Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Far East: China, Volume VII

893.00/9–447

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

No. 2016

London, September 4, 1947.
[Received September 15.]

Sir: 1. I have the honor to enclose, as of possible interest to the Department, copy of a memorandum of a conversation held by an Embassy officer on September 3, 1947, with General Chu Shih-ming, a high-ranking Chinese military officer who has just arrived in London from China.

2. The enclosed memorandum sets forth certain views expressed by General Chu on the situation in China.

3. General Chu is well known to Departmental officers as a Chinese of rare integrity and objectivity of thought. It is clear that General Chu has many reservations with regard to the competence of the Chinese Government under which he serves, but it is equally clear that he considers that Government—with all its admitted weaknesses—to [be] the only present alternative: i. e., a Chinese Communist Government subservient to the desires of the Soviet Union.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Everett F. Drumright

First Secretary of Embassy

[Enclosure]

Memorandum of Conversation, by the First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom (Drumright)

[London,] September 3, 1947.

Participants:	General Chu Shih-ming, former Chinese Military Attaché, Washington, former Chinese Member, Allied Control Council, Japan, et cetera
	Dr. Tuan Mao-lan, Chinese Minister, London
	Mr. Drumright

1. Dr. Tuan Mao-lan telephoned Mr. Drumright to say that General Chu Shih-ming had arrived in London and wished to discuss the China situation with Mr. Drumright. General Chu, Dr. Tuan and Mr. Drumright accordingly met the evening of September 3, 1947, and had a conversation lasting more than two hours. The highlights of the conversation were as follows:

2. Dr. Chiang Mon-lin, General Chu and other members of the Chinese delegation to the Institute of Pacific Relations Conference at Stratford-on-Avon had left Shanghai by air on August 24, 1947, flying via Hong Kong and India. General Chu proposed to travel from England to the United States after the conference. He tentatively proposed to remain in the United States about three months. General Chu omitted to reveal the purpose of his mission to the United States.

3. Military Situation in China. General Chu said that, generally speaking, the Government had made little progress in its campaign against the Communists. The Government’s campaign against the Communists had taken a favorable turn in Shantung just before his departure from China. But even in Shantung the Government forces had suffered several reverses and there had been four changes of commanders in recent months. Hsueh Yueh and Tang En-po were among the commanders who had been withdrawn from that front. The Generalissimo was pursuing a strategy of extended operations against the Communists in the hope of speedy victory. This strategy had not proved fruitful. The Generalissimo had not followed the blockading tactics employed in his Kiangsi campaign of 1934 because this method of operations was too slow and costly. General Chu had counseled against the Government’s plan to occupy Manchuria, but had been overruled. He considered the Government position there untenable and he, for his part, would urge withdrawal of Government forces to China Proper. But he thought that this would be a bitter pill for the Generalissimo and the Government to swallow and, moreover, withdrawal might severely impair confidence in the Government. He thought that the Government might compromise on the problem by withdrawing from extended positions at Kirin and Changchun. He said that he doubted whether the Generalissimo would waver in his determination to hold Mukden and the railway corridor to the south. General Chu said that he personally regarded Manchuria as a “shell” and reiterated his belief that the Government would be well advised to withdraw its forces completely therefrom. General Chu said that it was obvious that the Soviets had in various ways aided the Chinese Communists in Manchuria, and that he was astonished to find that there were western observers who went around saying there was “no evidence” of Soviet aid to the Chinese Communists. General Chu said that when he left China the Government was busy formulating a plan for the training of Chinese troops to be carried out at three centers, one of which would probably be in Taiwan. General Chu remarked that the American Military Advisory Group in China had contributed little to the training of Chinese forces, adding that the group was concentrated in Nanking and that General Lucas had virtually no access to the Generalissimo and that he rarely saw General Chen Cheng.

4. Position of Chinese Government. General Chu said that, contrary to reports commonly prevalent among western observers, there was no possibility of an imminent collapse of the Chinese Government. He said that, in his view, the Government could, even without external assistance, remain in power for another year. In expressing this view, General Chu said that he did not wish to minimize the seriousness of China’s plight. The economic situation was extremely critical. Inflation was an ever-growing canker which naturally produced corruption and inefficiency. The Government was still deriving 60 per cent of its revenue from the printing press, and the very great bulk of China’s expenditures went to the military machine. The fact was, General Chu observed, that China was far more exhausted by the war than Britain, France or even Italy, but it seemed that, as during the war, the United States was concentrating on the rehabilitation of Europe and leaving China to shift for herself.

5. The Generalissimo. General Chu said that the Generalissimo was as determined as ever to surmount the crisis enveloping China. He had been struggling with crisis after crisis since his rise to power, and he would not be daunted by the present one. The Generalissimo likened the present situation to the one which obtained in the earlier stages of the Sino-Japanese war, with the Soviets replacing Japan as the chief threat to China’s independence and integrity. The Generalissimo had carried on the struggle against the Japanese alone and at great odds, always counting on the fact that the United States would in the end come to China’s aid in her own interests. While the Generalissimo was now hurt and at a loss to understand the attitude of the United States, he was confident that in due course the United States would see the true significance of his struggle against Soviet aggression and again come to his assistance. Meantime, the Generalissimo would hang on grimly, shoring up the weaknesses of his Government as best he could.

6. The Wedemeyer Mission. General Chu was plainly reserved in his remarks about the Wedemeyer mission. He said that he had seen General Wedemeyer only once and had exchanged only a few remarks with him. He remarked that although General Wedemeyer had made some caustic remarks about China, he felt personally that General Wedemeyer would in the end recommend some sort of support to the National Government. In support of this observation, he said that he did not see, in the present posture of world affairs, just how General Wedemeyer could safely make any other recommendation. For any other course on the part of the United States would be the equivalent of an open invitation to the Soviets to march in (in the guise of their Chinese Communist comrades) and take over China. And however much the United States abhorred the weakness, inefficiency and corruption of the Chinese Government, he could not see the United States choosing the alternative course which would plainly be disastrous to its own interests and security.

7. Situation in the Southern Provinces. General Chu said that he was aware of reports of an imminent breakaway of Kwangtung and perhaps Kwangsi from the National Government. He went on to say that, based on his knowledge of the situation, there was no possibility of Kwangtung and Kwangsi seceding from the National Government. In this connection, General Chu explained that Li Chi-sen and those surrounding him were malcontents of long standing, and that they had no influence or power. As for General Chang Fa-kuei, the most powerful personality in the southern provinces, he was an intimate of General Chen Cheng’s and so long as that relationship existed there was no possibility of his abandoning Nanking.

8. The Chinese Communists. General Chu said that he felt there were now few observers of the Chinese situation who would deny the direct relationship existing between the Kremlin and the Chinese Communists. That relationship, he said, had become all too clear in the past two years to warrant any extended comment. General Chu then went on to make the interesting observation that the tie-up between Moscow and the Chinese Communists was the major factor militating against Communist domination of China. Had the Communists been a purely indigenous political grouping, they would by now have toppled the Chinese Government from power. But the bulk of the Chinese people sense the fatal link between the Kremlin and the Chinese Communists. While the Chinese people detest their present Government and long for another, they like even less the prospect of a Soviet-dominated Communist regime and are accordingly unwilling to support it. In discussing the Chinese Communists, General Chu also made the noteworthy observation that, contrary to most Communist fifth-column organizations, the Chinese Communists lack uniformity in the application of their policy to the areas controlled by them. In north Kiangsu, for example, their rule was most despotic and they accordingly alienated the sympathy and support of all classes of the populace. In Shantung, on the contrary, they have pursued a mild and beneficent administration and in consequence receive a good deal of support from the inhabitants. General Chu said he considered that however hard Mao Tse-tung tried to impose uniformity, China was too large and the Chinese (including the Communists) too individualistic to hew to an identic line of conduct.

9. The Institute of Pacific Relations Conference. General Chu said that the Chinese delegation recognized that in the discussions on China at the impending conference there would be many harsh things said about the Chinese Government, particularly by the fellow-travelling American delegation headed by Edward Carter and Owen Lattimore. While the Chinese delegates in discussions among themselves freely criticized the conduct of the Chinese Government, they would rise to a man to defend that Government against the attacks of outsiders. They were prepared for the worst and would in the conference reply item by item to the strictures of China’s detractors.

Everett F. Drumright