740.00119 Council/3–1147: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State
urgent
759. Delsec 1289. For Acheson from Marshall. This morning March 10, Mr. Bidault called on me at his request. He stated that he had been informed of my discussions with Auriol.99 I told him that since leaving Paris I had had some discussions with American technicians and had reached certain superficial conclusions.
I understood that it is now expected that coal exports from the Ruhr will be increased in April and that exports will be restored to the full level of September 1946 by June or July. I said further I understood there was hope that, as coal production further increases, there would be probable further increases in exports during the latter part of the year. He said he had hoped that the September export level of coal would be reached by April but did not press the matter. I stated my understanding that any increase in the level beyond 60% of prewar involved substantial increases in transport and steel production for the mines and equipment.
I said I understood that the French would like to see French and American technicians at the mines in operating capacities, but we felt this was the wrong way to increase production. We felt that there should be French, American and British control or supervision at the top, but that the way to get coal is to have the mines administered and operated by the Germans.
Bidault replied vaguely that we could discuss details later and he was not sure that this was an important point of difference.
I said France could help get her coal needs by accepting our invitation to join the bi-zonal arrangement we have made with the British. She would then have a say on the coal problems. Bidault smiled and said I was doubtless familiar with the origins of the French position on this matter. He made it clear that he referred to the Communist participation in the French Government and their reluctance to permit the French to join. He said that the joining of the French zone with the British and American would depend on how the whole picture develops.
We then discussed the length of the conference, and I emphasized the importance to the world of the problems with which we are dealing, saying that it sometimes is difficult to see the forest for the trees. He remarked that he had begun his political career working by the side [Page 242] of a man (De Gaulle) who saw only the forest and didn’t look at the trees, and he said this was equally bad.
(Department please pass to Paris as Moscow’s 62).