740.00119 PW/12–447
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Saltzman) to the Secretary of State, at London
Regarding the attached message to you from General Eisenhower (W–91489),85 I should recommend that, on the assumption that our time schedule for withdrawal is approximately the one indicated by [Page 870] General Eisenhower, it would be preferable for General Hodge to remain in Korea, since, in the normal course of events, he would be withdrawn by August or September of 1948 in any case.
I believe that General Hodge’s replacement at this time, no matter how favorably represented by us, would be considered a victory by extremist political elements in Korea, notably Syngman Rhee and his followers, who have been attacking General Hodge continuously. Although it has been generally felt for other reasons that General Hodge could be advantageously replaced, the situation can be expected to be reasonably satisfactory if he remains for another eight or nine months. The disadvantages of withdrawal under current conditions would outweigh the advantages. In view of General Hodge’s two year tenure, and the limited period remaining, there is insufficient justification for a change in command at this time.
The foregoing is based on the assumption that the time schedule indicated by General Eisenhower is the one presently visualized by the State Department. If you have serious doubt that our withdrawal will take place as scheduled, I believe it might be desirable to replace General Hodge despite the local disadvantages to which I have referred.
I have discussed this question with Colonel Byroade86 and Colonel Dupuy87 who concur in the views expressed above.