893.00/9–647: Telegram
The Consul General at Changchun (Clubb) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 9—1:54 p.m.]
182. There are indications that Communist “sixth offensive” is about to begin. Offer following estimate of situation (see Consulate’s telegrams 179, August 29 and 181, 6th62).
Communists begin again after 2 months’ preparation. Probably all losses have been replaced and strength increased. Communists begin drive roughly 150 miles farther south than in May and possess the initiative.
With change of Nationalist leadership in Manchuria just effected, Nationalist command presumably is now imperfectly coordinated. Nationalist strength has been increased since end June by one identified army (number troops arrived unknown), perhaps by other troops as rumored, and by some local recruiting but considering Nationalist losses in fifth campaign they may only have brought strength to approximately that of beginning May. Nationalists are on defensive with weakened communications system and bad officer and troop morale.
It is evident that Nationalists are uncertain where Communist blow will fall but they purport to believe Communists will attack Ssuping south of which Nationalists have strong concentration. It must be assumed, however, that Communists will avoid main points Nationalist concentration at least in beginning stages of campaign except to create diversions in such areas to pin Nationalists down there. If May fighting is standard, this will take little Communist effort. Tentatively suggest that following would be logical sectors of Communist effort: (1) south of Kunchuling, now lightly held, to cut Changchun-Mukden highway and isolate Changchun garrisons; (2) Kirin, [Page 279] where troops are poor, with cutting of Changchun–Kirin railway by pincer movement and subsequent attempt to capture Kirin; (3) Fushun, fall of which would severely reduce Mukden’s already meager power and fuel supplies; (4) Peiping railway, by attack from Jehol supported by drive from Liaoyuan with latter Communist force striking in vicinity Sinmin, with secondary operation to cut communications between Mukden and Yingkow. It will be appreciated that although ultimate Communist aim of conquest is a constant factor, strategy is developed flexibly in action and equation contains many unknowns. This paragraph, therefore, is highly speculative and is offered only for possible suggestive value.
Sent Dept; repeated Nanking as 352, Peiping, Dairen. Mukden by mail.
- Neither printed.↩