Department of State Atomic Energy Files
Memorandum by Mr. Edmund A. Gullion to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)
This is my attempt to get order out of our talk with Balfour and Maclean.1 I think the difficulty was caused by the fact that:
- a)
- The British memorandum does not make clear all the points they wanted to make, e.g., that they do not want to be forced, for the sake of solidarity, into voting with the U.S. right down the line, when in [Page 600] fact there are still relatively minor but nevertheless important points of difference between us and them;
- b)
- They had the impression that the “showdown” or “stock-taking” about which you spoke would necessarily take place in the Commission or in the Security Council itself. If it takes place in the Commission it would of course bring negotiations to a halt. It was not our intention that the “stock-taking” should take place in the Commission, but that the President should do it.
I simply do not know, nor am I sure that anyone knows, whether there will be any kind of record vote on the report itself at the stage of its consideration in the Commission. Mr. Kennan, Mr. Osborn and I will discuss this tomorrow.
The air should be considerably clearer when we have decided whether or not the recommendations of the Policy Planning Committee, which are now in the works, are to be followed, and we can then consult the British accordingly.
- See memorandum of conversation and annexed memorandum, supra. ↩