Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

891.00/12–2247: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

secret

London, December 22, 1947—11 a. m.

6579. Asked to call by Pyman Embassy official was told December 18 that on December 17 FonOff telegraphed British Embassy Tehran (repeated Washington) its comments re Qavam explanation of his “anti-British references” in his two speeches (Embassy’s 6377, December 8¹). Embassy official was handed copy this telegram of which full text is being airgramed but which should now be available from British Embassy Tehran, Washington.

2. In substance FonOff describes Qavam’s statement [not?] “very satisfactory” because they are disparaging to AIOC and liable create impression contrary to facts that substantial modifications in concession are being sought thus stirring up anti-British feeling quite needlessly and in light statements Qavam or some other Prime Minister may well in due course argue that because expectations public opinion he must insist important modifications concession.

3. Re Bahrein telegram states Iranian Government knows very well HMG does not and will not recognize Iranian claim. “In seeking at this moment to raise this dormant question Qavam’s purpose appears to be to appease USSR by attacking HMG”.

4. Telegram continues that HMG does not expect or desire fulsome speeches in praise UK but feels entitled to ask Iranian Government “after all I have done to support Persia’s independence” not stir up anti-British feeling and to refrain from further public statements.

5. In paragraph which according Pyman, was added last moment following Qavam’s resignation² Le Rougetel is told to take early opportunity to inform his successor and to express hope successor will not follow Qavam’s example.

6. Telegram contains following paragraph: “I am asking American Embassy London to suggest to State Department that US Ambassador Tehran might speak Qavam about general undesirability of arousing feelings against HMG and in particular to press Iran Government not to raise their claim Bahrein”.

7. Pyman said purpose underlying FonOff telegram was to dissuade so far as possible Iranian Government from short sighted “bogus balance” policy (Embs 6346, December 5, paragraph 2³). While telegram necessarily deals with interests primarily British there is general question involved which on some future occasion might plague US interests. Consequently Pyman inquired whether USG might be willing instruct Ambassador Allen on some suitable occasion to bring home to Iranian Government in general terms that it does neither Iranian Government nor anyone else any good if Iranian Government takes [makes?] anti-British speeches and if in pursuit of equilibrium policy Iranian Government seeks out grievances to raise with HMG or any other government. Pyman said HMG would be “particularly grateful” if USG will try to discourage Iranian Government from raising Bahrein issue.⁴

8. Embassy official undertook to put question to Department but pointed out that Hekmat had been Prime Minister for scarcely 48 hours and that so far as is known has not formed Cabinet. Pyman said Le Rougetel has complete discretion as to timing and form representations and that he thought there was “no hurry”. He remarked that if USG should decide to instruct Ambassador Allen latter could pick effective moment after Le Rougetel has had his say.

9. Subsequent December 20 press record resignation Hekmat. Pyman’s old instructions still stand for Qavam’s successor whoever he may be and whenever he takes office.

Sent Department, repeated Tehran 101; Moscow by pouch.

Gallman

1. Not printed.
2. On December 10.
3. Not printed; it stated that “bogus balance” meant “that as soon as Iran gives USSR a kick it must deliver comparable kick to some other power—usually to HMG.” (891.00/12–547)
4. In telegram 805, December 24, 2 p. m., to Tehran, the Department stated: “In your discretion you may take appropriate occasion express informally view that Iranian Govt would be well-advised avoid public attacks on British Govt. You may also reiterate views previously expressed that Iranian claim to Bahrein unfounded and that pressing this claim could serve no useful purpose.” The message was repeated to London as No. 5357 (891.00/12–2247).