894A.00/4–2547: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 25—5:20 a.m.]
893. Civilian character of new Taiwan Govt, as indicated by first appointment, is a step forward as regards the susceptibilities of the Tiawanese. At same time, only effective means of handling present situation in island is believed to be a thorough-going reform, not only of the political structure but of economic policies and attitude of Chinese (in Nanking as well as Taipei) toward Taiwanese. Complementary to civilian rule will be the question of military structure, including importantly military personnel, which will be established. Appointment of Wei Tao-ming30 as governor is probably designed for its effect on the American public. Although there is nothing to indicate his appointment was made at instance of T. V. Soong, who had refusal of post, Wei is on good terms with Soong (and incidentally with the Kungs31). Wei is, of course a protégé of Wang Chunghui32 and as such can be considered as not unsympathetic to the Political Science group, whose man he succeeds.
It is still too easy [early?] to estimate possible effect of political turn-over, but order just issued by Executive Yuan for the creation of positions of Deputy Commissioner in all provincial departments “to familiarize Taiwanese with the Chinese Governmental System”, carries implication that political tutelage and economic subordination may be key to future Govt policy. Complete endorsement by the Generalissimo, as reported in press, of General Pai’s recommendations (listed in Embdesp 637, April 15) is not on its face encouraging.
The fairly complete change of governmental structure in Taiwan as a direct consequence of the rebellion there may now be considered as official admission of the failure of the previous regime. Unfortunately, Chen Yi was given the opportunity to remove from the scene some of the ablest and soundest of the native elements and to create a situation which will confront his successor with manifold difficulties which might have been avoided had the National Government itself moved wisely and promptly in the first days of the incident.
Sent Dept; repeated Taipei 27, April 25, 10 a.m.