SPA Files: Lot 428
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Special
Political Affairs (Rusk) to the Under Secretary of
State (Lovett)
secret
[Washington,] September 23, 1947.
Subject: Explanation for the Secretary of the Provisional
Estimate of the Over-all Armed Forces Needed by the United Nations Security
Council
Discussion
On June 30, in response to a request from the Security Council, the
representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the United Nations Military
Staff Committee submitted a provisional estimate of the over-all forces
needed by the Security Council to carry out its Charter responsibilities.
The strength and composition of the force thus estimated is as follows: Air
force, 3,800; Ground forces, 20 divisions, Naval forces, three carrier task
groups, each of two carriers, one battleship, two cruisers and 16
destroyers; and three surface support groups, each of three cruisers and 12
destroyers; assault shipping and craft of three groups capable of lifting a
total of six troops divisions; and 90 submarines.
In the course of briefing the United States Delegation to the General
Assembly, questions were raised as to the necessity for an over-all force of
this strength and composition. Although negotiations currently progressing
in a Subcommittee of the Military Staff Committee indicate the possibility
of agreement on those elements so far discussed (ground forces and surface
naval forces other than assault forces), questions apparently still remain
unanswered in the United States General Assembly Delegation as to the need
for an over-all force of the size and composition estimated by the JCS representatives to be desirable from a
military point of view.
In response to a request of the Secretary (Telegram 856 of September 191) the attached paper has been
prepared giving the justification for the provisional United States estimate
of over-all forces.
Recommendation
It is recommended that the attached paper be approved and transmitted to the
Secretary in New York.2
Concurrences
IS—Coordinating of substance with the Army,
Navy, Air Force
[Page 666]
Representatives of
the Ad Hoc
SWNCC Committee to coordinate security
functions of the United Nations.
Attachments
Paper entitled “Proposed United States Estimate of the Over-all Strength and
Composition of the Armed Forces to be made Available to the Security
Council.”
[Annex]
Implementation of Article 43 of the Charter
Subject: Published U.S. estimate of the overall strength
and composition of the armed forces to be made available to the Security
Council.
Summary:
1. The published figures proposed by the United States representatives in
the Military Staff Committee represent an estimate made from the
military point of view of the aggregate forces which should be made
available to the Security Council by all Members of the United Nations.
Since forces called for by the Security Council from this aggregate may
be employed for enforcement action in any part of the world, the
aggregate forces estimated to be needed are larger in numbers and
different in composition than they would be if their employment were to
be limited geographically. The availability of such an aggregate would
make it possible for the Council to set up, and to bring promptly to
bear at any desired points, effective and well-balanced task forces
possessing such striking power, range, mobility, and capacity for
sustained action that they might be able to overawe an enemy without
having to fight and would almost certainly be able to accomplish their
missions with minimum losses.
2. The published proposals provisionally made by the other delegations to
the Military Staff Committee were probably based much more on political
considerations than on military estimates of the forces which should be
available to the Council to enable it to perform its enforcement
functions under the Charter.
3. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff consider that forces materially smaller than
those shown in the published U.S. proposal would be acceptable, though
much less desirable, from the military point of view. The U.S.
representatives in the Military Staff Committee were accordingly
authorized, if they consider it advisable to do so, to agree
provisionally to figures materially lower than those shown in the
published U.S. proposal.
4. Unpublished discussions taking place in a subcommittee of the Military
Staff Committee indicate that agreement with most, if not
[Page 667]
all, of the other delegations,
except the U.S.S.R., could probably be reached, within the range of
figures approved by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, on ground forces and on
surface naval forces other than amphibious forces. The latter, aircraft,
and submarines have not yet been discussed to an extent sufficient to
justify a statement concerning the possibilities of agreement on figures
for those categories.
Discussion:
5. The published estimate tentatively proposed by the United States (not
constituting a commitment and not prejudicing United States policy of
opposition to the “principle of equality”) is as follows:
| Air Forces: |
| Bombers |
1250 |
|
(Includes only strategic and tactical bombers.) |
| Fighters |
2250 |
|
(includes fighter bombers.) |
| Miscellaneous |
300 |
|
|
|
3800 |
|
(does not include air transport requirements.) |
| Ground Forces: |
| Divisions |
20 |
|
|
| Naval Forces: |
|
} |
(3 carrier task groups, each of 2 carriers, 1
battleship, 2 cruisers, and 16 destroyers; and 3 surface
support groups, each of 3 cruisers and 12
destroyers.) |
| Battleships |
3 |
| Carriers |
6 |
| Cruisers |
15 |
| Destroyers |
84 |
| Submarines |
90 |
|
|
| Assault shipping and craft. |
3 |
|
groups capable of lifting a total of 6 troop
divisions. |
6. The size and composition of the aggregate forces proposed by the
United States are justified by the following:
-
a.
- In the aggregate it would be strong enough:
- (1)
- To be a deterrent to aggression.
- (2)
- To deal with comparatively large states which do not
have the veto, or even with several states banded
together or with more than one situation
simultaneously.
-
b.
- The aggregate forces proposed by the published U.S. estimate
would provide a broad base from which to constitute, ad hoc, a balanced military force or
forces of the characteristics required to enable the Security
Council to deal successfully with a wide variety of situations.
- (1)
- It includes all necessary components of arms in
suitable numbers to form a well-rounded, combined
military establishment of such
[Page 668]
strength and disposition that in
many cases it could suppress active aggression without
prolonged fighting or excessive losses.
- (2)
- It permits balanced national contingents within the
aggregate forces, thus enabling the Security Council to
take prompt action by employing contingents of States
Members adjacent to the off ending-nation without the
long delay which would ensue if the entire security
force had to be first assembled whenever the use of
armed forces became necessary.
- (3)
- The large long-range striking elements (naval and air)
and amphibious lift which would be included, with the
necessary escort and support, would enable such task
forces to be used effectively in any part of the
world.
- (4)
- The air arm is of sufficient strength and its
composition is such that those national air force
contingents which must be held immediately available
(Article 45 of the Charter) would be adequate for urgent
military measures anywhere in the world, and with other
air units in a lower category of readiness, would be
available to support a striking force of other arms
whenever required.
-
c.
- The United States estimates would permit satisfying the desire
of the small Member nations to make contingents available to the
overall armed forces of the United Nations, since it would allow
all of the fifty nations not permanent members of the Security
Council to provide contributions of armed forces without unduly
reducing the strength of the more homogeneous forces to be
furnished by the Five-Permanent Members or preventing those
Members from making comparable contributions.
7. The aggregate forces proposed by the United States are related to the
tentative U.S. contingent, which is:3
| Air forces: |
A balanced task force of 5 wings (2
bombers, 2 fighters, 1 troop carrier—approximately 210 bombers,
450 fighters, 225 transport) |
| Ground Forces: |
1 corps comprising 2 divisions |
| Sea Forces: |
1 carrier task group with amphibious and
sea transport lift for the above troops to the extent available,
plus adequate surface support |
8. In connection with the size and composition of the U.S. contingent
relative to the overall strength and composition, the matter of command
is of great importance. The tentative U.S. contingent would make
available an air task force, a corps of ground troops, and a carrier
task force. Each of these would be directly under a U.S. commander
[Page 669]
responsible directly to the
U.S. Government and subject only to operational control of a United
Nations supreme commander. A U.S. contingent composed of smaller
elements would almost certainly have commanders of other nationalities
intermediate between the U.S. commanders and the supreme commander. From
the military point of view this is undesirable and should be
avoided.
9. Lower figures, less desirable from the military point of view but
still acceptable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were given to the U.S.
representatives in the Military Staff Committee for its use in
negotiation, provided there existed a possibility of agreement in that
committee on an acceptable overall strength and composition. The minimum
overall strength and composition acceptable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
were set at:
| Air Forces: |
2800 |
combat aircraft; air transports to be
additional and furnished as required |
| Ground Forces: |
15 |
divisions |
| Sea Forces: |
2 |
carrier task groups |
|
2 |
surface support groups |
|
30 |
submarines |
|
2 |
amphibious groups each capable of
lifting 2 divisions. |
In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have authorized the U.S.
representatives in the Military Staff Committee to use their discretion
in breaking down the composition of the groups, thus making possible a
reduction in the numbers of surface vessels shown in the published U.S.
proposal.
10. The French, Chinese, and U.K. proposals (Appendix), especially the
latter, are probably based more on considerations of prestige and
limited ability to provide forces than on a military estimate of the
Council’s requirements for the performance of the task prescribed by the
United Nations Charter. Such considerations would help explain the small
figures proposed, as compared with those proposed by the United States.
The U.S.S.R. estimate is apparently designed to further that
government’s objective of preventing or delaying the provision of forces
and of reducing the possibilities of effective action by any forces
which may eventually be provided, and evidently is designed to further
that government’s objective of increasing its military power relative to
that of the United States.
11. In making the tentative U.S. estimate of overall strength no
consideration was given to the possible effects on overall strength
requirements of agreements which may be reached for regulation and
reduction of armaments. It is assumed that appropriate adjustments of
the undertakings of Member states to make forces available to the
Security Council would accompany any agreement to regulate or reduce
armaments.
[Page 670]
Appendix
Provisional Estimates of the Overall Strength and
Composition of the Forces Which Should Be Made Available to the
Security Council on its Call
Note: The Chinese estimate has not been
published; the others have been. The Chinese originally accepted the
published British estimate; that fact was published.
|
U.S. (Published) |
U.S.S.R. (Published) |
U.K. (Published) |
FRANCE (Published) |
CHINA Not Published—See note
above). |
|
air forces
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Bombers |
1,250*
|
600 |
600 |
775 |
|
700 |
|
| Strategic |
|
|
|
|
(225) |
|
(400) |
| Medium |
|
|
|
|
(150) |
|
(100) |
| Light |
|
|
|
|
(400) |
|
(200) |
| Fighters |
2,250†
|
300 |
400 |
300 |
|
300 |
|
| Reconnaissance |
None) |
300 |
(None |
200 |
|
150 |
|
| Miscellaneous |
300) |
|
(200 |
None |
|
None |
|
| Total |
3,800‡
|
1,200 |
1,200 |
1,275 |
|
1,150 |
|
|
ground forces
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Divisions |
20 |
12 |
8–12 |
16 |
|
12–15 |
|
| Armored |
|
|
|
|
(3) |
|
|
| Airborne |
|
|
|
|
(3) |
|
|
| Motorized or Mountain |
|
|
|
|
(10) |
|
|
|
naval forces§
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Battleships |
3 |
None |
2 |
3 |
|
2
|
|
| Carriers |
6 |
None |
4 |
6 |
|
4 |
|
| Cruisers |
15 |
5–6 |
6 |
9 |
|
6 |
|
| Destroyers |
84 |
24 |
24 |
18–24 |
|
24 |
|
| Escort Vessels |
None |
24 |
48 |
30 |
|
48 |
|
| Minesweepers |
None |
24 |
24 |
30 |
|
24 |
|
| Submarines |
90 |
12 |
12 |
12 |
|
12 |
|
| Assault shipping and craft for number of divisions shown
opposite |
6 |
None |
Two-thirdsǁ
|
1 |
|
2 |
|
