891.24/11–1047: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State
urgent
1091. During long conversation with Prime Minister yesterday concerning military credit, Qavam said there was opposition to credit in Majlis due to three reasons:
- 1.
- He said some deputies hesitate to strengthen Iran Army at present due to their distrust of Chief of Staff Razmara and to their fear that he might use army to establish military dictatorship.
- 2.
- Other deputies believe ratification by Majlis of US arms credit immediately after Majlis refusal of Soviet oil concession might further antagonize USSR and feel that in absence of definite guarantee of prompt US military support in case of hostilities with USSR it would not be prudent for Iran to give further grounds for Soviet belief that Iran had become base of operations by US directed against USSR.
- 3.
- Other deputies believe Iran cannot afford to devote large sum to armaments especially in foreign exchange when imports from America for economic and social development are so much needed.
I asked Qavam to tell me frankly what he wanted of US in this matter. He answered as frankly that he would like for US to furnish Iran the $25 million worth of arms without requesting repayment. I said I would be glad to transmit his request but wished him first to consider all the factors and consequences. His request, if granted, would require a special act of Congress. To justify such an act, President Truman would undoubtedly have to inform Congress that Iran, since refusal of Soviet oil proposals, had now come into an analogous position to Greece and Turkey. Did his Government want us to say that with the consequences it entailed? I added that the Shah had indicated to visiting American Senators recently that in his view, [Page 978] purpose of Iran and US would best be served by carrying out present arms credit arrangement with such liberalization as regards prices and repayment provision as might be possible without special US legislation.
Qavam commented in passing that decision whether Iran should ask US to consider Iran in category of Greece and Turkey was primary responsibility of the Government rather than Shah. He said Government would consider matter promptly. Meanwhile he wished we could extend Iranian army priority for two months from present expiration date of November 17.1 He felt confident situation would have clarified in that time.
I said that while we in Tehran could understand and appreciate Iran’s difficulties many officials in Washington would think Iran should state specifically whether it wanted our aid or not, since many other nations were clamoring for it. Qavam appealed to me to make Iran’s position clear to Washington and hoped the difficulties he faced would be understood there as well as here. He asked incidentally whether Iran Government would have to request our aid in writing and whether the Greek and Turk Governments had had to do so. I said I presumed they had and that I myself would recommend this requirement in case of Iran and every other nation. I said that while Iran admittedly was in an especially difficult position, I thought it was a problem which his and every other government seeking our aid would have to face squarely.
I recommend that Qavam’s request for two months extension of priority be granted.
As regards his request for gift of equipment, I presume Department will not wish to initiate action in this regard until further word is received from Iran Government. I should point out however that practically all members of Congress who have visited Iran this year have expressed belief that Iran is in same strategic category as Greece and Turkey and should be treated as such if Iran Government requests it and if President recommends it to Congress. Some of them notably Congressman Merrow have even seemed inclined to think that action should be initiated in Congress.
I am aware that there is some disposition in US War Dept to consider that our limited supplies can be utilized better in other countries than in effort to strengthen Iran Army. However, US military advisors here, Generals Grow and Schwarzkopf and Colonel Saxton, are unanimously of the view that relatively small sum for Iran would be most highly beneficial to American strategic interests at this time in enabling Iran forces to maintain in Tehran security thereby rendering [Page 979] Soviet intervention less likely and in enabling Iranians to carry out as effective delaying action as possible if aggression does occur. General Grow is recommending that high level US military delegation come to Iran promptly to consider this aspect of question.
Meanwhile Department’s thoughts on question raised in this telegram will be welcome.
- The actual expiration elate was November 26, 1947.↩