Office of the Historian

740.0011 EW (Peace)/7–1447: Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State

secret
niact
us urgent
Rome, July 14, 1947—6 p. m.

1944. Personal for Secretary Marshall from Harriman.1 Dunn and I saw the President, De Nicola,2 this morning and later De Gasperi. Both of them talked at great length about difficulty of obtaining ratification of peace treaty by General Assembly at this moment. Each explained there was no doubt of a majority being in favor of eventual ratification but that first vote would be on whether to consider immediate ratification or postponement. On this it appeared vote would go against the government. De Gasperi told us Soviet Ambassador3 had recently stated Soviet Government would not ratify treaty at present time giving no explanation as to the reasons.4 In meantime Communists are spreading propaganda to the effect that Russia intends to offer more liberal territorial terms. In this atmosphere there are a number of the assembly who question for internal political reasons the wisdom of Italian ratification until Russia has done so.

De Gasperi is ready to force a vote if British and we insist but indicates there is a real chance of adverse vote in which event his government will be compelled to resign.

Bevin, in forceful terms, told Sforza in Paris that he would insist upon prompt ratification.

[Page 554]

Of course, I am not familiar with other side of question but from Rome it would appear a serious risk for us to force the Italian Government to vote at this time particularly as Italian ratification is of no substantive value without Russian action. The wisest course would seem to inform De Gasperi that we of course want earliest ratification possible but would leave to him whether now is right moment to press it.

If this course is decided upon I would suggest that Bevin be informed and urged to take a similar position.

If this government falls over ratification, it would materially strengthen the Communist position and play into the Soviet hands by giving the Communists the possibility of overthrowing the government on a national issue which would place them before the electorate in the position as defending Italian independence against the US and Great Britain.

Reference Embtels 1928 July 12; 1929 July 12; 1930 July 12, 2 p.m.5

Repeated to London as 129 for Ambassador. [Harriman.]

Dunn
  1. W. Averell Harriman, United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 1943–1946; Ambassador to Great Britain, April–October, 1946; Secretary of Commerce, October 1946–April 1948.↩
  2. Enrico de Nicola was not at this time President of Italy but was Provisional Head of the State (Capo provvisorio dello stato), June 28, 1946–January 1, 1948.↩
  3. Mikhail Kostylev.↩
  4. Cf. telegram 1872, July 8, from Rome, p. 552.↩
  5. None printed.↩