Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

501.BC Greece/8–747

Memorandum by the Acting Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Villard) to the Secretary of State

confidential

[Washington,] August 7, 1947.

Subject: Call of Mr. Constantine Tsaldaris, Greek Foreign Minister, on the Secretary.

discussion¹

Mr. Tsaldaris has been in this country for the past month ostensibly to conduct the Greek case in the Security Council. His visit was discouraged by our Ambassador in Athens who pointed out the importance we attached to Mr. Tsaldaris’ presence in Greece during the critical early stages of the American Aid Mission. Mr. Tsaldaris denied press rumors that he intended to discuss economic questions in Washington and stated that his trip was only in connection with the Greek case before the Security Council.

Nevertheless, Mr. Tsaldaris has talked extensively on many occasions with officers of the Department. It seems clear that one of his main purposes in coming to this country was with the hope of strengthening his own political position in Greece by taking back with him some tangible proof of this Government’s support of him. He has indicated frankly and somewhat ingenuously that he fears Greek public reaction if he should return without something to raise the morale of the people. Conditions in Greece, he states, are worse than they were two years ago and in spite of the Greek Government following U.S. advice about presenting its complaint to the Security Council rather than the General Assembly, the man in the street in Greece feels that nothing has been done for his country. Mr. Tsaldaris is discouraged at the inconclusiveness of the Security Council’s deliberations on the Greek case and seems to imply rather illogically that this Government should be able to get favorable decision from the Security Council within the next few days before his departure for Greece.

The proposed withdrawal of British troops and the recent decision of Mr. Griswold to approve no increase in Greek armed forces will have, Mr. Tsaldaris believes, a disastrous effect on Greece. He urges U.S. approval of an immediate increase in Greek armed forces and would like to request officially the replacement of British troops by American troops if he could be assured in advance that such a request would be acted upon favorably by the U.S. Government.

Mr. Tsaldaris has asked our views on the advisability of making overtures to Italy with the idea of arranging a Greco-Italian treaty of friendship. When it was indicated that we would be happy to see normal friendly relations restored between the two countries, Mr. Tsaldaris went further concerning possible suggestions of a security pact between the two countries involving the defense of the Straits of Otranto, perhaps with Valona in Greek hands. He also insisted that it would be very difficult for him to approach the Italians unless the U.S. Government was willing to take the initiative and indicate to Italy that we supported such a move.²

On the matter of broadening the Greek Government to include the only Parliamentary opposition party not now represented on the Cabinet, Mr. Tsaldaris has made it very clear that he considers such a move must inevitably result in the King’s requesting him as leader of the majority party to become Prime Minister.

In the attached memorandum from the Greek Embassy,³ Tab A, on which Mr. Tsaldaris hopes to base his talk with you, the above-mentioned items are listed with the additional proviso that the consideration of any broadening of the Greek Government should be postponed until three more urgent matters had been disposed of. Specifically,

(1) increase of Greek armed forces and/or replacement of British troops by “other contingents”;

(2) Security Council decision under Chapter 7; and

(3) U.S. support of Greece in efforts to undertake regional security pacts.

recommendations

In your talk with Mr. Tsaldaris the following points might be covered.

1 —Greek Case before the Security Council. This Government has strongly supported Greece throughout all of the Security Council discussions and intends to continue this ‘strong support until all possibilities of U.N. action have been exhausted. In this connection it may be pointed out that without the Balkan Investigating Commission, in the establishment and conduct of which the United States played a primary role, the Greek case against her northern neighbors would never have been made clear to the world at large. Although we realize the gravity of the situation in Greece, we are not unduly disturbed because no positive favorable action has yet emerged from Security Council discussions. It is our intention to keep the Greek case active before the Security Council and to take it on an urgent basis to the General Assembly if no satisfactory action has been taken before the meeting of this latter body.

2 —U.S. Aid to Greece. U.S. assistance to Greece during the war and since the war has been substantial. The President’s successful appeal to Congress for extraordinary aid has convinced the world and the Greek people of our interest in Greece. The presence of the American Mission in Greece with its plans for military and economic assistance and for reconstruction are tangible proof of U.S. interest and the effects, we hope, will soon be evident in improved conditions.

3 —Military Considerations. Although the withdrawal of British troops would of course have a very serious effect on morale in Greece, it is not at all certain that those troops will be withdrawn in the very near future. The British economic crisis necessitates the decrease of forces overseas and it may be that in a general reduction the troops in Greece will remain until such time as other factors will operate to offset their withdrawal. As for any approval of an increase in the Greek armed forces, Mr. Griswold’s Mission includes competent technical advisors who are in close touch with the Greek General Staff and other competent officers in Greece. Any decisions concerning supplying, equipping, and training of Greek armed forces or of their size, must be made on the basis of recommendations in Greece.

4 —Broadening of the Greek Government. It is well-known that this Government has welcomed the formation of the present coalition cabinet under the non-political premiership of Mr. Maximos and was hopeful at that time that an even broader coalition would result which would represent all loyal Parliamentary parties in the Parliament. It is our view that in Greece’s present critical situation a cabinet crisis should be averted at all costs but that a broadened government, including all loyal opposition parties represented in Parliament, would demonstrate to the world that Greek political leaders are able to cooperate with patriotic unity at a time when the independence of Greece is seriously threatened. In the hope that such unity may be achieved, it is our intention to issue, after this interview, a press statement, Tab B.⁴

5 —Regional Security Pacts. The U.S. Government would be happy to see friendly and normal relations established between Greece and her neighbors. Any negotiations for such purposes are, of course, decisions for the Greek Government to make.

concurrences

A/A—Mr. Armour

EUR

1. According to a memorandum of conversation of August 6 by William O. Baxter of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, the matters treated in this discussion had been reviewed with Mr. Tsaldaris by Messrs. Armour and Villard that day (868.00/8–647).
2. Mr. Armour had informed Mr. Tsaldaris, in their conversation on August 6, of “our belief that, though the reestablishment of normal friendly relations [between Greece and Italy] were desirable, it would hardly be appropriate for this Government to concern itself actively with any such negotiations.”
3. No. 5807, August 6, not printed.
4. Copy not found attached to the source text.