Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, General; The United Nations, Volume I

USUN Files

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Ross) to the Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs (Johnson)

secret

[Washington,] March 6, 1947.

Senator Austin’s Reply to Mr. Gromyko’s Speech, March 5,¹ on Atomic Energy Matters

I had a talk with Mr. Acheson on the telephone after lunch today on the question of what Senator Austin might say in the Security Council on Monday in response to Gromyko’s speech yesterday on the atomic energy matter.²

Mr. Acheson felt that Senator Austin’s remarks on Monday must be considered against the background of the President’s forthcoming statement on Greece.³ In the light of this statement there are two approaches which Senator Austin might follow, either one of which would be a mistake.

• First, Senator Austin might make a “patience and good will” speech. This would be inconsistent with the President’s statement on Greece since this will be a pretty strong and realistic statement of the present situation.
• Second, the Senator might make a speech which would indicate that as a result of Gromyko’s statement the jig is up and there is no longer any hope of accomplishing international control of atomic energy. This would be going to the other extreme and read in conjunction with the President’s statement would give rise to speculation that our foreign policy had undergone a far-reaching and fundamental reversal. Mr. Acheson thought that it would perhaps be desirable, if possible, to keep the whole atomic energy matter in the Security Council for awhile and expose fully the Soviet position in the Council. It was unlikely, however, that this could be accomplished. It seemed to Mr. Acheson, therefore, that the essential thing to accomplish in the Security Council on Monday would be to give the headlines and lead paragraphs to the work of the Atomic Energy Commission for the next few weeks following reference back to the Commission of the Atomic Energy Commission Report.

In this connection the Senator might stress the importance of the issues raised by Gromyko indicating clearly the great gulf between the Report of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Soviet views. This statement would bring out the fact that the Soviet disagreement concerns not only minor points but major points, and that the Soviet Government disagrees with practically all of the major points in the Atomic Energy Commission Report.

The Senator’s statement might further make clear that when the Soviet Government abstained from voting on the Atomic Energy Commission Report last December it had been generally felt that this abstention might indicate that the Soviet Government would after all sooner or later go along with the major conclusions of the Report. This impression had been heightened by remarks and statements made on various occasions, if not by Gromyko then by other Soviet leaders. Gromyko’s statement yesterday clearly indicates that the impression created by the Soviet abstention last December and statements made by Soviet leaders was a false one.

I told Mr. Acheson that I felt the best way of handling the preparation of a statement for Senator Austin along the lines indicated would be to get Mr. Osborn⁴ down here to spend all day Friday in the Department talking with Mr. Oppenheimer and others concerned so that he could then subsequently, upon returning to New York, work on Saturday and over the weekend with Senator Austin having the benefit of the firsthand views he would obtain down here tomorrow.

I suggested to this end that Mr. Acheson telephone the Senator which he agreed to do.

Mr. Acheson subsequently called me. He had talked with the Senator apparently somewhat along the lines of his conversation with me, and the Senator had agreed to send Mr. Osborn down here tomorrow.⁵ I agreed with Mr. Acheson that we would take Mr. Osborn and Mr. Oppenheimer⁶ in hand and accomplish as much intensive work tomorrow as we can.

1. Reference is to Gromyko’s address at the 115th Meeting of the Security Council, March 5; for text, see SC, 2nd yr., No. 22, pp. 443–461.
2. For text of Senator Austin’s address at the 117th Meeting of the Security Council, Monday, March 10, see ibid., No. 24, pp. 487–493.
3. For text of President Truman’s message to Congress, March 12, containing recommendations on assistance for Greece and Turkey, see the Department of State Bulletin, March 23, 1947, p. 534; for documentation on United States economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey, see Vol. v, pp. 1 ff.
4. Frederick H. Osborn, Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.

5. The record of the March 6 Acheson–Austin telephone conversation here referred to indicates that the Under Secretary’s suggestions with respect to Austin’s projected reply included the following:

   “It seems to me that what Gromyko has done now is to develop the tremendous gulf that there is between the Russian ideas and ours. That I don’t think ought to be fluffed over at this time. I don’t think on the other hand it is something that you possibly can develop in one speech. It has got to be developed in the commission over a long period of time, but what you can do is to sort of write the opening paragraph so that the American people will be oriented on this and will not think that this is just some technical jargon which they don’t understand and then perhaps a little good will will smoothen it all out.” (USUN Files)

6. Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, Consultant, United States Delegation to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission; Member, General Advisory Committee of the United States Atomic Energy Commission.