895.01/10–1047
The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State
No. 109
Sir: I have the honor to enclose a policy outline, dated September 25, 1947,40 for the guidance of the South Korea Interim Government, which was, as stated at the beginning of the outline, “Unanimously adopted by the Korean Interim Government, and also unanimously adopted by the Joint Conference of Directors and Governors.”
The memorandum was presented to Lieutenant-General John R. Hodge on October 1, 1947 by Mr. Ahn Chai Hong, Civil Administrator, and Mr. Cho Pyung Ok (known as P.O. Chough), who is Director of the National Police Force and a prominent member of the Hankook Democratic Party, as well as a political associate of Dr. Syngman Rhee.
In presenting the memorandum to General Hodge, Mr. Ahn and Mr. Cho expressed the hope that General Hodge would select a small group of top-ranking American officers and advisers now in Seoul to serve with a corresponding group on the Korean side as a “Policy Advisory Group”, to study the policy outline and seek ways and means of implementing its practical and proper features. General Hodge and Brigadier-General Charles Helmick, the Acting Military Governor, favor the idea and, in due course, some such advisory group may be constituted if developments with respect to the problem of Korea at the United Nations do not take a turn which will render such action unnecessary.
It is understood that the preparation of this memorandum was largely the work of the Director of the National Police, Mr. Cho. The motive behind this development, which, although dated September 25, 1947, refers to the Soviet proposal for mutual withdrawal of troops, made on September 26, 1947, is self-protection against the [Page 830] threat of engulfment by radical forces of conservative Korean elements in the event of precipitate United States acceptance of the Soviet proposal. Mr. Ahn Chai Hong no doubt signed the memorandum in his capacity as presiding officer of the Korean Directorate (Cabinet) of SKIG rather than is [in] his personal capacity of “Number Two Man” (Dr. Kimm Kiu Sic is “Number One”) of the Coalition Committee, whose jealousy of the Hankook Democratic Party’s paramountcy in SKIG is well-known to the Department. Nevertheless, it can readily be seen that the Coalition Committee would approve in principle of the constructive, patriotic, pro-American, nonpartisan aspects of the paper. Since signing the policy memorandum, Mr. Ahn has handed another memorandum to General Hodge in which he shows his distrust of the rightists by suggesting (a) that the Civil Administrator be given broader powers than he now possesses, (b) that rightist excesses be curbed, and (c) that the police force take in more nonrightist members and be subjected to greater control by higher administrative authorities.
The essence of the memorandum seems to be contained in Section III, “The Urgency of Strengthening South Korea”, the recommendations in which coincide closely with the philosophy of Dr. Rhee, namely: (1) a separate South Korean Government in which the American commander “holds the sovereign power in South Korea” (see I–B of the memorandum, viz., an American quasi-protectorate), and which would be “the moving power for the unification of North and South Korea”; (2) arming of South Korea, including military training of students and all youth. Section IV also deals with concrete political measures: a purge of all anti-national, anti-American (this smacks of oriental toadying to might and is discounted) and anti-Communist [destructive?] elements; state propaganda and control of the press; suppression of terrorism.
Many of the foregoing measures could hardly be supported by the United States, especially those conflicting with basic democratic principles and with the spirit of part I, paragraph 5 a of SWNCC directive No. 176/29, July 23,1947,41 providing that, in broadening the basis for Korean participation in the administration of Southern Korea, qualified Koreans must be utilized by electoral processes wherever appropriate, and for appointive posts by selection from all political groups, having due regard to their proportionate strength.42 However, if nothing comes of the discussions at the UN, and the United States must perforce remain in occupancy of South Korea, it may be necessary to [Page 831] adopt some of those measures. For example, careful screening of Korean employees in government and public enterprises may have to be necessary, as members of component parties of the Communist dictated Democratic Peoples’ Front are frequently saboteurs of our efforts. To give an instance: it has recently been found that it was impossible to keep the street cars in Seoul operating until the South Korea Labor Party members had been removed from among the Company’s employees. As soon as they were removed, the number of street cars operating quickly rose from the 30’s to more than 100. The same improvement is now being worked out in the railway system.
Respectfully yours,