711.93/8–746: Telegram
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Durbrow) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 10—4:56 a.m.]
3113. An outspoken and sharply critical survey of American policy in China written by A. Perevertailo appeared in New Times No. 14, July 15.
Article starts off with statement that principal factor favoring fomentation civil war in China is USA support of reactionary Kmt circles in their fight against democratic movement. American policy in China is motivated by (1) economic, (2) political and strategic interests.
USA Govt and businessmen regard China market as prime importance. During war USA consolidated economic position in China [Page 1461] through loans, Lend-Lease, many advisers and experts. Chief competitors Japan, Germany, Britain were eliminated or pushed aside. USA regards its economic predominance in China as legitimate war prize and views China as new economic frontier. China’s ruling circles count upon American aid to enable them to escape making radical agrarian reforms necessary to expand domestic markets. These considerations are economic basis of political collaboration between Chinese reaction and certain American circles.
American political and strategic aspirations shaping policy in China are part of obvious American plan of world domination. China is regarded as one of most important steps along road to world domination. American imperialists view Chinese democratic elements as chief obstacle obstructing realization of expansionist plans and fear that democratic victory may alter Chinese development so as to preclude possibility of using China in American global strategy plan.
Hence, “Communist danger” publicized by American reactionary press and insistence on support of Kmt reactionaries in fight against Chinese democracy. “Fables” about aggressive Soviet designs and interference in China are used as pretexts for keeping USA troops in China and extending aid to Chinese reactionaries.
“America’s present policy in China differs radically from that prosecuted by Roosevelt administration.” Under Roosevelt US diplomats concentrated on achieving Chinese unification and democratization. One-sided support of reactionary Kmt first introduced with advent of Hurley44 who encouraged Chiang’s intransigence and intention of reactionaries to liquidate Communists after Japan’s defeat.
With Japanese defeat USA military authorities gave Chinese Govt troops large scale military aid claiming it would facilitate Japanese surrender. Kmt used this aid to start first post-war offensive against Peoples Revolutionary Armies and democratic regions. Wedemeyer45 was quoted as stating “our assistance in redistribution of Chinese Govt forces ipso facto strengthens Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s position as opposed to Chinese Communist forces.”
“Pressure of public opinion in China and USA compelled American Govt to recall Hurley46 and send Marshall.[”] Although a truce was established American aid continued enabling Chinese reactionaries to violate truce and launch new and wider offensive which continued [Page 1462] until June when new truce was arranged which was observed no better than first.
Perevertailo itemized Lend-Lease and other advances to Chinese Govt, He then said: “It is palpably evident that none of these expenditures were called for by practical needs to bring Japanese capitulation to conclusion”. Capitulation could have been effected by Peoples Revolutionary Armies at cheaper cost to China and American taxpayers. Course taken by American command was only to prevent Japanese capitulation to Peoples Revolutionary Army troops, to prevent latter from keeping strategic centers and communications in liberated territories and to ensure technical superiority of Govt troops.
Administration bill introduced in Congress for rearming, et cetera, of Chinese Army “evoked a wave of indignation particularly in China.”
After describing at some length Chinese demonstrations against civil war and American intervention, Perevertailo asked what was reaction of American authorities to legitimate demands of Chinese people. “Notwithstanding all the activities displayed by General Marshall in China his efforts have so far borne no fruit. They are obviously at variance with the policy actually pursued by America in China which policy in its turn is at variance with decisions at Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers.”47 American troops are to remain in China, military assistance bill is being pushed through Congress48 and Senate has voted to give China 270 naval vessels. Judging by their actions American military authorities in China are preparing for major operations.
These facts compel conclusion that USA has no intention of changing its policy of interfering in Chinese internal affairs. [It is?] Furtherance of ambition to create in China economic, political and strategic bases for establishment of American domination in Far East.
“Such policy is bound to excite most serious apprehensions in circles that strive to maintain and consolidate peace. The Soviet policy cannot be indifferent to America’s policy in China.”
Comment.
Although this article is perhaps the bluntest which has appeared in Soviet publications regarding American policy in China it is subdued in comparison with treatment of many other international subjects, characterized by ranting hyperbole and dialectical subjectivity. [Page 1463] We suspect that Perevertailo’s comments represent pretty accurately all sentiments of Soviet leaders regarding American policy in China.
- For special mission of Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, see Foreign Relations, vol. vi, pp. 247 ff.↩
- Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, Commanding General, U. S. Forces in China. October 1944–April 1945.↩
- For resignation of Ambassador Hurley, November 1945, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. vii, pp. 722 ff.↩
- For text of the Moscow communiqué of December 27, 1945, see Department of State Bulletin, December 30, 1945, p. 1027, or Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. ii, pp. 815 and 821.↩
- For correspondence on this subject, see vol. x, pp. 724 ff.↩