Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, General; The United Nations, Volume I

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edmund A. Gullion, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

top secret

[Washington,] August 13, 1947.

Subject: British view in regard to breakdown in the present negotiations of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Participants:	U—Mr. Lovett,
	Mr. Balfour,1 Chargé d’Affaires, British Embassy,
	Mr. Maclean, First Secretary, British Embassy,
	U—Mr. Gullion

Mr. Balfour presented the attached paraphrase of the Foreign Office’s telegram which gives the British view that it would be undesirable to adopt any line which would lead to a breakdown in the present negotiations of the Atomic Energy Commission, especially in view of the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in November.² The British would like to see the Report of the Commission take the form of an interim or progress report to the Assembly not requiring any recorded vote. In conversation the British representatives amplified the memorandum to state that not only did they not wish to see the issue joined with the Soviet Union at this time, but that, inasmuch as there were still points on which the United States and the British did not agree, e.g. extent of “ownership” and research functions of the international agency, they would not like to vote on the proposals of the Committee thus far. This would be an additional reason for not bringing things to a head at this time.

Mr. Lovett explained that it was not our thought to “upset the applecart” or to take any action which would bring to a close the negotiations in the Commission. Nevertheless, we felt that some stocktaking or “balance sheet” was necessary at this time in order that the people of this country and of the world would not continue to feel a false sense of security. We must find some way to make it clear that the negotiations had not so far been productive and that the prospects were not favorable.

Mr. Lovett assured the British representatives that before we came to the point at which we thought that the negotiation effort should be definitely brought to a close, or took some action which might bring it to a close, we would consult the British beforehand. Although we do not wish to join issues now, still it was clear enough that the Russians were not going to agree, so that a showdown would not be altogether disadvantageous even if it occurred earlier rather than late.

Mr. Lovett could not say that there would not be any showdown before the Foreign Ministers’ meeting in November, which was looking very far ahead, but didn’t necessarily anticipate one.

The British views as to the form which the next report of the Commission should take and the way it should be then dealt with would be taken into account. Although we could not say just what might occur, he did not know of any resolution or method of submission of the report which would [not] require a vote. Our delegation in New York would be informed of the additional reasons why the British did not wish to see a general vote at this time, i.e., the existence of the unresolved points of difference between the US and the UK. (Mr. Balfour had previously stated that these were minor compared to the differences between the Soviet Union and the other delegations.)

Mr. Maclean pointed out that the British concern had to do with the action at the next important stage, the meeting of the Commission to consider its report, which he believed to be set for August 29.

E. A. Gullion

[Annex]

Paraphrase of a Foreign Office Telegram of August 12 to His Majesty’s Embassy at Washington

In the present state of international relations there seems to be no prospect of securing an agreed solution on the matters before the Atomic Energy Commission and therefore of sending an unanimous report to the Security Council and the Assembly. In any case, the Commission in the present phase of its work has not yet tackled some of the most important and difficult questions e.g. of quotas and strategic balance; the stages by which control is to be introduced; and enforcement. In the circumstances we feel that it is undesirable and indeed unnecessary to force atomic energy questions to an issue with the Soviet Government before the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in November.

2. We have the impression, rightly or wrongly, that the United States authorities are anxious to take issue with the Soviet Delegation on the questions at present before it, which, in present conditions, can only lead to a breakdown. Rather than adopt this line we should prefer to see the Commission make an interim or progress report to the Assembly giving an account of the position which has been reached in the Commission but if possible without recording votes. This would certainly facilitate an agreement if international relations improve as a result of the Foreign Ministers Meeting. It would also appear more realistic in so far as it is not clear what would follow after a vote on the present report of the Commission.

3. We should be grateful for the United States Government’s considered views on the broad issue of policy involved and hope that they will give favourable consideration to the conception of a progress report.

Washington, August 12, 1947.

1. John Balfour.
2. For documentation on the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers at London, November 25–December 15, see vol. ii, p. 676.