Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East: China, Volume IX

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270: Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

Peiping, 10 August 1946.

6752. The following is reply to questions listed in your 1288.⁶⁹

a. Colonel Davis did not object to agreement on a settled procedure for team action. Both he and the Natl Govt representative did vote to examine Major Freese and Mr. Duke, Executive Headquarters personnel who were passengers in the convoy at time it was attacked, and the Marine witnesses from Tientsin, during the time team was waiting for safe conduct pledge from Communists requested on August 2 and not reported until August 6. General Huang on the other hand insisted upon the following procedure in the order enumerated as a sine qua non for team action:

1. Interview with General Hockey in Tientsin;

2. Interview with General Sun Lien-Chung, Commander Generalissimo’s 11th War Zone Hqs;

3. Interview with unnamed Communist Commander of unidentified Communist unit;

4. Agreement that all witnesses called upon to give testimony would have to be unanimously approved by team.

Colonel Davis offered the following counter proposals for procedure:

1. Interrogation of Major Freese and Mr. Duke;

2. Interrogation of the Marine Commander and witnesses;

3. Visit by them to point of conflict to interview such Communist commanders and other Communist witnesses as may be available and any civilians who may be found as witnesses;

4. Visit such other commanders and Hqs as team considers appropriate;

5. Team meeting to consider evidence and formation of team report.

National Govt representative voted to accept the American program. Communist representative objected and to the time of this writing has not allowed team to examine any witnesses although Marine witnesses have been standing by ready to testify since Wednesday August 7. (In my 6688⁷⁰ it was erroneously stated that testimony was taken on ground from villagers at time of team visit to scene of conflict on afternoon of August 8. Both Natl Govt and American team representatives voted to hear testimonies of magistrate of district and other villagers who were available, but Communist representative refused to allow testimony to be taken.

b. Question already answered under a.

c. Colonel Davis did not object to rotation of chairmanship. When question was raised in Chiefs of Staff meeting, American Chief of Staff’s reply was that it had been agreed by the Committee of Three that American Branch members would act as chairman of teams. Subject was not pursued further. I have personally stated to General Yeh that I did not object to rotation of chairmanship, but decision of course also involved consent of Natl Govt Branch. General Yeh replied that he did not consider the question important.

d. Colonel Davis is not the officer you met at Tsinanfu. He did not go to the field until 12 April and has never met you in China. You are referring to Colonel Lake. Davis was selected by Timberman and me after consideration of new available officers. Colonel Martin would have been our first choice, but unfortunately he was and still is ill and incapable of taking assignment. However, Davis, formerly a Brigadier General in the Air Force, is an intelligent, sincere and earnest officer, approximately 52 years old, and entirely too dignified a gentleman to be subjected to the rough handling he has had to undergo at the hands of General Huang. General Huang having again blocked all team action this morning, I again propose[d] to General Yeh in private meeting this afternoon that we either appoint new Communist and American team representatives or report to the Committee of Three that the team was in hopeless deadlock. After some discussion, during which he mentioned having a msg from Chou En-lai, Yeh and I came to tentative agreement on program of procedure almost identical to the one submitted by Colonel Davis and is now being translated for submission to Natl Govt Commissioner. I am hoping to obtain signed agreement this evening. I fully appreciate the threat of this situation to your position as mediator and to the future effectiveness of Executive Hqs. For this reason it may be advisable to wait and see what comes out of the agreed program of procedure. However the Communists appear to be endeavoring to maneuver this incident into an issue of Americans fighting with Natl Govt troops against Communists, the purpose being, I believe, to force the withdrawal of American military force from China. I feel certain the Communist leaders in this Hqs are fully cognizant of the falsity of their official claim, but have a propaganda job to do; there is no prospect in my opinion of reaching agreement with them on this incident, whatever procedure is adopted.⁷¹

69. August 10, not printed.
70. August 9, p. 1489.
71. Agreement on a “program of procedure” was reached by the three Commissioners on August 14: see communication from the Three Commissioners of Executive Headquarters to Field Team No. 25, August 10, vol. x, p. 329.