Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall, General Chou En-lai, and Dr. Stuart at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, August 10, 1946, 10:40 a.m.
| Also present: | Colonel Caughey |
| Mr. Chang | |
| Captain Soong |
General Chou: With reference to the negotiations, yesterday Doctor Stuart informed me about the present situation. I feel that we are placed in a most difficult position. Prior to your departure [Page 1494] for Kuling, I felt that the only way to think was in terms of broad principles and leave aside the detailed points for the time being. Therefore, at that time I suggested three procedures by which we may compose the present dispute.
The first one is an immediate nation-wide truce. Once the truce is established, all the documents which we prepared prior to June 29 could be signed and put into effect, with the exception, of course, of the points concerning the local administration.
Secondly, would be a simultaneous solution of the government reorganization problem and the military problem. This would appear to be a reasonable approach because, if we leave the point of administrative affairs aside, the Government may not feel safe to declare the truce. It was my thought that with the participation of Doctor Stuart we might easily negotiate that matter. Our present problem is merely an elaboration of the principles for the government reorganization as already laid down by the PCC. I fully agree with the proposals suggested by Doctor Stuart regarding that question—that the American, the Government and the Communist representatives should first have a preliminary discussion and that then the other parties would be informed about their proceedings. Finally the basis agreed upon can be put before the steering committee of the PCC for approval. Then the government can go ahead with its reorganization.
As a third alternative, in case we fail to achieve the first two alternatives—that is a total truce and government reorganization—then we may, in the process of our negotiation, first settle the cessation of hostilities piecemeal so that at least the fighting will not be spread out, but on the contrary, be narrowed down. This was my suggestion prior to your departure for Kuling. I conveyed the same idea to Doctor Stuart later on. This proposal seemed to me the most reasonable action.
As indicated by my statements yesterday we (Communists) may easily conclude that the Government has no intention to settle the disputes. The Government merely issued terms which they knew beforehand would be unacceptable to us, and that those terms go beyond the terms which were brought forward in our previous discussions prior to June 30, and also at the 5-man conference between the Government and the Communist representatives. Therefore I do not see a way to complete those terms. It appears the Government attitude indicates that they are pursuing a different course, as I explained yesterday, instead of intending to settle the issue.
Because there was little time left yesterday, I did not have a chance to enumerate the facts in support of my statement and I would like [Page 1495] to give a few main facts for that purpose. Regarding the military affairs, at the time when the armistice in June was still in effect, the Generalissimo in a speech delivered to the military officers at a Memorial Service said that he has perfect assurance that the military issue would be settled within one year. General Chen Cheng at the press conference in Kuling also said outspokenly that the Government will resort to force. As the matter now stands, the Government forces have deployed over 80 per cent of their strength to the north of the Yangtze River; in north, central, northwest and northeast China to fight against the Communist troops. Should the demands put forward by the Generalissimo be not accepted by the Communists—which demand Communist evacuation in areas to the south of the Lunghai railroad in North Kiangsu, in Shantung, Shansi, Jehol Provinces and in Manchuria, plus the sector of the adjacent areas of the Peiping–Tientsin–Shanhaikwan railroad area—then fighting will take place in the entire region to the north of the Yangtze River. Should we reject the terms, they would attempt to take those places by force as was clearly indicated by General Chen Cheng. Therefore, in case the fighting cannot be narrowed down and we do not accept the terms, the Government would insist on occupying those places by force and the fighting will spread. This procedure of the Government is obviously in contradiction with President Truman’s statement and the terms which Ave worked out during the 22 days’ armistice. The Communist desire, as always, is for an unconditional truce and as soon as that truce is announced the armies of both sides should withdraw for a certain distance in order to effect a separation of forces.
Regarding the PCC resolutions, there are even more instances which show that the Government is trying by all efforts to pursue a course it alone chooses without consulting the other parties. Doctor Peng Hsueh Pei67 declared outspokenly to the correspondents to this effect. Mr. Chen Li Fu also stated to Mr. Wang Yen Pi and other leaders of the Democratic League in Shanghai that the minor parties should not wait for the Communists but should participate directly in the Government and break with the Communists. He openly condemned General Mao Tze Tung68 as a traitor. He is openly sowing dissension among the democratic elements and is paving the ground for a government reorganization without Communist participation. I anticipate that the procedure of the Kuomintang elements would be that they may invite the Communists to participate with the Government but they would not first consult us. The Kuomintang merely would say, “Here are the seats and whether you take them or not, we will go ahead [Page 1496] with reorganizing the Government anyway.” In case they would be less polite they would just simply ignore the Communist Party. They would adopt the same procedure at the National Assembly and the Constitution. With regard to the PCC resolutions, they would only carry out those parts which seemed favorable to them and neglect those parts which are unfavorable. Our desire is, of course, for the government reorganization but we hope this reorganization is accomplished through consultation with the other parties and along the procedure proposed by Dr. Stuart.
In the meantime, of course, we could discuss the civil administration problem. Then we would consult the opinion of the other parties, and finally the steering committee of the PCC. The steering committee would approve the civil administration agreement as a matter of formality. However the latest events would seem to indicate that this course is not acceptable to the Government. Therefore I rather feel lost as to how to make any suggestions with regard to the PCC resolutions.
Now as to the attitude of the United States toward China and the attitude of the Kuomintang. Since the An-ping incident the Kuomintang is bending all their efforts to sow dissension between the Chinese Communist Party and the U. S. On the other hand, they hope that during the coming two and three months the U. S. will stand aside and not bother any more about the hostilities between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. This would leave a free hand to the Kuomintang in that they may capture additional places from the Communist area, and in that they may go ahead freely with the government reorganization and the National Assembly as they desire.
With reference to the An-ping incident I made a careful study of the statement you made yesterday. I immediately wired to Peiping about your statement and after studying this matter again by reading the reports of the Central News and other Kuomintang sources it seems to me that the Communist Party did not have the intention to stall the matter. I do not want to refer to the information that comes from my own source, I merely want to judge my opinion from the reports of the Central News and the Kuomintang papers. From the papers I read that the team was dispatched on the 8th but they came back without result on that day. The reason for the failure on that day was because they had no agreed procedure. The Communist representative insisted on having such a procedure. According to the report of the Central News the procedure put forward by the Communist representative was; first, to hear the report of the American commander; second, to hear the report of the local commanders of the Communist forces; third, to hear the report of the local government; fourth, to hear the testimony of the eye witnesses; fifth, the eye witness may [Page 1497] include both American and Communist personnel; and sixth, to hear the testimony of the local civilians. After going through this procedure the team may collect the material and submit their report and recommendations to the Three Commissioners. Now, according to the same Central News report the American commissioner mainly agreed to that procedure, but the National Government commissioner refused to sign because he did not feel assured by such a procedure. Without a signature the Communist member did not feel assured and he insisted that such a procedure should be formally agreed upon by the Commissioners. His insistence seems to me quite reasonable because the Nationalists seem to want to hear only the American member, then conduct an investigation on the spot. Then they would term the investigation as concluded. In effect such a procedure would permit reaching a conclusion before any investigation is made and the conclusion would be that the whole incident was created by the Communist side. That is why the Communist representative raised objection. It can be accepted without dispute that the Central News certainly would not in particular favor the Communists. Therefore, I cannot see from that report that we have any intention to avoid a settlement of that issue. The only thing is that the Communist representative does not feel assured without a definite procedure and he is afraid of the Kuomintang intentions to reach a conclusion prior to the investigation. Now the judgment made by me is entirely based on the report from the Central News.
With regard to the second point I just raised about the present sentiment of the Kuomintang, they are now circulating in many papers that you are preparing to go back to the U. S.—reports to that effect. The other day when I spoke to Dr. Stuart, his personal comment was that in case there is no way of settlement right now the only thing for the Americans to do is to stand aside and to look upon the matter. Should those two points be realized then I think it would be most unfortunate and disadvantageous for China. It seems to me that the most desirable thing for China would be that the mediation of the U. S. in line with President Truman’s statement be successfully accomplished.
Should that mediation fail then there would be only two alternatives as I related to Dr. Stuart the other day. The first alternative would be to leave China to a chaos of civil war which would mean a complete tragedy. The second alternative would be international intervention which is highly undesirable. The Kuomintang has recently published an editorial in the Li Hsing daily in Kuling which was written by Mr. Tao Hsi Sheng and prompted by the Generalissimo. In that article he said that the National Government is not afraid of intervention and implied thereby that they would like to see General [Page 1498] Marshall leave for the time being and let them have a free hand to carry on war for a certain period. By such a procedure they would force the Communist Party into a dead corner and leave us no way out of the situation. There is a Chinese proverb that used to say, “Even a dog, if he is pressed to a dead corner, would jump over the wall.” Therefore the Government can hardly expect the Communist Party to find itself pressed into the corner without finding for itself a way out. As I told you before, all our efforts had been aimed to achieve unity and we avoided doing anything that would lead to National dissension. That is why we abandoned recently the calling of the federation conference of the liberated areas. We also assumed a tacit attitude toward the suppression of the Kuomintang authorities of our papers in Nanking and Shanghai and to the suppression of freedom of rights. Though we could in accordance with the normal procedure first get our paper published and then have it registered in order to avoid any trouble, we have no intention to do so. Recently the Kuomintang circulated many rumors and I refrained from making any reply, placing hope on the success of our negotiations as I have full confidence in the efforts of you and Doctor Stuart.
One of the recent rumors says that we have broken the dykes in North Kiangsu and I made a study of the reports carried in the reports this morning. I found that the flooded area is all within the Communist control. (General Chou produced a map Avhich he showed to General Marshall and Dr. Stuart.) According to the report we would have broken the dykes merely to flood our own area. This action, from the military as well as the common sense standpoint, would be impractical as it would result in the flooding of our own area. They permitted the correspondents to view the area from the air and did not permit the correspondents to go overland. As you know in summer time there is some flooding because of high water in many places all over China and it cannot be detected from the air whether they were caused by the dyke breaking or due to natural causes. The correspondents said that they could not detect from the air any break of the dykes, but rather the whole dyke itself was overflooded by high water.
Now all the procedures adopted by the Kuomintang is directed to cause a split with the Communist Party. What the Kuomintang most desires is that we would pursue the way to civil war to try to overthrow the government. Of course we would never pursue that course. Meanwhile we have to contemplate seriously what measures we should adopt. We have to record carefully what we should do in case the fighting cannot be stopped and the Kuomintang goes ahead with the government reorganization and the National Assembly without consulting us. Should the Kuomintang use a free hand to [Page 1499] go ahead for the next three or four months according to its own desire then we have to conceive our own measures. In that case China may be virtually divided into two parts. That would not only be against the interests of the Chinese people but would also be detrimental to the world and to the United States. That is why I am so seriously concerned that General Marshall and Dr. Stuart would continue their efforts. During the past six months, I have exerted efforts to achieve peace in China and I would like to see that in this present dilemma they double their efforts to compose the situation.
Now speaking of concrete terms, I would like to cite an instance. For example, with reference to the U. S. Marine Corps in China, it has been enunciated that the Marine Corps was stationed in China for two purposes. One, for the repatriation of Japanese. As a matter of fact all the Japanese in China Proper have been evacuated. Therefore that reason no longer continues to be a consideration. Second, to help to maintain peace. It appears to me that if the position of the U. S. Marines is to maintain a true peace, the area garrisoned by the U. S. Marines should be free from any attacks, and also free from any military movement on the Kuomintang side. That area would be a true neutral zone. Communications would be used then for no other purpose than for peace. If the Communist troops are not permitted to move in that area, but the Kuomintang may use that area to transport troops, that area cannot be considered neutral. That pertains to Tsingtao also. Therefore, in order to assure peace, the Marine Corps should be made just as completely neutral as the Executive Headquarters. Otherwise it would be hard to comprehend by all sides. It seems that these points require consideration of the U. S.
Doctor Stuart made a few comments in Chinese.
(Summary of Dr. Stuart’s comments to General Chou).
“After talking to General Marshall I made an informal proposal for General Chou’s consideration that General Marshall and I jointly recommend that the Communists withdraw from all of North Kiangsu to a point north of the Lunghai railroad, that they withdraw from the Tsingtao–Tsinan railroad, that they withdraw from the city of Chengte and the part of the province south of the city, and that they withdraw into the 2½ provinces of Manchuria previously specified. That if they agreed to this we shall urge the Government to arrange at the earliest possible time for the proposed informal committee to meet and that this be followed by the establishment of the steering committee and the State Council. This would in effect establish a reorganized government in which the Communists are represented and could take up all such matters as local administration, not only for the areas specially under consideration but in a more inclusive sense. We would further recommend to our own government that [Page 1500] plans for a reformed and reorganized government be assisted in every possible way.”
General Chou: Now with reference to the proposal just made by Doctor Stuart to both parties. I would like to make the following comments on points raised by Dr. Stuart with reference to the Communist Party calling for complete evacuation from North Kiangsu to the north of the Lunghai railroad, from Tsingtao–Tsinan railroad, south of Jehol including Chengteh and, in a large part, from Manchuria. Now those are all old issues which have been under discussion prior to June 29 and also by the 5-man committee. The Communist feeling has been that some definite measures have already been worked out or rather proposed by me concerning the military aspect. For example, I proposed that the Communists would only station a small force in North Kiangsu and that they will have no force stationed along the Tsingtao–Tsinan Railroad or in South Jehol. The two issues in connection with Manchuria are Harbin and Antung. The Harbin issue may be considered as solved, while I am willing to consider the Antung issue. So it seems to me that Antung is the only point that remains under consideration. As far as the military aspect is concerned, the issue can be settled in this way.
Speaking about the political aspect, the Government now demands taking over certain places from the Communists prior to the Government reorganization. Such a procedure is in contradiction to the PCC resolutions because the PCC resolutions specified that discussion will be held regarding the disputed areas after the Government reorganization. It seems to me that the taking over of those places by the Government are by nature administrative and therefore political problems. Such a procedure is against the PCC resolutions. The Generalissimo, himself, has stated that he would abide by the PCC resolutions. If such a procedure is adopted, as I said, then it constitutes an overthrow of PCC resolutions. Following that as a precedent, the Government may overthrow any part which is disadvantageous to them. In that case, the PCC resolutions will be completely thrown out. In previous discussions, I made a concession to this effect, that an informal committee may be called together to hold preliminary discussion on such matters prior to the government reorganization, with a view to facilitating the government reorganization. Of course the discussion will not be confined to only a part of those territories, but they must consider the whole issue of the Communist areas. Now if the Government’s present desire is merely to take over the places referred to in the terms and to leave the other Communist areas in a state of uncertainty, such a procedure is not acceptable to us; nor do I feel that I can make a report to our own [Page 1501] people about such a procedure because the interest of millions and tens of millions of population are at stake should we turn over to the Kuomintang those areas while the fate of the population in other parts are still in suspense. That is why such a procedure seems unreasonable to me and is beyond my consideration. On the other hand, the proposals raised by the Government are all matters which have been faced in the period between January and March. All those terms have been signed and agreed upon by the Government. The Government is committed to carry out such as the reorganization of the Government, the army reorganization, and the live resolutions of the PCC governing such matters as the government reaction for democracy, peace freedom, the National Assembly with participation of all parties, and democratic constitution. The Government should have carried out those parts on its own accord and it is not a new issue. Of course we desire and fully welcome the American representative to press the Government to this effect, but it is also our view that the Government should on its own accord carry out those parts unless the situation has changed so much that some points are no longer applicable.
I would like to point out that those proposals which concern the Government are all points which have been agreed upon by the Government previously and to which the Government is already committed; while those proposals which concern the Communist Party are new issues which have no direct bearing to the points we have had under discussion. By putting those two claims side by side, it seems to us not very fair. It is therefore not acceptable to us, nor can it be comprehended by our own people. Instead I would rather suggest this division of issues: Any proposal concerning the military affairs that was not settled prior to June 29, I would suggest be settled now but, as to local administrative affairs, that should be referred to the political sub-committee which will then discuss this issue in an over-all manner and not piecemeal. Otherwise the handing over of such territories is tantamount of [to] ceding of territory by the Communist Party. If we reject the Government claim, the Generalissimo will try to achieve his purpose by force. I recall that Dr. Stuart told me the Generalissimo had mentioned to him recently that he sees no purpose for the Communist Party to insist of [on] holding North Kiangsu because they cannot defend it. That seems to say that he would take those places by force. This seems most unfortunate to me. I must also point out that we never asked the Government to cede any territory to the Communists because we think it is not proper to lay such claim.
[Page 1502]That is my comment with regard to Dr. Stuart’s proposal.
General Marshall: Apparently that concludes what we can do this morning. I do not know now just when I personally would wish to meet with General Chou again nor do I know now what phase of the situation I would wish to discuss. I will have to think about it. I will discuss the situation with Dr. Stuart, Should, on the other hand, General Chou have any matters or thoughts that he wishes to bring to my attention my time is at his disposal. However, it might be that Dr. Stuart would prefer to discuss matters further and he can so proceed on his own initiative.
General Chou: I think the present situation is extremely tense, as I have said before. Therefore we cannot wait too long because the fighting is still continuing. That means that the Kuomintang is going along the road to a complete national split and that the Kuomintang is persistently working along its own line to the complete disregard of any other factor. Therefore we cannot wait too long to let the situation stall by itself. It is my conviction that the more the situation becomes deteriorated, the more it will be difficult for mediation. I have told you very frankly and completely about what I am thinking with regard to the present situation and I hope that you would let me know about your observations and any point of view you may have on this so that I can then render a report to Yenan and send them at the same time my own opinion on the situation with my recommendations. Therefore I hope that you would let me, at an early date, know about the opinions you may have formed. Of course I will also find time to contact Dr. Stuart.