Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, General; The United Nations, Volume I

Policy Planning Staff Files

Memorandum by Mr. Edmund A. Gullion, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)¹

top secret

[Washington,] September 27, 1947.

Summary—Mr. Osborn’s Views on Atomic Energy Policy (PPS/7, August 21, 1947)²

For your information I submit herewith a general summary of Mr. Osborn’s views on atomic energy policy, us gathered from several conversations I have had with him in the past two weeks.

Mr. Osborn in general is strongly in favor of the policies outlined in the S/P paper on atomic energy policy. He is, however, especially anxious that other countries represented on the Atomic Energy Commission be consulted in advance of any public announcement of a reorientation of our policy, particularly, the U.K., Canada, Belgium and France. The latter has been a staunch supporter in the delegation. (Parenthetically I should point out that if consultation involves discussion of exchange of information, there would be special difficulties with respect to France, where the domestic atomic energy policy is directed by Joliot Curie, member of the Communist Party.) The S/P paper, in reference, points out the advantages and disadvantages of making public any consultations with countries other than the United Kingdom and Canada.

According to Mr. Rusk, Mr. Osborn also recommends that the timing of any discussion in the General Assembly, or of any public announcement, be considered with reference to other items on the Agenda. We probably would not want to concentrate all discussions of major issues into one part of the Assembly calendar.

Mr. Osborn is generally informed on the problem in respect to the content of the proposed consultations with the British and Canadians. In this connection he is most strongly opposed to any project to link the question of our source material shortages with the question of aid to Britain or other European countries.

I have informed Mr. Osborn that policy outlined in the S/P paper is by no means definitely decided and indicated to him some of the problems involved in obtaining concurrence from other departments. In response to his inquiry about the possible time schedule, I informed Mr. Osborn on September 24 that I could not see that we could possibly hope to have an announcement ready and have consulted other governments in under two weeks’ time; on the other hand that we wished to do anything which could be done within the term of the current General Assembly or about six weeks.

It would, of course, be desirable to synchronize any announcement, or the initiation of any talks looking to tripartite consultations, with the submission of the Atomic Energy Commission’s Second Report to the Council.³ Mr. Osborn pointed out that Mr. Gromyko is not particularly anxious to have the report submitted now, and I indicated that neither were we, in view of our hope of synchronizing our overall policy with its submission.

It was agreed that the time limits for possible implementation of the Kennan paper policy, which Mr. Osborn might have in mind in his conferences with the other delegations (but not for disclosure to them), would be not less than two weeks from now and not later than the close of the General Assembly. We would continue to reckon with the possibility that any public announcement might coincide with the submission of the report to the Assembly which might be within three or four weeks time. If the Assembly should terminate before the Kennan recommendations could be put into effect, that would not necessarily mean that the policy would not be carried through later on.

Mr. Osborn also made some comments in writing about the details of the S/P paper, which are attached. He doesn’t believe it takes sufficiently into account that the Russians don’t really understand our proposals. He asks “If the British Labor Government is so confused on this issue, isn’t it likely that the people in the Kremlin are even more confused?” He believes that the Russians are continually weighing the comparative disadvantages of our having the bomb and of their submitting to inspection. He thinks they “will consider accepting international control on the day that the disadvantages of inspection seem to them less than the disadvantages of our having the bomb, and not before.”

[Annex]

Comments by Mr. Osborn

The explanation commencing on page 8 leaves out entirely the following:

a. The Commission report is a new idea in international relations, not easy to absorb. Only the Canadian, French, Belgian and United States Delegations understand the plan and what necessitates it. The British Government certainly does not.

The entire United States Delegation is convinced that the present British reservations do not, in reality, protect any British interests, but rather seriously endanger them, and that they are put forward because of a complete lack of understanding, not only of how the international organization would operate> but particularly because of a lack of understanding of why it still seems the only alternative to national rivalries in which dictator states would have immense advantage.

If the British Labor Government is so confused on this issue, isn’t it likely that the people in the Kremlin are even more confused. Certainly, Gromyko and Skobeltzyn,⁴ who are the only Soviet representatives with whom we deal here, show no understanding of how the agency would operate. Except for their interest in quotas, it would appear that they do not consider the majority proposals as any true safeguard against atomic war. Their intense interest in quotas may indicate that when we come to writing down in details such things as staffing, financing, strategic balance and sanctions, they may get quite a different picture of the advantages of the treaty.

b. I know of no evidence that “we have tended to labor the point that there is no effective means of defense against atomic weapons,” as giving the Russians the idea that they are in an advantageous position. It is more likely they think we have labored this point either so as to frighten them or so as to frighten our own public into a larger air force. On the other hand, it is quite possible, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the Russians actually do not think we could or would use the bomb against them very effectively. Though in this connection, it is interesting to note that both the French and Syrian Delegates believe that if it were not for our possession of the bomb, the Russians would by now have taken over France and the Arab States, respectively.

My own belief is that the Russians mind very much our having the bomb. They also mind very much the idea of opening up Russia to inspection. They must be constantly weighing these disadvantages against each other. I think they will consider accepting international control on the day that the disadvantages of inspection seem to them less than the disadvantages of our having the bomb, but not before.

1. This memorandum was directed to Lovett, Kennan, and Rusk.
2. Ante, p. 602.
3. The Second Report of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council, ABC, 2nd yr., Special Suppl., or Department of State Publication 2932 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1947), had actually been formally transmitted to the Security Council on September 11. However, the Council, preoccupied with other issues, did not consider it in 1947.
4. Dmitriy Vladimirovich Skobel’tsyn, Soviet nuclear physicist serving as a technical adviser to the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations Commission for the Control of Atomic Energy.