891.00/12–2647
The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Acting Chief of the Division of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Jernegan)
Dear Jack: [Here follows a reference to Mr. Jernegan’s letters of December 41 and 9.]
First and foremost, it is important for us to know your thought that special legislation for Iran might not be out of the question. We have been completely in the dark on precisely this point, and I have often wished I could fly to Washington for half a day to find out. I knew it would probably do little good to put up a theoretical question to the Department, based on hypothetical assumptions, at least until the Persians made up their minds whether and in what form they wanted our help. I have often wondered, however, whether we were wasting our time here in many of the speculations and discussions we have held on the subject, for it has seemed to me quite possible that for one reason or another special legislation for Iran might be entirely out of the question. Your letter indicates that this might not be the case, so we can now proceed more intelligently. I am, of course, fully aware that yours is a personal expression of opinion, but at the same time it is [Page 997] extremely valuable, for if there were insuperable obstacles you would probably be aware of them.
In the second place, it is most useful to have your remarks regarding the comparative importance of Iran and Turkey and that the strategic importance of Iran is fully appreciated. You may feel that I should have known this all along, but without some indication, I could not be certain, in view of our military aid to Turkey and the difficulties we face here in connection with our arms credit proposals to Iran.
As for the best manner of assisting Iran, I am in very much the same frame of mind as you, which is to say, one of uncertainty. General Grow, whose opinion I value most highly and whom I regard as one of the most effective American officials I have seen in action abroad, feels strongly that I should recommend a fifty million dollar grant to Iran immediately, without further ado. Both the Shah and the Prime Minister have requested direct aid several times, as you have noted from our telegrams, and your letters seem to indicate that if the Embassy had recommended it strongly, without any equivocation, there might have been a chance of enactment. Yet I have assumed the responsibility of consistently and stubbornly, if you wish, declining to recommend it, and have insisted that an indication by the Majlis of a desire to receive our assistance is necessary. I have given the matter a great deal of thought, and have been constantly faced with the realization that I might be blocking consideration of a direct aid program to Iran. It is primarily for this reason that I have recommended that General Grow be called to Washington. I want him to express his views fully to everyone concerned there, for I want to be certain that his point of view gets an adequate hearing. Perhaps I am too hesitant in this matter. Perhaps, if Ed Wilson,2 for example, had followed the same policy as strictly in Turkey and had insisted on a request from the Turkish Parliament, no aid-to-Turkey program might have been enacted. I don’t know. At the same time, I remain convinced that we should require the Iranians to stand up and say clearly whether they want our assistance or not, before we make any further move. The best way I know to get a clear-cut expression is for the arms credit to go before the Majlis. I am well aware that the Majlis is not a representative body in our sense, and that a large number of extraneous considerations would enter a debate over purchase of American arms. However, the Majlis is the nearest thing to an expression of Iranian opinion there is, and we are on much safer grounds in sticking to our guns.
[Page 998]I have often been faced with the problem whether to continue to insist on democratic processes in Iran. One is frequently made aware here that Iran is not ready for full democracy and that, as the result of insisting on democratic processes in a country not ready for them, we often get more fraud, corruption, and self-seeking than we do good government. One is tempted by the thought that, although a dictatorship of the Reza Shah variety would be undesirable, perhaps a middle ground of a somewhat stronger government would be preferable to the chaotic and corrupt condition we now have. However, I have steadfastly resisted the temptation, and my own policy continues to be based firmly on support of democratic principles, no matter how badly they may be carried out in practice. The Shah sometimes uses cogent arguments with me on the subject, but I continue to argue for the ways of democracy.
The best way for Iran to become a decent democracy, it seems to me, is to work at it, through trial and error. I am not convinced by the genuinely held view of many people that democracy should be handed down gradually from above, even though Turkey is frequently cited as an example to the contrary.
[Here follow last four paragraphs dealing primarily with the visits of Congressmen to Iran.]
As ever,