800.646/3–1247: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

confidential

1581. Jebb, Foreign Office, said he was not surprised by Gromyko’s statement on atomic energy1 as he had always been sceptical of Soviet intentions, and didn’t believe Molotov had ever meant to agree to international supervision and inspection within Russia as we contemplated it, but envisaged rather an international organization, only the Soviet section of which would inspect and supervise within Russia. Molotov’s statement represented a diversionary tactic to meet a transitory situation, he thought, and no change in basic strategy. Returning the matter to the commission seemed the only course open.

Cadogan intends to take an early opportunity to take exception to Gromyko’s breach of confidence in quoting Churchill2 from the secret record at Yalta, and to his statement that the British had favored the veto at Dumbarton Oaks. Jebb remarked that the Dumbarton Oaks record would clearly indicate the British had been strongly opposed to veto at that time.

Thinking out loud, Jebb wondered whether it might not be possible to conclude some sort of international agreement for the use of atomic energy among those willing to play ball, excluding untrustworthy nations and the Soviet Union if it would not come in on our terms. He admitted immediately, however, that the broader the knowledge of atomic energy the more likely it would be to fall into Russian hands. It seemed, nevertheless, too bad that here as in other fields the Soviets were succeeding in preventing the rest of the world from obtaining the benefits which would result from international agreement.

Sent Dept 1581, repeated Moscow 98, repeated Paris 192.

Gallman
  1. Reference is to Gromyko’s address at 115th Meeting of the Security Council, March 5; for text, see SC, 2nd yr., No. 22, pp. 443–461.
  2. Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister, 1940–1945.