Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, August 3, 1946, 11 a.m.
| Also present: | Colonel Hutchin |
| Mr. Chang |
General Marshall: (Opened the meeting by handing General Chou a copy of the last report33 on the ambush of the Marine convoy).
Dr. Stuart had a long conference with the Generalissimo. His proposal was that a special committee be organized with Dr. Stuart as the chairman for the purpose of reaching an agreement for the immediate organization of the State Council. Such a committee would be informal, in a sense that is, it should meet in Nanking and not Kuling. He (Dr. Stuart) stated in a message to me that the Generalissimo seemed to have agreed in principle with the proposal, but wished to delay any decision until he had discussed the matter again with Dr. Stuart and with me. I notified Dr. Stuart to remain in Kuling until I arrived there. That is the basis for the discussion with the Generalissimo at the present time.
Now I hope to have an immediate meeting with the Generalissimo so that Dr. Stuart can return here tomorrow and see General Chou. I will probably remain there with the Generalissimo in order to have some quick means of taking up with him the points reported to me by Dr. Stuart that represent a difference and regarding which the Government representatives do not seem to have the authority to negotiate. However, I will have to let the progress of events decide my movements. In these matters it has seemed best to me to utilize Dr. Stuart so far as possible in the political negotiations instead of myself because it not only obviates the necessity for an interpreter which slows down all talks a great deal, but he knows most of the individuals personally as well as having a special understanding of Chinese reactions, procedure and political history.
General Chou: Of course it is a good thing that along with the negotiations for truce we will try to settle the question of the Government reorganization. We will have to wait to see what kind of a procedure will be adopted. Of course I will wait for Dr. Stuart to [Page 1444] come here to learn the results of his discussion with the Generalissimo. I wonder if the Government is now trying to stall by initiating the political discussions while on the military side a full-fledged civil war is being waged and in view of this situation the efforts toward political settlement may again be defeated. That is what I am worried about. Now I have received two reports which are of a serious nature. The first one is at noon yesterday Yenan was bombed as may also be testified by the American liaison officers there. 7 Nationalist planes of which 6 are P–47’s and 1 B–24 came from the southern direction. The first strafed the outskirts of the city for over twenty minutes, shooting over 10,000 machine gun bullets. Subsequently they released 11 bombs. They had two places as targets. The first one is the airfield and one Nationalist B–24 plane which came over to the Communist area from Kunming the end of June was destroyed. The second target place is near Wang-chia-ping. That is the place where you met Chairman Mao Tse Tung and General Chu Teh and where Chairman Mao is living. I am still awaiting detailed report about the casualties.
The American liaison officers also helped to examine the pieces of the bombs and bullet shells and testify that they are American made and are of the time bomb type.
The second report is that definite instructions have been issued to the Nationalist Hsuchow headquarters (General Hsueh Yueh and General Cheng Hsueh Chung) that a general offensive will be launched today northward along the Tientsin–Pukow railroad toward the southern part of Shantung. The offensive will be taken up in three routes. The first is on the eastern route from Haichow, the eastern terminus of the Lunghai railroad, toward Lin-i, the Communist headquarters of the New Fourth Army. The central route is from Hsuchow toward Taier-chuang, which lies south of Tsao-chuang. The western route is from Hsuchow along the Tientsin–Pukow railroad toward Teng-hsien. It is planned to reach these objectives within two or three weeks to reach the line Lin-i–Teng-hsien. For that purpose the army units, which comprise six army units, now stationed at Haichow and Hsuchow are deployed. This information is absolutely reliable that the attack will be opened today.
When I relayed day before yesterday that the Government is planning to attack in seven areas, I did not take the Tientsin–Hsuchow section into consideration. I did not expect that the attack in this section will be opened right now, but now instead of seven we have eight places. The purpose of the Government is obvious. They hope during the process of negotiation to occupy all those previously mentioned places; namely, to annihilate the Communists in Hupeh, to occupy north Kiangsu, to clear the Tsingtao–Tsinan railroad and the [Page 1445] southern section of the Tungpu railroad, and to seize Chengte, Antung, Harbin, and now plus the Tientsin–Pukou railroad. They try by these means to obtain their purpose and that explains why they refused our representative in Hsian, Mr. Chou, to meet the chairman of the 9th and 32d field teams which by now arrived at Hsian. The field teams cannot enjoy free movement. This shows that they are unwilling to cease their attack upon the Communist troops in Hupeh.
On the other hand, we now have the bombing of Yenan. The purpose can be nothing less than to get the Communist Party provoked to plunge into the total civil war. That purpose can also be detected from two pieces of propaganda. The first one is the statement recently made by Doctor Peng, Minister of Information, in Kuling in which he stated that ultimately we will reach a political settlement but it will take some time. By that he implies that the negotiation will be drawn out so as to enable the Government to reach its military purpose in the meantime.
Secondly, is the public speech given by a war minded general in which he stated that if the Communist Party would accept a total civil war then it would greatly facilitate a settlement. This shows their intention to get us drawn into a total war.
The situation now put before us is very complicated. While the negotiations are being drawn out the fighting will be spread out. Suppose the Communists, instead of playing a peaceful part, go over into some places to the active side. Then the areas of conflict will be enlarged and this may provide an opportunity for the Generalissimo to manoeuver in such a way that if we would yet concede to his demands in the negotiation so that he can lay hold on the disputed places then he can call off the fighting. If his desire with regard to those eight places are not complied with and the fighting is being intensified then he can make an announcement about a general civil war. Such a situation is extremely dangerous. Therefore I am thinking that if we do not approach the problem from effecting a truce first, we may face such a situation that while we are talking about the political matters the fighting will be more and more intensified and it may get completely lost. Therefore I am still of the opinion that while the political discussion is going on we must find means of effecting a truce. It can be accomplished either by the announcement of a general truce, or by effecting the truce piecemeal as I explained last time, instead of intensifying the war.
As to the bombing of Yenan, I have not yet received any instruction from Yenan, but merely information. Therefore, I reserve the right to make further comment.
General Marshall: I would like to point out to you at this moment that the proposition to have the political discussion at this time was [Page 1446] suggested by Dr. Stuart. It was not the proposal of the Government.
General Chou: It is true that the proposition of opening the political discussion is brought up by Dr. Stuart, but what I meant to say is that the Government would not flatly refuse such a discussion, but they may have in mind to stall it.
Coming to the Marine incident in the neighborhood of Peiping, all sides have agreed to send a special mission to investigate the situation. I would rather wait for the result of the investigation, but right now the Government is intensifying propaganda on this subject. According to the American report you have just shown me, and which was published in the papers yesterday, the American side claims that it is a raid upon the American personnel. The report I received from our side, which was submitted by the local commanders to Commissioner Yeh and relayed to me is essentially similar to the broadcast released by Yenan which claimed that not only American, but also Nationalist troops were present. Secondly, that the U. S. personnel was a patrol unit which was also admitted by the U. S. Marines. It is further said that they have patrolled that point for three times. It is essentially of a military nature. Thirdly, that place where the incident took place belongs to the Communist liberated area because the highway between Peiping and Tientsin goes through the Communist area. In that respect it is different. I don’t know what was the procedure in the past for the passers-by but, as a normal procedure, notification should be given before they pass. The American report also admitted some firing took place and both sides sustained casualties. The papers reported the American headquarters in Peiping gave the figure of Communist casualties as 8 dead and over 10 wounded. Judging from the report I have received from my side, it seems that the whole matter is still worthy of investigation. I am particularly interested to find out how the incident was provoked, whether the Nationalists are involved in the matter. Of course I am perfectly willing to wait for the result of the investigation made by the special mission, that the responsibility will be determined. It is most probable that the Generalissimo will utilize this incident to intensify the military warfare and which is worthy of serious attention.
General Marshall: I have not previously heard of the bombing of Yenan. I can understand the probable purpose of the Government in destroying the bombing plane that had previously landed there. I don’t understand the purpose of bombing elsewhere in Yenan. No report has come from our detachment there. I assume that one will be received within the course of the day. I am aware of the rapidly disintegrating military situation. I am intensely desirous for having an order issued for the cessation of hostilities, as is Dr. Stuart. The problem on our part is how to get an agreement to permit the issuance [Page 1447] of that order immediately. That is what we are struggling towards at the present time. That was one reason I regretted so much the incident of the Marine Corps just at this particular moment because I felt that the Chinese Government would probably react to the incident in a manner that was not conducive to a cessation of hostilities.
With regard to the situation in Hupeh and Team 9, I received on August 1st a summary of the recommendations of Team 9 submitted to me by General Hsu.34 In that letter it said that Director Chen (Commander in Hankow) radioed a report on 23 July that up to that moment no reply had been received from Li Hsien Nien35 and that his headquarters (Chen’s) and the field teams had really done their best in a last attempt to effect a truce but that Li Hsien-nien had refused to accept mediation. Previously Chen had radioed a report that according to the statement of Colonel Ho Chu Chin that he would return to Hankow if Li Hsien Nien’s representative had not arrived before the 18th of July. Furthermore, that if General Li’s troops did not advance further west then the matter could be completely settled within three or four days. Another radio from Director Chen on the 22d stated that Li Hsien-nien did not come to Hsin-chuang in acceptance of their invitation. Team 9 again dropped leaflets on the 21st of July asking Li to meet with Field Team 32, that if Li failed to appear the teams would fly to Peiping for instructions. I gave you the sense of his last radio of the 23d of July. This communication further states that an agreement was reached by teams 9 and 32 on 15 July near Lao-ho-kou that the Government representative had agreed to a cease fire on both sides for a period of 24 hours pending the arrival of a representative of General Li’s headquarters. Those are just some of the items of information that the Government sent me which I transmitted to the Commissioners in Peiping, but which would not have reached them on the critical date of August 2 that General Chou referred to in his statement. I am going to take up to Dr. Stuart a copy of General Chou’s remarks to me today and those of the other day. Is there anything further that General Chou would like me to tell Doctor Stuart.
General Chou: With regard to Doctor Stuart, I share the view of having an informal meeting regarding the Government reorganization. I think that as soon as some suitable basis has been reached the whole plan should be passed as a formality by the steering committee of the PCC because this is the normal procedure, and I would also like to remind Doctor Stuart to get in touch with the other parties in the course of discussion so that they will not feel that they are completely [Page 1448] detached from the discussion. I have mentioned the last point to Doctor Stuart but I would like to remind him.
I have a few remarks regarding General Li Hsien Nien’s affairs. I received a similar memo from General Hsu enumerating the points you just outlined but to me it appears the crucial issue now is that General Li is constantly being pursued by the Government troops. He therefore cannot bring his troops to a stop because when he stops fighting will occur and his chief concern is to avoid fighting. If he stops, he must prepare for fighting. By now the field teams have arrived at Hsian. The 8th Route Army has one office in Hsian and its director, Mr. Chou, can make negotiations with the Government side and the field teams in behalf of General Li and then he will inform General Li to send his own men out to Hsian to conclude the negotiation. Therefore, what we should now do is instruct Executive Headquarters to communicate to General Hu Chung Nan to permit Mr. Chou, Director of the Communist Office, to contact the field teams and to talk with them on behalf of General Li.
Meeting was adjourned.