841.24568/8–147: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin)1

top secret

I am very much concerned at the communication I received through your Embassy here on July 30 regarding the intention of the British [Page 274] Government to withdraw your troops from Greece and reduce those in Italy to the 5,000 provided for Trieste. It is true that in the case of Greece we were made aware last spring of your intention progressively to withdraw your forces during this summer and autumn, but we are concerned at your decision to implement this intention in the light of recent developments affecting Greece. I feel that the decision was made at a most harmful time and that such abrupt action makes cooperation unnecessarily difficult. In the case of Italy the news came as a complete surprise and indeed is in contradiction to the understanding approved as late as May 20 by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to provide SACMed forces he deemed necessary to carry out his mission. I must point out that we are by no means certain exactly when the Italian Treaty will enter into force and that until it does there is a joint UK–US responsibility for the maintenance of the status quo established by the Morgan line.2 Quite apart from these immediate considerations as important as they are, I am still more disturbed at the possible implications of this decision as to future British policy. Because of the importance I attach to the maintenance of the present intimate relationship between our Governments, I am asking Douglas to give you in complete frankness our feelings on this matter and I hope you will be equally frank with him.

Marshall
  1. Transmitted to London as telegram 3305, with the statement: “Top Secret for eyes only of the Ambassador. Please deliver the following message from me to Bevin.”
  2. This line, drawn in 1945, defined the portions of Venezia Giulia to be administered by the Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean Theater and by Yugoslav forces. For further documentation on this subject, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. iv, pp. 1103 ff.