501.BC Armament/7–847
The Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments (Bard) to the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Rusk)
Dear Mr. Rusk: In view of the approval of our Plan of Work by the Security Council today,1 it is important that we make plans ahead at once covering our position on the various items of the Plan.
I have already asked you for advice and definition covering Item No. 1 on the Plan of Work, and I understand that you are sending me tonight the JCS definition covering this item, approved by the War and Navy Departments.2 As soon as I receive this, I will get in touch with you about it, as I understand that it has not been officially released.
It is possible that item one will not consume too much time and it will very shortly be necessary for us to give the Commission our ideas on item No. 2, which as you know has to do with the consideration and determination of general principles in connection with the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces. When this comes up for discussion, we will of course have our own ideas as to how it should [Page 546] be handled, and in the absence of any advice or instructions from the State Department we will have to proceed along those lines.
What I am trying to say is that these procedures will not necessarily wait for the State Department. Quite a few of the delegates are very impatient and want to make progress, and when these subjects come up they will have to be discussed by us as well as by others. I therefore suggest that you give us as promptly as possible whatever suggestions you may have on items 1, 2, and 3 of the Plan of Work.
We may also be up against the introduction of a plan by the French or the Soviets in connection with item two, and it is therefore wise to do everything we can to set up our Plan so that it may be available when needed. Otherwise we may be placed in the position of having to oppose a French plan, instead of talking for our plan. It is very difficult for us to tell when such a plan might be needed.
Some time ago in talking to Secretary Marshall, he made the definite statement that our Delegation could not afford to take a negative position in connection with the disarmament program. The other delegates are looking to us for leadership, and I can assure you that our position is going to be practically untenable unless we are prepared to talk some definite plan.
Perhaps the best position to take at present is that the non-cooperative atmosphere in which we are negotiating and the lack of confidence, good will and security make the discussion of real disarmament futile at this time. For that reason, it might be well to adjourn further meetings in the Disarmament Commission at least until the General Assembly has met and some of the present problems resolved.
Several of the delegates have suggested to me in conversations recently that they can see no possibility of going forward with the disarmament program under the conditions which now exist. It is questionable whether or not it is wise to kid the public into feeling that something constructive is being done. They are smart enough to realize that until the general atmosphere changes, nothing can really be accomplished. We know that is a fact and so do others involved. Is it now the time to say so?
We shall be glad to have your advice on the various problems confronting us.
Sincerely yours,
- Nine nations voted in favor of the plan; the Soviet Union and Poland abstained.↩
- Item 1 concerned the weapons falling under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Conventional Armaments. The memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS 1731/28) which sought to define “weapons adaptable to mass destruction,” those which would fall within the competence of the Atomic Energy Commission rather than within that of the CCA, is printed on p. 531. See also RAC D–4/2b, July 8, infra. ↩