868.00/8–547: Telegram
The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State
1293. After discussion with Griswold, I would respectfully submit following in regard to political suggestion in paragraph 3 of his telegram 47, today’s date (my telegram 1291, August 5).
I feel, as Department knows, that every non-interventional influence at our disposal should be used to secure greater political unity here [Page 281] during period of national emergency while we ourselves actively endeavoring preserve Greek integrity and independence. Have been hoping and still hope that influence of AMAG’s presence and operations here may eventually bring Greeks to realize that working successfully with us requires greater unity among themselves. Should we decide replace British troops, believe this could not fail to help Greek politicians realize utter dependence of this country on us and necessity of cooperating with us.
On other hand, Department may wish to consider whether it can afford to make decision to send troops contingent on prior agreement of Greek politicians to broaden Government. As I see it, such decision must necessarily rest in last analysis on considerations far transcending Greek internal problems and involving indeed our whole Near Eastern policy. Furthermore, Greek politicians thoroughly understand this situation and are therefore only too likely to discount threatened sanctions and take their time about uniting, if they do so at all.
Consequently, while providing military assistance might very well strengthen our position here as regards gradually influencing Greeks to improve Government (see Secretary’s top secret letter of instructions to Griswold of July 11), perhaps we should be careful not put into hands of Greek political leaders any possibility of preventing or delaying a decision vital to ourselves.