Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, General; The United Nations, Volume I

Department of State Disarmament Files

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State¹

secret
RAC D–17 Final

[Washington,] February 14, 1947.

Statement of Position of the United States on the Procedure To Be Followed With Respect to the Report of the Atomic Energy Commission

I. Present Situation and Possible Developments.

1. The resolution regarding regulation of armaments which the Security Council adopted on February 13² contains a paragraph providing that the Council shall “consider as soon as possible the Report submitted by the Atomic Energy Commission (on December 31) and … take suitable decisions in order to facilitate its work.”³ Immediately after adoption of the resolution the Council began consideration of the Report.

2. Gromyko announced in the Security Council on February 11 that the Soviet delegation “reserves the right to state (during the discussion of the Report) the position of the Soviet government on the question of control of atomic energy and will, in particular state its belief that the early conclusion of a convention is necessary to prohibit atomic weapons.” (Underlining added.) It has already been announced that Gromyko will make his statement today, February 14. It is probable that the Soviet delegation will not be willing to proceed to an examination of the Atomic Energy Commission Report to the exclusion of the other questions relating to atomic energy, and that the U.S.S.R. will seek consideration of its proposed prohibition convention prior to actual examination of the Atomic Energy Commission Report.

3. The attitudes of other delegations cannot be stated with any certainty, as there has been no discussion of this question with them since January. Three of the countries which voted for the Report are no longer members of the Council or of the Atomic Energy Commission. So far as is known there have been no discussions between the U.S. Delegation in New York and the representatives of the three new members of the Council, Colombia, Syria and Belgium, regarding any aspect of the work of the Atomic Energy Commission. The Polish representative will presumably follow whatever line the U.S.S.R. takes. The old members of the Council (and of the Atomic Energy Commission) unquestionably desire the Security Council to take speedy action on the Report, with a view to sending it back to the Atomic Energy Commission for further work. They would probably wish to obtain as large a measure as possible of agreement in principle on the Recommendations contained in the Report, without attempting to be too specific on details or to go over the Recommendations line by line. Whether they will wish to go into the Findings as well as the Recommendations is not known.

II. U.S. Strategy in the Security Council Regarding Consideration of the Atomic Energy Commission Report.

1. The Council should consider, not the whole problem of the international control of atomic energy, but solely the Report submitted by the Atomic Energy Commission on December 31, 1946; any attempts to have the Council take up other aspects of the work of the Atomic Energy Commission should be discouraged and countered. This applies specifically to a convention for the prohibition of atomic weapons, which Gromyko has announced he will bring before the Council.

2. The Council should make plain that it appreciates the work of the Commission to date; that it understands this to be only an interim report; that the first stage of this work has been completed; that the second stage now begins; and that any agreements proposed to be reached are tentative, depending upon the fate of each factor essential to a complete system because such a system is indivisible. It should also be made plain that the Council recognizes, as has already been recognized in the Commission’s Report, that in connection with the drafting of treaty provisions there must be further studies and deliberations by the Commission in regard to any problems antecedent to drafting.

3. Our major objectives in the Council are:

(a) To avoid losing any ground thus far gained.

(b) To get the Atomic Energy Commission at work again and as quickly as possible on the problem of the international control of atomic energy.

(c) In order to accomplish both of the above, to endeavor to obtain agreement in principle on the Report as a whole, including the Recommendations relating to sanctions, and to have it referred back to the Atomic Energy Commission as soon as possible for further development in a draft treaty or convention of the principles embodied in the Recommendations.

(d) Failing, as is probable, to obtain objective (c), to obtain agreement in principle on as large a part of the Report as possible. The purpose would be to refer back to the Atomic Energy Commission for further development and the drafting of treaty provisions, those Recommendations upon which agreement has been reached in the Council. At the same time those Recommendations on which agreement has not been reached would also be referred back in the hope that after further deliberation and study the Atomic Energy Commission would find it possible to reconcile divergent points of view in the drafting process.

4. The emphasis in all Security Council discussion should be on the Recommendations contained on pages 22–24 of the Report (S/239). The portions of the Report other than the Recommendations, e.g., the Findings and the Technical Discussion should be taken for what they are, namely, the interim product of the Commission helpful in providing background for consideration of the principles recommended. The Council should not specifically approve these parts of the Report, although it will have to examine some of them in order to understand fully the Recommendations upon which they are based. It would be understood that reconsideration of these Findings would not be precluded, if further study in the Atomic Energy Commission indicated the desirability of such action.

5. There being no certainty as to how many of the Recommendations are acceptable to the U.S.S.R., or indeed whether any of them are acceptable, it is important to keep in mind the desirability of ascertaining exactly what the Soviet position is. There is widespread belief that the only issue as to which unanimity was lacking in the submission of the Report to the Security Council was on the much publicized question of punishments for violation of the treaty. This, however, is supported neither by the record nor by the votes of the Commission.

6. With specific respect to the Recommendations regarding relationship between the international control agency and national agencies concerned with atomic energy, it is important to make plain that any approval of these Recommendations by the Council in no way prejudices the basic principle that the international authority must have all the powers necessary to insure adequate safeguards.

7. The Recommendation that the Atomic Energy Commission supervise the transitional process involves very important questions for the United States, since it relates to the control by this Government over revelation of information and over the giving up of our special position with respect to atomic energy. Until further exploration has revealed the precise way in which we should deal with the transitional problem, we should not commit ourselves irrevocably to this Recommendation. On the other hand, it would appear unwise to call attention to this problem by raising it ourselves in the Security Council. The United States position on this matter should therefore be covered by a carefully phrased statement clearly referring to all the Recommendations and announcing that the United States considers that Security Council approval of Recommendations should be regarded as approval of the fundamental principles contained therein, but should not be considered as binding instructions to the Atomic Energy Commission as regards details.

8. However the discussion develops, it should be our endeavor to keep discussion in the Council from being too detailed or prolonged. Our aim should be to have consideration concluded by a general resolution reciting the nature of the Council’s consideration and the nature and degree of agreement reached by it with respect to the principles contained in the Recommendations, and giving directions to the Atomic Energy Commission respecting further study and the drafting of appropriate treaty provisions. In the case of Recommendations on which no agreement is reached, the directions could include a request for further efforts at reconciliation of views and for a report regarding those points on which lack of agreement still exists.

1. This memorandum, drafted by Edmund A. Gullion of the Office of the Under Secretary of State, Ernest A. Gross of the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Occupied Areas, Charles Fahy, Legal Adviser of the Department, and Joseph E. Johnson, the Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs, was approved by the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments as RAC D–17 Final on February 13 and was sent to the United States Representative at the United Nations for his guidance.
2. SC, 2nd yr.; Suppl. No. 5.
3. Omission indicated in the source text.