501.BB Korea/10–1447

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison) to the Secretary of State

secret

Subject: Chinese Position on United States Korean Resolution.

When Dr. Wang, the Chinese Foreign Minister, was handed a copy of the United States Korean Resolution on October 10, he raised two questions: (1) What effect the United States resolution had on the special responsibilities and position with regard to Korea of the Four Powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement; and (2) what action would the United States take should the Soviet Government decline to be guided by any United Nations resolution on Korea. Dr. Wang stated that he would be prepared to make further detailed comments on our resolution by the evening of October 14.

At a meeting in Assistant Secretary Saltzman’s office in the Department the afternoon of October 13, it was agreed that the points raised by Dr. Wang should be met as follows:

1.
The United States Resolution is a method of accomplishing the first step in the carrying out of the Moscow Agreement on Korea, namely the setting up of a Korean government, plus a provision for the mutual withdrawal of troops. The achievement of this objective as a result of recommendations in a United Nations resolution would not affect the responsibilities or special position of the Four Powers under the Moscow Agreement. These would remain the same, and after the setting up of a Korean Government it would still be for the Four Powers to decide how to exercise their continuing responsibilities under the Moscow Agreement in the light of all circumstances then obtaining.
2.
With regard to the action the United States might take in the event of a Soviet refusal to carry out the terms of a United Nations resolution, it was agreed that no final decision could be made until we know the manner of the Soviet refusal and that this question must [Page 832] be left open. However, it was agreed that the Chinese might be assured that the United States had no intention of carrying out a precipitous withdrawal of troops, leaving a vacuum behind.

It is recommended that should Dr. Wang raise the above points again in his conversation with you this evening, that you reply along the above lines.

J[ohn] M. A[llison]