868.00/8–147: Telegram
Governor Dwight P. Griswold to the Secretary of State
top secret
Athens, August 1,
1947—4 p. m.
1268. Amag 41 to McGhee from Griswold. ReGama 29.1 Factors considered in making decisions outlined in Amag 212 follow:
- 1.
- Estimate based on Greek Army being designed as anti-bandit force only, not capable of action against any large scale invasion.
- 2.
- Many infantry battalions fight in much below authorized and listed strength, causing low combat efficiency.
- 3.
- All available strength not being utilized for combat. About 40 companies specially trained as commando fighters in mountains are not being effectively engaged against bandits.
- 4.
- Additional trained strength would be useful but to form new units would further dilute combat units by withdrawing cadres for organization and training. New units could not influence campaign against bandits before winter. Believe immediate effective results only possible by better utilization of present strength. Greek General Staff has been informed these shortcomings and three-day conference their high command ended last night at which they discussed these matters.
- 5.
- Estimated cost of requested increase in Greek Army would render ineffective our economic aid which can be used to drain away Greek recruitment pool for bandits.
- 6.
- Adhere to conclusion Greek Army sufficient in size to cope with bandits and action is being taken to make Greek general staff realistic so that they will make better use of army strength.
- 7.
- Any large scale invasion which would necessarily involve use of foreign troops would create condition beyond hope of settlement through use of mission funds. Indications however are that present bandit fighting in Greece being conducted only by Greeks.
Above conclusions concurred in by Livesay, Snackenberg,3 British Military Mission and by Embassy Military Staff including Col. Miller who is just returned from fighting area.
MacVeagh