894A.00/5–3147
Memorandum by the Vice Consul at Taipei (Kerr) to the Ambassador in China (Stuart)29
Wei Tao-ming’s prospects for success as civil Governor of Taiwan are conditioned by the influence he may be able to exercise over (a) the military, (b) the intricate and well entrenched bureaucracy developed under Chen Yi, and (c) the policies so far supported by the Central Government, which have led to this politico-economic crisis.
The major administrative problems within the next 6 months will probably center on food and commerce, military conscription of Formosan youth, and public health. The major external problems will be the task of convincing world opinion that genuine reforms [Page 456] are taking place and that Formosa should offer no cause for discussion at the projected peace settlement. Dr. Wei may be thought to be eminently suited to deal with any international problems involved in the projected transfer of the sovereignty of Taiwan from Japan to China.
The Military Problems
The new Governor must bring about the reduction of armed forces and army influence. The Chinese Army Headquarters at Nanking show unusual reluctance to reveal the extent of present military commitments on Taiwan. An Assistant Military Attaché (Colonel Dau) has made an informal and rough estimate that from 50,000 to 60,000 troops (sent in after March 7) may be engaged in “pacification”.
The presence of such large numbers of troops is in effect the military occupation of a hostile area; its psychological effect will tend to negate the Governor’s best efforts to win the confidence of Formosans and will stiffen opposition to mainland control of island affairs.
The economic pressure exerted by such a number will gravely affect economic revival. To the demands of the commissariat and the burden on transportation must be added a system of levies disguised as “gifts of food and other supplies offered by the citizens as tokens of their appreciation of the good conduct of the troops and the gendarmes during the quelling of the uprising.” Organizations of leading citizens in several urban centers have been formed to gather and deliver such token gifts.
The developing rice crisis in February had caused General Chen Yi to appoint his Chief of Staff, General Ko Yuan-feng as Chairman of the Food Commission. General Ko created an organization based on military force, which was prepared to meet the popular charge that the Army was in large part responsible for an apparent stripping of the island of its rice supplies. The Government counter-charged civilian hoarding and smuggling.
The enlarging participation of the military in civil administration under guise of civil appointments must be checked. As an example, the newly appointed Magistrate of Hsin Chu Hsien (Chou Chingchih), a Formosan Chinese (presumably a Hakka by birth) has been an Advisor to the Kwangtung and Kwangsi Military Command, a Counsellor in the Kwangtung Province Government and a Counsellor to General Chen Yi in Taiwan. The newly appointed Mayor of Taichung (Li Huei) is a former major-general, a graduate of the Japanese Military Academy and a cavalry officer. These appointments appear as civil appointments.
The proposed new military conscription of Formosan youths will [Page 457] create one of the new Governor’s most serious problems. The Army will demand the right to remove Formosan youths from the island; the public will continue hereafter to resist overseas conscription as it has in the past. A civil Governor will have to reconcile the issues.
Administrative Problems
It is too early to know if Dr. Wei’s services abroad—especially in the United States—will be played up locally to create an encouraging aura of liberalism. He will find it necessary in any case to convince people that he has a program broader and more informed than the one offered by General Pai on behalf of the Generalissimo. From the Formosan point of view the “inspections” of General Pai (on behalf of the Generalissimo) and of Commissioner Yang Liang-kung (on behalf of the Control Yuan) were not encouraging.
It is believed that the probabilities of Dr. Wei’s success can be gauged by his first changes in administrative officers. The principal architects of the state monopoly system which is choking the economy of Taiwan, impoverishing the Taiwanese and enriching the officeholders, their aides and adherents must be removed. These certainly include the present Commissioners of Finance, of Mining and Industry, of Agriculture and Forestry and of Communications. The Director of Public Health Administration must go if the public health services are to be rehabilitated in time to prevent grave epidemics in 1947.
The new Governor must at once demonstrate his reluctance to continue General Chen’s policy of protecting rascals from legal prosecution and of reinstating corrupt officials who had been impeached and in many instances convicted. Notorious examples were the release and reinstatement of Jen Wei-chun, former Director of the Monopoly Bureau and Yu Pai-chi, ex-Director of the Trading Bureau, both impeached by a special investigation commission sent from the mainland in 1946. (They are understood to have left the island, however, at the conclusion of the present disturbance.)
Personnel problems facing Dr. Wei include the disruption of organization through resignations of qualified mainlanders because of personal fear and sense of insecurity after the March riots. (A press campaign has been started to build up public tolerance for preferred treatment, salaries etc., for mainlanders in Government offices.) The Government payrolls must be freed of great numbers of salaries paid to mainland men on the books of enterprises operating far below former capacity or in actual suspension.
As for the creation of offices in Government to be occupied by Formosan Chinese, on paper it appears to have the advantage of admitting [Page 458] Formosans to a period of tutelage, of familiarity with administrative procedures at the highest levels. In practice, however, the Governor will have to avoid the past abuse, whereby Formosans in posts of nominal importance were occasionally “consulted” but were usually in fact ignored. The new Governor’s appointments will be scrutinized by the people for a clue to the sincerity of all reform efforts.
It must be assumed that those outstanding Formosans—men of practical private administrative or other experience—who have survived the purge of opposition which took place in March will be extremely reluctant to expose themselves to the mercies of a military-dominated Government which they mistrust or to the opprobrium of public association with it. It may be presumed that the Formosans who will step forward to take appointments, pending the time when widespread free elections are held, will be men with long and close past association with the mainland.
Policy Problems
In the economic field the new Governor will be expected to modify the all-inclusive state monopolies which are at the heart of Taiwan’s economic difficulties. Recent Taipei announcements appear to be intended to give the external impression that popular demands are being met. The publicized abolition of certain monopolies (including matches, camphor and liquor) appears designed merely to gloss over the real issue. These individual monopolies are not vital to the economy of the people, who have been demanding that the monopolistic policy of the Government be modified. The question is one of overall policy, not merely one of specific institutions.
The announced policy of tutelage in political and economic leadership will be watched closely to see if changes under Dr. Wei are substantial or merely formal extensions of unwanted, unwarranted and often inimical mainland management of local affairs.
Dr. Wei’s External Problems
In considering the effect of the announcement of Dr. Wei’s appointment in Washington, the authorities may well have considered his possible usefulness at the forthcoming conferences and peace settlement, at which time a man so well versed in international negotiation may be called upon to defend Chinese administration in Formosa. The impact of current American criticism may prepare the way for the Governor’s presence at the Conference.
- Prepared prior to Mr. Kerr’s departure April 28 from Nanking to return to Washington; copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in his despatch No. 771, May 31; received June 11.↩