Policy Planning Staff Files
Memorandum by Mr. Edward A. Gullion, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett), to Mr. Joseph E. Johnson of the Policy Planning Staff and the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Rusk)
Subject: Future Course with Respect to Atomic Energy
I have had a couple of talks with Dean Acheson1 about our future course with respect to atomic energy.
He seems to believe that it is high time for some intensive high level consideration as to what we should do as the September “deadline” approaches. For that reason he thinks the Kennan2 group should be brought especially to bear.
Although Mr. Acheson appeared to have been impressed by some of the arguments for a large-scale alliance, grouped around the atom, without Russia, he now appears to believe that a grouping confined to the US, UK, Canada and certain raw material supplying countries would be sufficient. This understanding could be established with practically no negotiation and with little chance of any new overt provocation to the Soviet Union. In any wider alignment of powers the small countries would be liabilities and among the middle powers few could be forced to choose sides in such a fashion without great disturbance.
As to tactics in the UN, Mr. Acheson inclines to the opinion that negotiations should be brought to an unmistakable and definite close if results in September are negative. He endorses this course for two reasons:
- (a)
- So long as negotiations are allowed to trail along with no real prospect of constructive achievement, public opinion in this country, and in countries sympathetic to our views, will be lulled into a false sense of security unaware of the gravity of the situation.
- (b)
- The longer the talks go on, the less prospect there seems to be of maintaining our united front with the countries in AEC other than the Soviet Union and Poland.
However, before negotiations are broken off, Mr. Acheson feels that we should be absolutely certain that there is no modification of the U.S. proposals based on the Baruch plan, now before the Commission, or under discussion in the committees, which would offer reasonable world security if adopted. He believes this question requires early and earnest consideration within the government.
I suggested a new Board of Consultants3 constituted to consider the specific question of possible changes in the U.S. proposals but he believed most of the competent people were already in the AEC and that we should start by ascertaining their views. He said that he had been surprised to hear reports that Dr. Oppenheimer had now developed some second thoughts about our proposals.