Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, General; The United Nations, Volume I

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Record of a Meeting Between United States and United Kingdom Representatives at the Foreign Office, London, June 18, 1947, 2:30 p.m.¹

London, June 18, 1947, 2:30 p.m.

top secret

Gallman, Harrison and I spent two hours with Makins, Rickett and Miles,² who had just arrived from New York. Miles looked very unhappy, possibly as the result of a rough plane trip, but more likely as the result of the way things are going on the negotiations. He seemed quite friendly but subdued. He made very little contribution to the discussion.

Makins stated at the outset that as a result of our previous meeting, they now understood fully the firmness of the United States’ position. They felt, however, that inasmuch as no formal governmental commitment has yet been made on the papers dealing with the functions and powers of the Agency they were still free to put forward alternative proposals, suggestions or changes. He welcomed this opportunity to discuss the matter in detail in order that they might more fully understand the reasoning behind our conclusions and also in order that they might make up their minds as to their own position and what to do about it. He emphasized that they considered these talks purely exploratory and that no government commitments were involved in anything they might say. He said they were as concerned about security as we were but that they felt that a system less tight than ours would provide security, would be more practicable, and, in addition, might prove acceptable to the U.S.S.R. I said we, too, were interested in getting Russian acceptance if this were at all possible, but that we did not propose to sacrifice effective control in trying to do so. Agreement for agreement’s sake would be of no value and would not be considered for a moment by the United States.

Rickett said he could not see what additional advantage the right of ownership would give to the Agency in terms of maintaining security. He felt that security could be achieved through a system of management, inspection, and the allocation of source materials. He thought that ownership would place needless burdens on the agency and require it to make exceedingly difficult political decisions which might cause it to fall of its own weight. Members of the Board of Governors would certainly be representing their respective governments and the net result would be a jockeying for position in arriving at Board decisions.

I stressed very strongly that we found no particular magic in the word “ownership” in itself. What we were concerned about was that the Agency should be given powers normally associated with ownership to the extent necessary to carry out its functions without equivocation. We were particularly concerned that the Agency should manage and operate all dangerous facilities, decide (under the terms of the Treaty) on the location of such facilities and have final right of disposition and distribution of all source materials and nuclear fuel. To our minds, this meant in essence that the Agency would have all the important powers normally residing in ownership. If it was the word itself which was causing the difficulty, we would be glad to use another or invent one, provided that the Agency’s powers were of the character I had indicated.

As to the value of giving the Agency ownership rights, I said that this would make it clear where the right of final decision lay, always subject, of course, to the general principles contained in the Treaty itself and to whatever review procedure might be established. Ownership would greatly facilitate the expeditious carrying out of Agency decisions. There would be no question as to residual national rights over materials or facilities. Endless negotiation and argument would be avoided. In other words, the advantages of ownership (or the bundle of rights included in that term) would be both substantive and psychological.

There is no way in which difficult decisions can be put off. Someone will have to make them and it seems to us that the Agency itself under the terms of the Treaty, should be the body to make these decisions. One such important policy decision had already been reached in these working papers, namely, that security considerations should be the overriding factor in making decisions concerning the stock-piling of nuclear fuel and the location of plants. Any proposal which contemplated leaving such decisions in the hands of individual nations and to the pulling and hauling of negotiations between nations and the Agency would, in our view, be completely hopeless.

Rickett asked how we thought considerations of security could be reconciled with economic need. I repeated that working papers had concluded that security should be paramount, and, in furtherance of this conclusion, had decided that stocks of nuclear fuel should be kept to an absolute minimum consistent with realistic peacetime requirements. The fourth paper concluded that this basic principle should govern the operations of the Agency until changed by participating nations through amendment of the Treaty itself. I went on to say that as far as the item on the list of topics dealing with strategic balance was concerned, the U.S. Delegation itself had not yet jelled its ideas. We recognized that it was perhaps the most difficult of many difficult problems. Indeed, we had put it rather far down on the list of topics with the idea that a more complete spelling out of the functions and powers of the Agency would help in considering this question. I said that whatever level of operation might be decided upon in the treaty, i.e., whether all-out effort should be made to achieve atomic power in the shortest possible time or whether it should be allowed to come more slowly, it was evident that the nub of the matter was to arrive at some kind of equitable distribution. This meant that the present predominating position of the U.S. would have to be redressed. It also seemed to us that this fundamental problem would have to be taken care of in the terms of the treaty itself and that the Agency could not be allowed any broad powers of discretion on this point. Whatever solution might be worked out, it seemed to us perfectly clear that in no event could such decisions be left in the hands of individual nations.

The British said that they thought the paramountcy of security over economic considerations might have the net effect of retarding the development of atomic power. I went on at some length on the thesis that the Agency, rather than retarding the development of power, would advance it and that it would do so under sound and secure arrangements. Conceivably some single nation, i.e., the U.S., could outstrip the world in developing atomic power, but it could do so by itself only in the most dangerous circumstances and the constant fear that other nations were producing, or were about to produce, atomic bombs. We envisaged the Agency as having the fullest knowledge of all phases of atomic energy, the facilities to make use of such knowledge, and instructions to move ahead as quickly as security considerations permitted. The Agency would also be enjoined to help individual nations carry on research and development in all peaceful phases of atomic energy provided dangerous quantities of nuclear fuel were not involved. This, to our minds, was an arrangement which provided safety plus real encouragement to whatever advance might be possible on technical and security grounds. When it became feasible to erect power reactors, the Agency would do so at the request of any nation which could prove economic justification and provided:

1. paramount security considerations were met, and

2. materials and facilities were available.

I stated that I could not see how anyone could propose that individual nations should be free to go ahead at their own pace to build power plants with the provision that the Agency would manage such plants wherever and whenever built. It seemed to us that such a scheme would completely wipe out any advantage international control would have in the direction of eliminating national rivalries, interminable suspicions, and unbearable tensions.

We discussed at some length the nature of the Governing Board of the Agency. The British apparently look upon the Board of Governors as a typical kind of international organization in which the members would in each case represent their respective governments. I agree that members would not be unaware of their country of origin but that every effort should be made to secure men who could take a world view of the matter. In general, these men should not receive or request instructions from their governments. Admittedly, this was an ideal which might be difficult to achieve and yet to the extent that it was achieved, the success of the Agency could more nearly be assured. However difficult this question might be, it was clearly no solution to leave important matter involving world security in the hands of individual governments. We explored tentatively possible voting procedures. I suggested certain methods that had occurred to us:

1. simple majority on all questions with review by the Security Council on certain specified major decisions and

2. simple majority on day to day matters with extraordinary majority in the Agency on important policy decisions.

In the course of the day’s discussions, the following ideas were presented by the British. (These ideas were not put forward very clearly and, in large part, developed as a result of my asking at various points what the alternatives were. The British were most anxious to point out that these ideas by no means represented any official view but merely the trend of their recent thinking.)

A. One way to obviate placing in the Agency impossibly difficult decisions would be to allow nations to go ahead to build whatever power plants they see fit to build. Once such plants were built, presumably with the design and construction supervised by the Agency, the Agency would take over management. The Agency would have no right to retard, or duty to foster, such development. The Agency would merely take over management but not ownership of plants, whenever and wherever built. Pressed as to what they meant by management, the British were not at all concise. In general, however, it seems that they have in mind that the Plant Manager would be responsible to the Agency for all questions regarding security and the safe operation of the plant but would also be responsible to the government concerned on many questions of operating policy. I stated that this would be a completely hopeless situation. One could foresee nothing but endless bickerings, suspicions, and inaction under this kind of scheme. The British seem to feel that this idea would have the advantage of leaving present plants and stocks of material in the U.S. but under Agency management. I said this obviously was no answer at all to the question of a strategic balance. If the Russians accepted this idea, we would all be very much surprised.

B. The Agency would presumably have certain limited powers of research and development, not for the purpose of fostering developments, but merely to enable itself to keep informed of the increase of knowledge. Their research facilities would serve as a training ground for personnel. Arrangements would be made for clearing and coordination of information generated in individual nations.

C. The principle control measure given to the Agency would be the power to allocate source materials quotas and to control the flow of such source materials. Source materials could be purchased by a nation and transported only under Agency license. Title to the material would go to the nation-purchaser. Plants using source material would presumably be owned by producing nations. I pointed out that this proposed source materials allocation scheme would in no way solve the basic problem of strategic balance. It would prove fully as difficult to decide on source material quotas as it would to decide on location of plants. Furthermore, without solving this problem, this scheme would deny to the Agency critical control powers which to our minds were essential. Rickett ruefully agreed that their scheme did not solve the strategic balance problem but it appealed to them nevertheless because it placed on the Agency fewer difficult duties. I asked whether these quotas would be worked out in advance in the Treaty or whether they should be decided on the basis of negotiation between the Agency and each individual nation. He said that they had not really worked that out and they were not certain which might be the more practicable.

The British seem to think that the above scheme would have the following merits:

1. It would avoid placing impossible burdens on the Agency.

2. Decisions as to location of plants would be avoided. (They would apparently grow up over the world like Topsy.)

3. Nations would be free to develop atomic power to the maximum extent of their ability and interest.

I asked whether the British were seriously proposing this as something which they hoped the Soviet Union might accept. For our part we would be frightened to death if the Soviets did accept it. Makins quickly replied that this was not in any sense a formal proposal but merely some ideas they had been considering.

From today’s discussion it rather seems to me that the British think that this laissez-faire scheme they have been considering would provide them with atomic power more rapidly than any other nation except the United States and more rapidly than under our plan. Basic to this point of view seems to be the confusion on their part that the time scale of atomic power development is much shorter than we do [consider it].

Miles said very clearly that they were most anxious that the U.K. and the U.S. not show any major differences between them in the presence of the Soviet and Polish representatives. It was because of this that they were pleased to have these private conversations with us. It seems to me that the British are again engaged in a whittling-down procedure trying to see how far we will yield. I am completely convinced that if we remain firm and make our firmness quite evident they will eventually join with us. They know that the U.N.A.E.C. working papers are a cooperative effort but they think that if we weaken, other friendly nations will follow. I would put more strongly than I did in my cable No. 3359 of June 19 the conviction that I doubt very much that the British will attempt to put in any alternative proposal or major amendments.

We hope in the next discussion with the British to get a further elaboration of their ideas and to take as long as necessary to make clear the details of our own position. They seem anxious at this stage not to get into the questions of:

1. Tactics in the U.N.A.E.C. negotiations, and

2. Broader questions of U.K.–U.S. relations in the whole field of atomic energy.

They seek (and we are quite willing) to confine present discussions to the question of the major functions and powers of the Agency.

R. Gordon Arneson

1. This meeting was reported to Washington in telegram 3359, June 19, not printed.
2. R. T. G. Miles, Adviser, British Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission.