893.00/9–2746: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 27—12:40 a.m.]
1546. Minister of Information issued following statement Sept. 25:
“If essential conditions are fulfilled (by the Communists), peace will follow immediately and permanently. Conflicts are much less widespread than advertised by Communist propaganda. The Communists have been clamoring for peace. The govt wants peace, too, but the govt wants a real peace, a permanent peace, not a patchwork peace. In the past our experience has been that cease fire orders have been used by the Communists reculer pour mieux sauter, a means of gathering strength for a new attack. In the past the Communists have wanted peace where they were weak, and used it as a breathing spell for regrouping and reorganization; but where they were strong, they attacked. This record of Communist tactics is fresh in our memories. After the general cease fire order in January the Communists occupied Changchun in violation of a solemn agreement. In June, after a second govt cease fire order, they attacked and captured Techow and besieged Tsinan and Tsingtao. They precipitated conflict in northern Kiangsu by attacking Taihing. The tragedy of the Lunghai railroad was caused by the assault of Communist troops under Liu Po-cheng. Their siege of Tatung caused hostilities in Chahar. All these incidents show that, unless the Communists live up to their agreement under the Army reorganization and integration program, and unless there is definite determination of the places where the Communists should be garrisoned, cease fire will mean only a patchwork peace that suits the convenience of the Communists. But if these essential conditions are fulfilled, peace will follow immediately and permanently. Conflicts are much less widespread than advertised by Communist propaganda. As a matter of fact, except the area around Chahar, fighting has practically come to an end in the other sections. There is no fighting along the Lunghai railway, in the south of Shantung and in the north and east of Hopei. In north Kiangsu merely mopping-up operations are going on. The Communists broke many dikes in that district, but by an irony of fate, these operations only served to handicap the arrival of Communist reinforcements and prevent the retreat of the defeated Communist troops. A great number of Communist troops were trapped in these flooded areas and made prisoners.”