USUN Files
Memorandum by the Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (Osborn) to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)
This memorandum supplements my recent memorandum of June 30th1 which refers to the current status of preparation for the second report of the Atomic Energy Commission. In addition to the contents of that report, there will arise questions as to the form of its presentation to the Security Council. This memorandum will present the various alternative forms which have been discussed by the leaders of the different Delegations, and on which you will undoubtedly desire to ask the views of the State Department.
We are assuming that the second report will have as its main body the specific proposals and explanatory statements covering the operating functions and responsibilities of the international agency. It has been suggested that the introduction to this report should be a discussion of the Russian proposals recently submitted to the Commission2 with strong, but simply presented, arguments to the effect that the Russian proposal is unacceptable to the majority of the Commission because it does not provide for sufficient or effective control and might, indeed, encourage rather than prevent national rivalries. There has been some discussion as to whether putting this condemnation of the Russian proposal in the introduction of the report might force the Russians to an adverse vote. As an alternative, it has been suggested that there might be an appendix to cover the Soviet proposals of June 11th, and a statement to be signed by the ten nations giving their reasons why the Soviet proposals are unacceptable. The report itself would then simply contain the specific proposals for the functions of the agency, and while the Russians would not vote for it, they would be more likely to abstain than vote against it.
Which of these two proposals is the best will probably depend on the decision as to what we would want the Security Council to do with [Page 554] the report when they get it. Here again, two alternatives have been proposed. The first, that the report might put it up to the Security Council to accept the proposals in the report as the basis for the further work of the Atomic Energy Commission, ruling out the Russian proposals as unacceptable. The other alternative would be a report such that the Security Council could accept it as an interim report only and again refer it back to the Atomic Energy Commission with instructions (a) to complete the report by the elaboration of specific proposals on strategic balance, sanctions, and, ultimately, stages, and (b) secondarily to examine any further Soviet counter-proposals.
So far as the work of the Delegation is concerned, the second alternative, namely, that the report should be an interim report, drafted in the expectation that the Security Council would return it to the Commission, both for further elaboration and to consider any Soviet counter-proposals, would, in our opinion, be the most likely to further our work. We see no advantage in a showdown with the Russians on atomic energy in September. We are conscious that the matter is very difficult to understand and that even the detailed statement of functions of the agency which will be in the report will take months to be absorbed and understood in the Russian hierarchy. But until the Soviet bureaucracy has some idea of the proposed functions of the agency, it will be very difficult indeed to deal with them on such matters as strategic balance and sanctions.
We recognize, of course, that the tactics of this situation will depend on the over-all decisions made at the highest level. The control of atomic energy is only a part of the totality of our relations with the Soviet. It is important that this Delegation should receive clear instructions based on the relation of their work to the whole of the American position.
In this connection, it may be worthwhile to quote a conversation which illustrates the point of view of the majority group of the Delegates to the Commission.
At dinner the other night Gonzales Fernandez3 of Colombia said he saw no sense in doing all this work when the Russians had specifically said they would have none of it. The Canadian, Ignatieff,4 immediately replied that the reason seemed to him and to the other Delegates very clear. The democratic nations are engaged in a great debate with the totalitarians. Atomic energy is one facet of that debate. If the democratic nations keep on proposing a solution which they can defend as the only realistic solution, then the Soviets are in the position in the eyes of the world of refusing to accept atomic disarmament. [Page 555] If we do nothing, the Soviets take over the offensive and are in a position to claim that they have made proposals for atomic disarmament which the democratic nations are unwilling to accept, and that their refusal indicates some evil motive. It is for these general reasons that we feel so strongly that the initiative must be kept in our hands by continuing to develop a sound plan which would really control dangerous uses of atomic energy.
- Ante, p. 540.↩
- Reference is to the proposals contained in Gromyko’s speech at the 12th Meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission, June 11; for text, see AEC, 2nd yr., Plenary, pp. 20–24.↩
- Alberto González Fernández, Colombian Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission.↩
- George Ignatieff of the Canadian Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission.↩