Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East: China, Volume IX

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Record of Conference at the Embassy in China, August 6, 1946

August 6, 1946

[Participants:	Ambassador Stuart
	General Chou En-lai
	Philip Fugh, Assistant to Ambassador Stuart]

Doctor Stuart: I feel very much disturbed that during the peace negotiations anything like the An-ping incident should have happened. If the Chinese Communists wish to force the withdrawal of U. S. forces from China, public opinion in the United States indicates that the opposite might be the result.

Regarding the question of the Informal Committee, as discussed in our previous conversation, the concurrence of President Chiang has been secured. But he made certain preliminary conditions which Mr. Fugh took down in writing. I shall now ask him to read these.

Mister Fugh: The An-ping incident has placed considerable difficulty in the way of peace negotiations. The reaction of United States public opinion regarding the incident depends much upon its future developments. After discussion, President Chiang approved the establishment of the Informal Committee. But before the meeting of the Committee the Government should first discuss what the objectives of the Committee are to be. They should be as follows:

(a) To put into effect the cease fire order of June 30th.

(b) To put into effect the plan of February 27 [February 9] for restoring communications.

(c) To carry out the basic plan of army reorganization of February 25th.

Decision should be made in one month to six weeks time on the following:

(a) Withdrawal of the Communists in Northern Kiangsu to north of the Lunghai Railway.

(b) Withdrawal from the Chiao-chi³⁹ Railway line.

(c) Withdrawal from Chengteh and the area south.

(d) In the northeast the Communists must withdraw into the 2½ provinces (Heilungkiang Province, Neng Kiang Province and ½ of Hsin-an Province).

(e) Territories in Shansi and Shantung Provinces taken after July [June] 7th should be restored. Fighting is to be stopped at once and the Committee will meet again and resume the negotiations, if in the first meeting of the Committee the above stipulations have been adopted.

General Chou: Regarding the An-ping incident, it is my opinion an investigation should be made before our drawing any conclusions for, according to reports of the Chinese Communists, the incident was precipitated by the intrusion of Kuomintang troops together with United States troops into the “liberated area”. The United States Marines had several times before created disturbances, only fortunately no incidents were precipitated then. The fact that conflicts are liable to occur along the Pei–Ning⁴⁰ railway line can be explained as follows:

(1) The United States troops in wanting to protect the railway line, have a tendency to push away from the line. The Chinese Communist troops, while trying to avoid conflict, cannot very well help resisting when coming into direct contact with the United States troops. In the recent past, several United States undertakings have given rise to misunderstandings on the part of the local people, such as photograph-taking and setting up of radio stations by the United States troops in liberated areas.

(2) The United States troops want to protect the lines between Chinwangtao and Tientsin, between Tientsin and Peiping and the highway between Tientsin and Peiping, but these lines are utilized by Kuomintang troops for shipping arms and ammunition.

(3) The railways from Chinwangtao to Shanhaikwan, from Shanhaikwan to Manchuria have since the end of the war been used by the Kuomintang for shipping troops. The practice is still being continued.

(4) The Kuomintang makes use of the railway line between Shanhaikwan and Peiping for shipping arms and munitions and try to expand their territories along the line. When attacked by the Communists they retreat to the railway line. If the Communists further attacked, conflict with United States troops would result. The Chinese Communists and the people regret the above state of affairs.

An-ping is in the liberated area. The Communists were usually notified when United States troops passed through the place on previous occasions. But this time no notification had been received. As the fight lasted four hours, it could not be called surprise attack.

General Marshall stated that, according to United States reports, no Kuomintang troops were involved in the incident, that the Communists really made a surprise attack. As statements from both sides do not agree, General Marshall considered the feasibility of dispatching a field team to investigate. Finally it was decided upon that a field team be sent. The Communists urged that the investigation be made as early as possible. I wired Chief of Staff Yeh to make further investigations. According to telephone message received today, the Kuomintang are inclined to delay the matter. The reason seems to be that there have been preparations for war at Shiang-ho and Pao-ti, hence their reluctance to have the field team dispatched. Occupation of Shiang-ho and Pao-ti would considerably increase the difficulty of the investigation.

In the first place, the occurrence of this incident is most unfortunate regardless which side is responsible.

In the second place, I was in favor of an investigation immediately after the incident happened.

In the third place, delay in dispatching a field team for investigation may give rise to unforeseen developments.

In the fourth place, I make the following statement on behalf of the Chinese Communists Party: The Chinese Communists never purposely created the incident with a view to forcing the United States forces to withdraw from China as is so often supposed. For by doing so the Chinese Communists would lose United States friendship; they are not so unwise. General Marshall requested the view of the Chinese Communists on a suggestion made by him that the garrisons of the United States troops in north China be taken over by the 2nd Army of the Kuomintang. It should follow that the withdrawal of the U. S. troops can be effected by other methods rather than creating incidents. General Marshall once mentioned that each U. S. patrol group consisted of 42 men and 13 vehicles. From the military point of view, a patrol group has duties to fight. The essential point is from which side provoked first originated, or how the incident started. For this reason the sooner the field team is dispatched the better.

In addition, I like to stress on a point which deserves consideration. Is the Kuomintang using it as a pretext to provoke conflict between the Communists and the Americans? While Mr. Kan Nai-kuang⁴¹ was in the Philippines, some Americans informed him that there was no more civil war in the Philippines and they expressed hope that China might expedite to reach settlement. General Marshall and Doctor Stuart are, of course, advocates of peace for China. But the speeches and opinions of some American quarters often encourage the activities of the war-mongers of Kuomintang. I can assure you that the Communists have no intention whatsoever to clash with the United States. The Chinese Communists wish to achieve Chinese-American-British-Soviet cooperation through Sino-American cooperation. On the contrary, the war-mongers of Kuomintang are provoking World War III, driving the Communists into the arms of the Soviet Union and exclusively receiving United States aid. I am speaking frankly that the Communists are not satisfied with part of the United States policy, for example, the garrisoning of United States troops in China has actually benefitted the Kuomintang tremendously. It not only denies benefits for the Communists, but has even sustained harm for the latter. As for the Executive Headquarters, both Government and Communists have received blessing from it. Resentment of the presence of United States troops in China is hotter among the lower classes than the higher classes of the Communists. For example, the 10 years’ extension of United States military aid to China and the extension of Lend-Lease make the Communists feel such aid prior to the formation of a coalition government would become capital of the Kuomintang to attack the Communists. It is this part of the U. S. policy that has met the fiercest resentment. Since the arrival of General Marshall, his great achievements for the unity of China have given light for the future of the Communists. The Communists even put into oblivion the movement of Kuomintang troops by the U. S. forces. However, inasmuch as the PCC decisions are overthrown and the U. S. Congress approved the extension of the Lend-Lease, fear on the part of the Communists become[s] inevitable.

Mister Fugh: In view of the feeling of unrest among the lower level members of the Communist Party toward the United States troops in China, was the Anping incident caused by such a feeling?

General Chou: Such feeling is present on both Chinese and American sides. On the American side, there is a feeling expounded by a group of Americans that they have helped China to win the war against Japan. Now they are responsible to protect the railroad and should have the freedom to move in all directions. They feel resentful whenever they are interfered [with]. But they lack the understanding toward both the Government and the Communist troops. Take the incident in which the 7 Marines were captured for instance. Both reports from the American and the Communist Party stated that American troops opened fire. American soldiers frequently fire their guns just for fun. But on the Chinese side, it is felt that whenever a gun is fired, there is intention to attack, particularly in the areas where a tense military situation between the Government and the Communists is in existence. Therefore, before a thorough investigation is made on this incident, I do not intend to draw any positive conclusion. I also hope that you will tell General Marshall that the earlier the investigation team is sent the better it is.

Mister Fugh: According to my observation, the Generalissimo personally does not seem to have the intention to emphasize this incident.

General Chou: All problems can be easily solved if we can settle the larger differences first. If we try to solve our problems by starting on the small and odd issues, then a dragging situation will necessarily be created. In the proposal suggested by the Generalissimo this time the focal attention should be given to the fact that it does not mention that the problem of local government, after evacuation in Northern Kiangsu and other areas is to be solved by the PCC. The breakdown of negotiations at the end of June by the refusal of the Communist Party to accept the proposal, was caused by the fact that it was contrary to PCC decisions. During July, the negotiation was continued by Mr. Shao Li Tse, General Chen Cheng and Dr. Wang Shih-chieh and it was still centered on these four areas (mentioned fewer areas than this time—withdraw into 2½ provinces and Yenki area in Manchuria; and must evacuate all areas in Shansi and Shantung occupied since 7 June). Finally the Government conceded that if one area could first be solved, then it will be all right. The conditions stipulated this time are more than previously. For instance, should the areas occupied by Government troops in Shansi and Shantung also be evacuated. It should also be noted that in the fourth document of the supplementary paper⁴² to the Army Reorganization Plan, it has already been stipulated regarding troop disposition areas in both Manchuria and China Proper. The demands made this time are greater than all demands made previously. It seems that they have no sincerity in seeking a solution.

Mister Fugh: Among these demands, which ones can be immediately discussed, which ones can not at all be considered, and which ones can be reserved for future negotiation?

General Chou: The Generalissimo feels that General Marshall’s proposal in solving the present situation is too complicated. He wants to solve it on the basis of solving the problem of troop disposition areas. The Communist Party however insists that the solution must be based on General Marshall’s line of thought and it should allow the organization of people-governments in various areas, and then, we can proceed on the reorganization and integration of the Army. The viewpoints on both sides are totally different. On 20 July, the Generalissimo had said: “I have given you several provinces, you should therefore evacuate from certain provinces.” This kind of attitude is not what the Communist Party would I desire.

Mister Fugh: In the forthcoming reorganized Government, Communist Party and Kuomintang will be merged into one body. There seems to be no need in insisting on certain areas in the present negotiation.

General Chou: This point is very true and we cannot understand it either.

Doctor Stuart: To how many stipulations in this proposal can you agree?

General Chou: I can agree to none.

Doctor Stuart: Is it meant then there is no hope for peace?

General Chou: There are four ways the Generalissimo views the present situation: (1) Accomplish his aim by force, then negotiate. (2) Since General Marshall and Ambassador Stuart are here to negotiate peace and therefore cannot be rejected, he brought forth the above demands. (3) Fight on one hand and negotiate on the other. (4) If the Communist Party refuses to negotiate, then he can place the responsibility of civil war on the Communist Party.

It may be that the Generalissimo brought up these unreasonable demands because he feels that he is militarily victorious according to reports from his field commanders. It is noted that he is in a much more favorable position militarily than the time when General Marshall first arrived in China. The Government now possesses an air force and a Navy through the Americans. It has completed the project in transporting troops to Manchuria and North China. It has also taken over many large cities in the Northeast. He believes that within three months or so, he can accomplish his aims.

Mister Fugh: Ambassador Stuart feels that if the Government and the Communist Party cannot reach a compromise, the only way is to suspend negotiations temporarily pending further developments?

General Chou: Then how about the Chinese people. This way, the civil war will necessarily be prolonged.

Mister Fugh: Ambassador Stuart is always sympathetic towards the Chinese people. But the difficulty in the present negotiations cannot be solved by one man.

General Chou: Prior to 29 June, I already conceded that we could make concessions militarily, but no more concessions could be made on political issues. We had agreed that no troops will be stationed along the Tsingtao–Tsinan Railroad. On the problem of Chengte, the Generalissimo also had promised not to discuss it for the time being. In Manchuria we had agreed to evacuate Harbin provided the Government troops there would not exceed 5,000 and that the Mayor will be appointed by the Government with the approval of the Communist Party. The Antung problem could also be considered. Regarding item (d) and item (e) in this proposal, they were not mentioned before. Furthermore, the issues in these two items were agreed upon in the fourth document of the supplementary paper of the Army Reorganization Plan on 29 June—in Manchuria the situation must be returned to the conditions existing on 7 June, and in North China the situation must be returned to conditions existing on 13 January.

Doctor Stuart: If this is the case, then is there no hope for peace?

General Chou: It seems that there is no way to conduct the negotiations, in the light of President Chiang’s way of talking. What we are demanding are still unconditional cease-fire and convocation of the Committees of the PCC. In regard to military matters, Ambassador Stuart had said that they fell within the sphere of General Marshall and the best thing is still to request General Marshall to consider them, this is because he is more familiar with the proceeding of such issues. According to Ambassador Stuart’s way of looking at it, it seems that the Chinese Communists cannot accept any of the five points presented by President Chiang. In reality this is an unsolved problem as contained in General Marshall’s four documents. The Chinese Communists have time and again made many concessions.

Can we wait till General Marshall returns and then we hold a joint discussion to see whether there is a way to settlement?

Doctor Stuart: Will there be ways and means after General Marshall returns?

General Chou: Yes, the U. S. attitude is that the U. S. certainly hopes that some democratic elements lead both the Government and Communist authorities, but in actual practice China has no such elements. Since the Northeastern incident, the U. S. has been feeling that the Communist strength is growing too strong that it might not be beneficial to the United States. In connection with such fears, ways and means should be sought to make observation on other aspects and to banish such fears. Otherwise, there will be two results, namely:

(1) The Chinese Civil war will be prolonged and aggravated, which will not be beneficial to the United States. Nor will the United States be able to render open help to Kuomintang. The consequence will be a permanent civil war in China.

(2) International intervention or the United Nations may send an investigation party to conduct an investigation, neither of which will render any good to China.

Therefore the U. S. should continue to arbitrate the China issue, but must also consider whether or not the Chinese Communists are to be feared and whether or not cooperation with them is impractical. Recognizing Soviet and British special privileges at Port Arthur and Hong Kong respectively one must not forget that U. S. special privileges also exist in China. They are “open door” and freedom of trade. Owing to the superior quality of American goods, the U. S. has already, imperceptibly, acquired the market in China. Although the U. S. has no other designs subjectively, she has, objectively, gained the first special privilege in China. Only until such time that the U. S. has helped China to industrialize herself can such special privileges be abolished. Ambassador Stuart is a lover of China, I am sure he feels that such powers are irresistible and that they can only be diverted to aid China. The Soviet Union and Great Britain recognized what [that?] they possess special privileges. It is easy to predict that the U. S. must occupy a No. 1 position in China when Roosevelt gave recognition to Soviet special privileges in the Northeast at the Yalta Conference.⁴³ He had extraordinary foresight. His death is surely a great loss to the world. We agree with the policy formulated after General Marshall’s arrival, we hope the U. S. will still be able to continue to implement it.

On the question of veto power, its use will be limited to the overthrowing of proposals on the PCC Outline. It must obtain a majority of over two-thirds votes. Other matters are not bound by this restriction.

On the question of cease-fire, should General Marshall feel there is danger of conflict in a certain locality, I can assure him that there is no such danger. I agree to send Americans to any area for investigation. This is an evidence that the Chinese Communists have no desire for civil war.

Will the U. S. participate in the war should fighting continue and peace become hopeless?

Doctor Stuart: Consideration should be given as [to] what attitude the U. S. should adopt under such circumstances. If the Chinese Communists cannot accept President Chiang’s terms, I am afraid we will not get anywhere even after General Marshall returns here.

General Chou: General Marshall had said that he would take up military matters while Ambassador Stuart tackles the political issues. What President Chiang had talked are military problems. If the U. S. China policy will still be handled by General Marshall for implementation he may accomplish his peace mission. Of course I hope General Marshall will continue to strive hard. But if the U. S. should change its policy to assist Kuomintang to annihilate the Communist Party, there is no necessity for him to strive in that line. I do not believe, however that the U. S. would act likewise.

Dr. Stuart: Should this be the situation, I think we will have to resume our talks after General Marshall has finished with the Military issues.

General Chou: Why can’t President Chiang discuss political matters with Ambassador Stuart? When talks on military subject are held with General Marshall, he can also bring forth political issues simultaneously. At least the Communists can yield so as to allow military and political discussions be held simultaneously. I cannot accept the provision of the so-called previous decision on the five points. If I am to accept it, it can be considered only as an unsolved problem of military matters. If it is to be a subject of political talks, it cannot be regarded as a provision that must be decided upon previously. Only under these conditions can I accept it and discuss it. The reason is that local administrative authority is always a part of political talks.

39. Kiaochow (–Tsingtao)–Tsinan.
40. Peiping–Liaoning (Mukden).
41. Chinese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs.
42. Not printed; substantially the same as the draft of June 29, p. 1246.
43. See agreement signed February 11, 1945, Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 984.