Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall, Dr. Stuart, and General Chou En-lai at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, September 6, 1946, 1:30 p.m.
| Also present: | Colonel Caughey |
| Captain Soong | |
| Mister Chang |
General Chou: Are you leaving for Kuling this afternoon?
General Marshall: I probably will. It is not certain.
General Chou: The paper I said I was going to write, Mr. Chang is typing up. As soon as it is finished, it will be brought over here. The purpose of this paper is to summarize the points in all the previous discussions, to write it down on paper to clarify all these points discussed before and to avoid any misunderstandings. As soon as the points are clarified I will report it to Yenan.
Doctor Stuart then arrived. General Chou gave him a brief résumé of what had occurred.
[Page 154]General Chou: In the past when I reported to Yenan, I had hoped that a cease fire order could be issued when the agreement is reached on the procedure of a State Council regarding reorganization of the Government in the informal group. But, in view of these strong demands on the part of the Government, it has made negotiation extremely difficult. In view of yesterday’s talk with you and Dr. Stuart, I felt that something new has been put into the negotiation. In the last few times of negotiation many of the new conditions have come into existence which have made negotiations extremely difficult.
In the first place, there is no guarantee that can be given for cease fire immediately upon reaching an agreement in reorganization of the government. Second, the signing of the sale of the surplus property by the United States Government to China.43 Third, after the occupation of Chengteh by the Government, General Chen Cheng announced the intention of the Government to advance into Kalgan. These three things happened at the same time. These three things have made the purpose of the informal group to discuss reorganization of the Government extremely difficult. Therefore, I must give it very serious consideration. Therefore, I want to have it written on paper. I also put down the last comments made by both you and Dr. Stuart yesterday and I want to present this report to Yenan. Also I will make my comments to this report and ask Yenan for instruction. In doing this, it will avoid any further misunderstanding on our part. I will submit this report to you later when Mr. Chang comes and I want to have you check what I have written down to make any necessary corrections on your and Dr. Stuart’s comments.
That is all I have to say.
Doctor Stuart: I have nothing to say until we see the document.
General Marshall: How long will it be before Mr. Chang arrives?
General Chou: I think about 5 to 10 minutes. When I left I had already read the script.
General Marshall: I will leave General Chou and Dr. Stuart to have any conversation they want.
General Marshall left the meeting for about ten minutes. When Mr. Chang arrived General Chou gave copies of the message44 to General Marshall and Dr. Stuart.
General Chou: This is what I have put down that I want to transmit as a report on the present situation of issue. Because some points refer to your and Dr. Stuart’s statements, I would like you to check them before I dispatch the message.
General Marshall: In the first place you use a term here that I inquired about yesterday, “government reorganization”. Dr. Stuart [Page 155] and I have discussed the establishment of a State Council as an initial step toward governmental reorganization. We have confined our discussion to that issue above and have explained that it is our intention that the group proposed, with the chairmanship of Dr. Stuart, would so far as American participation is concerned, confine its discussion to the problem of the State Council. As I have just said, this paper uses the general term “government reorganization”.
General Chou: My understanding is this—that according to Dr. Stuart’s proposal this informal group, under chairmanship of Dr. Stuart, is entirely confined to discussion on the initiation of the State Council, but when it reaches the Steering Committee the Steering Committee may go beyond that scope as to envelop the Executive Yuan and other matters. That is why I used the term “reorganization of the government”. So there is a different understanding on the function of the Stuart group and the Steering Committee. They may be made explicit in my message.
General Marshall: My comment is addressed to the fact that you are asking us for an expression of opinion regarding this paper and yet you are using a term that I do not accept.
Doctor Stuart: So far as the small committee is concerned, it is confined to the State Council. General Chou is changing that. But he said the Steering Committee had the right to raise that issue.
General Marshall: We have not time to go over all those things. They are long and complicated and we would need days instead of hours.
Doctor Stuart: We would rather that is left out altogether.
General Marshall: The Steering Committee only came into this matter to meet General Chou’s demand that whatever this small group did, it would be confirmed by the Steering Committee. We are not putting ourselves in a position of attacking, at this time, all of these complicated political matters that you gentlemen have been unable to settle after long months of discussion. We are trying to get one single thing straightened out.
As to sub-paragraph one, regarding governmental organization and PCC resolutions, the first sentence states these are included, the implication being from Dr. Stuart and myself, that such an understanding is favored by the government. The only understanding Dr. Stuart and I have with the Government pertains to the State Council alone.
Sub-paragraph two again brings up the question of governmental reorganization in regard to the business of the informal group. We had confined our proposal for the informal group to the sole question of the State Council.
As to sub-paragraph three, I have no comment.
[Page 156]As to sub-paragraph [paragraph] four, in the last sentence Dr. Stuart and I think the word “prospect” should read “assurance”.
Sub-paragraph [Paragraph] 6, in the first sentence relating to Dr. Stuart is the expression that “the United States side will exercise criticism on the Chinese Government.” That is Dr. Stuart’s statement regarding his willingness.
As to sub-paragraph [paragraph] seven, the first sentence where it says “The American side,” should read “support” instead of “endorse” the stand. The remainder of that paragraph presents a confusion of my statement and your recording. As nearly as I can recall, what I stated was that I could not promise at this time just what my view would be regarding the military situation at that time. That can only be a guess at the present moment, and would have to take into account the events between now and then. I do not recall to what extent I elaborated on that but we can look at the record and see. The situation has changed materially since June 30th and is changing every day and becoming much more complicated for readjustment. My own attitude is very much that which I expressed in relation to Manchuria, that I could not commit myself either with the Government or the Communist Party until I had a fairly definite understanding of what their respective stipulations or conditions were to be; that I could not put myself in the position of being a party to an agreement which probably would quickly break down in serious disagreements over the actual terms of agreement.
General Chou: With regard to the statements you have just made, I think I understand what you mean, but there are two points to be made clear: 1) When we come to the point of bringing about the cessation of hostilities, is it your understanding that it will be brought before the Committee of Three for settlement?
General Marshall: That is correct, it is my idea rather than my understanding, as understanding implies that the Generalissimo had told me that.
General Chou: 2) I suppose that by that time the Government instead of agreeing to an unconditional truce will want to present certain demands, for example the five conditions, and whether such a possibility exists or not that the government will want certain terms?
General Marshall: That is my guess, as that is what they have been stating.
General Chou: But you do not preclude such a possibility?
General Marshall: What happened was this; a statement had been made by the Generalissimo that might well be taken as indicating that the basis for settlement of hostilities was very simple. For example, that the Communists cease fighting would be all that was necessary, and that the terms of the January 10 agreement apply now. [Page 157] In order to avoid the possibility of any misunderstanding, to avoid my being embarrassed and General Chou being misled, I have in each case carefully questioned the Generalissimo to make certain that each one of these difficult points was brought out into the open. So far I have found each time that he was not receding on his 5 conditions. Therefore, I have so explained the matter to General Chou in order that he would not be misled. I wondered once or twice whether or not General Chou had unconsciously come to feel that I was making the conditions. I was trying to be very certain that I did not find myself in the embarrassing position, so I have in each case asked as many searching questions as seemed necessary to make certain that there could be no misunderstanding. If the Generalissimo today were to make a statement to me indicating his intention to go ahead with the cessation of hostilities, I would question him very closely to make certain that I did not find myself in a dilemma of misunderstanding.
I have disliked asking some of the questions because they seem to suggest difficulties, but I was afraid to pass the matter over and accept the general statement without the detailed exposition of actually what was intended. Now my hope, and that of Dr. Stuart, has been that we might prevail upon the Government to moderate their demands to an extent that would be acceptable to the Communist Party and when we found ourselves in a deadlock we turned as a last resort to the settlement of one political phase of the matter. We thought that if that could be accomplished it might have the effect of stimulating a little of the mutual confidence that seemed to exist in January and under that condition we could find a solution to the problem of terminating hostilities.
General Chou: I accept all the points which you have suggested be amended, but as to the last part of paragraph seven, I wonder if my understanding of your statement is correct. Does it mean that as to the cessation of hostilities it is expected to be brought before the Committee of Three for discussion and that there is also the possibility that the Government would bring forth certain conditions before the Committee of Three; such conditions for the cessation of hostilities as the five conditions recently put forth by the Government?
General Marshall: That is my conception. I am not agreeing to the procedure because I have to get the Generalissimo’s views first. That is my conception and it will be my effort to have that arrangement agreed to.
General Chou: We can leave out the last part of that paragraph if it is not clear to you.
General Marshall: Do you have any objection to my outlining this message to the Generalissimo, or would you rather I wait?
General Chou: No objection.
[Page 158]Doctor Stuart: This is supposed to be confidential. I do not think General Chou wants it published.
General Marshall: I am thinking of the publicity. You never can tell where the publicity is going to come from and if I talk to the Generalissimo I cannot be certain what will happen.
Doctor Stuart: They (the Communists) are the ones who don’t intend to announce it.
General Chou: My idea is that you can certainly communicate to the Government and the Generalissimo the contents of this message. If they would leak it out for publicity it is not your concern. If the Government makes publicity of it, then of course I will feel forced to make a reply, but I hope that before our next meeting you will keep it confidential.
General Marshall: Maybe a better way would be for me not to refer to that document but merely talk about the issues.
General Chou: I agree.
General Marshall: I will do it that way if possible. I think I can make the approach. I can state all the matters you have listed and say that you are communicating with Yenan without saying we have this in the form of a document.