893.20 Missions/10–1447: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 14—2:38 p.m.]
2070. Embassy understands from War Department’s 877078 to AAG that division training program is matter of interdepartmental consultation. [Page 894] AAG’s reply to this message (CYF 755) mentions that divisional training program was discussed with Embassy representative.
For Department’s information there is quoted below full text of letter dated October 9 from Ambassador to General Lucas:
“I have read with great interest the copy of radiogram 877078 from the Department of the Army enclosed with your letter of October 6, 1947. I am gratified to learn that this important matter is the subject of interdepartmental consultations in Washington.
Mr. Ludden has reported to me the nature of his talk with you and members of your staff on the morning of October 8. In general, I feel that the divisional training program, or for that matter the continuation of an American Army advisory group in China, cannot be considered as an individual problem, but is essentially an integral part of the overall question of how the United States can best assure its national interests and at the same time contribute to the emergence in China of conditions more acceptable to American political concepts than those now prevailing.
I realize that most of the questions posed in the Department of the Army’s radiogram under reference are military in nature and you are better qualified than I to answer them. However, I am sure you will agree that especially in circumstances now prevailing in China, any purely military program has important political and economic ramifications and that such a program must be examined in the light of these ramifications as well as on a purely technical basis.
Since the rebellion which occurred in Formosa during last February and March,70 I have felt that the plan of the Central Government to establish a training center there while political tensions continued was ill-advised. The stationing of American personnel at such a training center, although their direct involvement in any further insurrection against the government would be remote, could possibly be interpreted by the Formosan population as direct American support of a government which has been slow to make any adequate attempt to win the good will of the local population.
Specifically with regard to point “H” I believe that official reaction to the implementation of a divisional training program would be favorable and would offer at least a temporary morale boost to the present government. This morale effect in my opinion, however, could as well, perhaps better, be created by limited economic support, such as, commodity loans. On the other hand, reaction outside of official circles would undoubtedly be initially unfavorable even though largely inarticulate because of suppression of the press. This unfavorable reaction would continue and develop, perhaps into a wave of serious anti-Americanism, unless we had in mind and proceeded to implement an overall program which clearly indicated that we were not champions of the status quo.
Furthermore, it is my conclusion that the implementation of the contemplated military program would not have any significant effects, [Page 895] either favorable or adverse, with respect to beneficial reforms in the Chinese Governmental structure or to the effective implementation of the national mobilization order and continued procurement of necessary personnel. I am forced to this conclusion by the conviction that unless competent measures are taken by the Chinese Government to ameliorate current social and [apparent omission] organization purely military measures by themselves will not induce any of the desired changes in the overall situation.
I appreciate your offer to supply me with a copy of your reply to the message under reference.
Very sincerely yours.”