Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

867N.01/3–2847

The Department of State to the British Embassy

Washington, March 28, 1947.

Memorandum

palestine and the united nations

Following the conversation on March 20, 1947, at which time a memorandum dated March 18, 1947 with regard to Palestine and the United Nations was presented by the British Ambassador to the Acting Secretary, careful consideration has been given to the various points which have been raised and informal discussions have taken place between officers of the British Embassy and of the Department.

It is stated in the memorandum under reference that the British Government has already made it clear that it wishes the United Nations to make recommendations concerning the future government of Palestine and that in submitting the problem to the General Assembly the British Government had in mind simply to provide factual and historical material dealing with the administration of the country under the Mandate. The British Government, in the memorandum under reference, has raised the question whether the Department, in asking for a fuller definition of the part which the British Government wishes the United Nations to play, desires the British Government to make suggestions for procedure or for policy.

The United States Government is of the opinion that it would be extremely difficult for the United Nations to undertake to consider the problem of Palestine unless the United Nations was in receipt of some kind of a communication from the British Government containing its formulation of the problem. The position of the United States Government, in this latter respect, is that the British Government itself is in the best position to determine the nature of the formulation of the problem which it desires to present to the United Nations.

The position of the United States Government, with regard to the procedure in the United Nations, is that it is prepared to agree to any procedure for handling the problem which is clearly in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and which would appear to expedite such handling. The United States Government would, for example, be prepared to support what it has been given to understand was the original British proposal that a special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations be called for the purpose of appointing a committee to consider the Palestine question. Such committee could assemble, analyze and collate all pertinent available data; could study the various issues which appear to be involved; and could present the various alternative solutions of the problem, together with the committee’s recommendations concerning each alternative solution, to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The Department is of the opinion, with regard to the legal and other difficulties which it sees in the proposal for an ad hoc committee appointed by the Secretary General, that the appointment of a committee in this manner is neither sanctioned nor prohibited by the Charter of the United Nations. In view of this opinion, the Department feels that, if a committee were appointed in this manner, any work which it undertook or recommendations which it made to the General Assembly of the United Nations with regard to the delicate and complex problem of Palestine might be open to question and might have the effect of rendering a complicated problem more difficult.¹

1. During conversations between officers of the Department and the British Embassy on March 21, it was informally agreed that the Department would request the U.S. Delegation at the United Nations to obtain the comments of the Secretary General regarding a special session of the General Assembly for the purpose of creating an ad hoc committee. In telegram 105, March 22, 8 p. m., to New York, the Delegation was directed to approach the Secretary General along these lines (867N.01/3–1147).

   Herschel V. Johnson had informal discussions with Mr. Lie and reported in telegram 289, March 26, from New York, that the latter “thinks the best way to proceed is for Great Britain to request a special session of the Assembly. He will then immediately send out the notice to member nations and as soon as twenty-eight affirmative notes have been received, he will call a meeting to take place within a fortnight.” Mr. Lie noted further that he would be unable to limit additional items which might be placed on the agenda after a two-thirds vote of the Assembly (867N.01/3–2647).