Subject: U.S. Position on Armaments and Armed Forces Within
the Competence of the Commission for Conventional Armaments.
There is forwarded herewith for approval a document on the above subject
which has been approved by the Executive Committee on Regulation of
Armaments.
Item No. 1 on the Plan of Work drawn up by the United Nations Commission for
Conventional Armaments requires that recommendations be submitted to the
Security Council concerning the armaments and armed forces within the
Commission’s jurisdiction. The attached paper recommends a United States
position on this question. At the same time it recommends a definition of
“other weapons adaptable to mass destruction” which phrase is used in the
terms of reference of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to
describe its competence with respect to weapons other than atomic.
Briefly, the attached paper recommends that the United States position in
respect to Item No. 1 of the Plan of Work should be
The position outlined above is in harmony with the views of Joint Chiefs of
Staff as given in JCS 1731/28.1
A copy of this document is also attached together with a copy of a letter to
the Secretary of State dated June 23, 1947 from the Secretaries of War and
the Navy (RAC D 4/3).2
[Enclosure]
U.S. Position on Armaments and Armed Forces Within
the Competence of the Commission for Conventional
Armaments3
[Washington,] July 7, 1947.
the problem
1. To determine the U.S. position in respect to item No. 1 of the
proposed Plan of Work in the United Nations Commission for Conventional
Armaments, which is:
“To consider and make recommendations to the Security Council
concerning armaments and armed forces which fall within the
jurisdiction of the CCA.”
facts and discussion
2. The General Assembly Resolution of December 14, 1946 commits the
member nations to establish an international system of control and
inspection for the regulation of armaments, including atomic energy.
Before this Resolution was adopted, the Atomic Energy Commission was
already in existence, having been established in accordance with the
General Assembly Resolution of January 24, 1946, and having terms of
reference which clearly indicated that it had primary responsibilities
in the field of atomic weapons and other major weapons adaptable to mass
destruction. When, on February 13, 1947, a Resolution was passed by the
Security Council establishing a Commission for Conventional Armaments,
the problem was raised as to where its jurisdiction should be delimited
vis-à-vis the Atomic Energy Commission. Despite objection on the part of
the Soviet Union, it was generally understood that in establishing the
Commission for Conventional Armaments, the Commission would deal with
all weapons and armed forces not within the jurisdiction of the AEC.
3. It follows, therefore, that the final determination of the competence
of the CCA must logically be made by the
Security Council by means of:
- (a)
- definition of what constitute “major weapons adaptable to mass
destruction”, or
- (b)
- specification of particular weapons presently deemed to fall
within the category of such weapons of mass destruction.
4. It should be noted that a decision by the Security Council as to a
definition of “weapons of mass destruction” would not obviate the
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necessity for a subsequent
decision by the Security Council to determine whether any given weapon,
other than atomic weapons, should be so classified, now or in the
future. Therefore, there would appear to be no impelling reason for the
U.S. to press for immediate definition except as necessary to prevent
the adoption of one which could be interpreted to our serious
disadvantage.
5. The following definition of “major weapons adaptable to mass
destruction” has been developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS 1731/28) and concurred in by the
Secretaries of War and the Navy: “Major weapons adaptable to mass
destruction are all atomic explosive, radioactive material, lethal
chemical and biological weapons; and, in the future, are weapons which
have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the
atomic bombs and other weapons mentioned above.” This JCS paper also calls attention to the
possible danger to the U.S. interest deriving from any confusion of
“weapons” with “means” or “method” of delivery, and provides valuable
background material in support of the position taken.
6. From a political and social point of view it is desirable to eliminate
from national armaments any weapon which—
- (a)
- in its initial impact or inevitable after-effects, is capable
of producing widespread destruction of life comparable to that
attending such natural catastrophes as plague, pestilence,
famine, earthquake and flood;
- (b)
- affords an aggressor state the means of overwhelming or
paralyzing its victim before national or international
counter-measures could become effective;
- (c)
- in the constant threat of its possible use, imposes on
organized society, as the only means of achieving “freedom from
fear”, defensive measures wholly incompatible with its normal
peacetime social and economic structure.
7. In line with the U.S. estimate of Soviet intentions, as set forth in
the “Ridgway Report”4
and interchanges of correspondence thereon among the three Secretaries,
it can be anticipated that the Soviets will attempt to have long range
aircraft, rockets and guided missiles designated as weapons capable of
mass destruction, hoping thereby to eliminate them from national
armaments to the particular disadvantage of the U.S. Similarly, it can
be expected that the Soviets will attempt, during consideration of Item
1, to include within the competence of the CCA marginal items such as: base systems, industrial
potential, utilization of manpower, transportation networks, and
communication systems.
8. It is of utmost importance that the U.S. prevent the exclusion from the competence of the CCA of any weapon which it is unwilling
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to see eliminated from national armaments.
Conversely, it is of importance for the U.S. to prevent the discussion
in earlier items of the Plan of Work of matters, particularly marginal
weapons and methods of warfare, which should be dealt with in connection
with Item 4.
conclusion
9. It is concluded that the U.S. position in respect to Item No. 1 on the
Plan of Work of CCA should be—
- (a)
- to recommend to the Security Council:
- (1)
- That all armed forces fall within the jurisdiction of
CCA rather than the
AEC.
- (2)
- That all armaments not specifically exempted by being
classified as major weapons adaptable to mass
destruction fall within the competence of CCA.
- (3)
- That major weapons adaptable to mass destruction may
be specifically defined as atomic explosives,
radioactive material, lethal chemical and biological
weapons; and, in the future, any weapons developed which
have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to
those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned
above.
- (b)
- to insist, failing to secure agreement on the above definition
in either the CCA or the SC, that the only weapons now
subject to classification as weapons of mass destruction and
thus exempted from CCA
jurisdiction are:
- (1)
- Atomic explosive weapons.
- (2)
- Radioactive material weapons.
- (3)
- Lethal chemical weapons.
- (4)
- Biological weapons.
- (c)
- to oppose vigorously any attempt to interpret the above
definition or to expand the alternative list to include a
“means” or “method” of delivering massed attack as distinct from
weapons.
- (d)
- Since the competence of the CCA covers all armed forces and all armaments not
specifically exempted by classification as weapons of mass
destruction, the U.S. opposes any attempt to make in connection
with Item 1, a detailed listing of specific categories or types
of armaments and armed forces falling within the CCA jurisdiction, since the
elaboration of such detail would be expected to fall under Item
4.
recommendations
10. It is recommended that the above conclusions be approved and that
this paper be forwarded to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations for
its guidance, accompanied by copies of the JCS document 1731/28 for its information.
