891.51/11–1847: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State
1129. Prime Minister Qavam asked me again yesterday in conference at his request (Embtel 1123, November 171) for free gift of arms. I asked him to state clearly basis for his request in order that there could be no misrepresentation of Iranian Government’s position in matter.
It was clear from Qavam’s hesitant and roundabout reply, not only that he had not thought out specific grounds for request but that he himself was not enthusiastic about it and was making it primarily because Shah wanted him to. He referred to necessity for careful wording of request to avoid giving Soviets additional cause for hostility and repeated that a good many Iranians themselves were opposed to strengthening Iranian Army under its present leadership.
I said if President Truman should ask Congress for special legislation to grant Iran’s request, President would have to be able to state whether Iran considered itself threatened with aggression. Qavam said he was afraid gift of arms by US might actually increase rather than reduce that threat. He added, however, in strictest confidence that he himself was primarily afraid of Iranian Army.
I said that before Embassy could take further action Iranian Government would have to decide what it wanted. I assured him that US was not pressing its arms on Iran and that if Iran declined them, we would still be friends.
I then said I had been thinking matter over a good deal and had come to personal conclusion that if Iran wanted arms from US, first step was for him to present our existing credit offer to Majlis for ratification as it stands, bringing subject out in open for full debate. I thought he could obtain ratification if he tried genuinely to do so. He could assure Majlis that since Iran must have an army he wished to [Page 980] obtain best equipment with money available; that Government had examined matter closely and found US offer only feasible means of obtaining arms vitally needed, with prices averaging 10% of cost; that matter was entirely commercial proposition, with no strings attached and involving no foreign domination; and that if any Majlis member could suggest better bargain Government would welcome it. Otherwise any vote against proposal would be direct vote against Iranian Army and the dignity and perhaps independence of Iran. I thought he should make question one of confidence and let his Government stand or fall by results.
I said foregoing would have advantage of following democratic process and could do more than anything else to heal breach in Iran between civil and military authorities. Qavam seemed impressed with idea although he referred to risk either that proposal might fail in Majlis or that, if it succeeded, army might use added strength improperly. I admitted risk involved but thought he might succeed in gaining confidence and support of Shah and army by this forthright move. Qavam said he would discuss subject in cabinet and talk with me further.
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I should add that most American military advisers here consider strategic position of Iran is so important to US that we should furnish essential military supplies to Iran free, in our own interest and regardless of any possible disposition of some Iranian politicians to question our motives. These advisors are disposed to regard request of Shah and Qavam for gift of arms as sufficient basis for Embassy’s referring request to Washington with favorable recommendations and without further delay. They think likelihood of pending arms credit being defeated in Majlis because of extraneous considerations such as opposition to Qavam, latter’s own lukewarmness, British influence, et cetera, is too great for US to take this risk in view of direct strategic American interest in strengthening this area.
I admit force of their argument. However, under present conditions I am unwilling to recommend that Department initiate any direct aid to Iran program as long as there is possibility that it might backfire. Our own interests, strategic as well as political, might be more harmed than helped by any substantial expression of opinion in Iran that we were forcing our arms on country. Open discussion of present arms credit in Majlis is best method of ascertaining extent of such opinion.
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