center was inadvisable from a political point of view. While agreeing that the implementation of such a program would provide a temporary morale boost to the Nanking Government, the Embassy felt that the same effect would be better created by limited economic support with much less unfavorable reaction outside official circles. In closing the Embassy stated that merely military measures by themselves would not induce any of the desired changes in the over-all situation (Tab 4).
Recommendation
In the light of the Embassy’s comments, and because of the difficulties inherent in supplying China with anything like the desired amount of equipment and ammunition, it is recommended that for the present the Army Advisory Group remain disassociated from the retraining of combat personnel, and that consideration be given instead to the practicability of more active participation by the Army Advisory Group in the rehabilitation of the Chinese Services of Supply.